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Preface
Across the globe, communities and their civic and business leaders find 
themselves increasingly preoccupied with the mobility of capital, most tangi-
bly in the pressures to produce large incentives packages to attract and retain 
private sector employers. Each individual expression, interest, or demand for 
concessions sets off flurries of energy, negotiations, and press furor. Entire 
communities are plunged into considerable anxiety, often in a cloud of un-
certainty about what is being offered or threatened, their options, and the out-
comes. Information is imperfect, and the “market for jobs” imbalanced. Cities 
and regions may lose their bids and wonder if they offered too little or whether 
the outcome had been decided long before the bidding. Or, they may win and 
find that the promised jobs do not materialize, or are short-lived, or go to new-
comers who drive up the local cost of living. Worse, they may find that the op-
portunity cost of subsidies is stiff. Investments in infrastructure, human capital, 
or entrepreneurship that would do more for diversified local development are 
foregone, while state and local government have a hard time meeting operating 
costs because of tax giveaways over the long term.
This book explores the causes, character, and potential remedies for the 
growing spatial competition for capital. The authors, from the United States 
and Europe, are economists, political scientists, lawyers, and nonprofit pub-
lic policy leaders. Each was invited to give a paper at a spring 2004 confer-
ence, Reining	 in	 the	 Competition	 for	 Capital, hosted by the University of 
Minnesota’s Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs. Each author was chosen 
for his or her unique expertise and proven track record in path-breaking intel-
lectual contributions and workable policy solutions on the subject of incentive 
competition. Before the conference, each submitted a draft for public Web-
based distribution. At the conference, each paper was presented and responded 
to by a panel of three commentators from diverse walks of life, followed by a 
20-minute debate by the larger audience. We strived to ensure that every point 
of view was represented in the debate, from site consultants, mayors, and sub-
sidy critics to Federal Reserve Bank vice presidents and members of Congress, 
as the acknowledgements below demonstrate. At the close of formal sessions, 
all participants were invited to a two-hour discussion, where new directions for 
action and research were debated. All these lively intellectual encounters were 
incorporated into the authors’ final drafts and our overview. 
Five conclusions emerge from this project. First, the phenomenon of in-
terregional competition for capital is increasing in intensity and becoming 
a pressing problem for many governments, regions, and communities. It is 
spreading across the globe, especially in larger countries with decentralized 
vii
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fiscal responsibility for economic development planning. The book tracks the 
proliferation of this competition from the United States, where it is almost 
completely uncontrolled, and Europe, where it is severely regulated, to coun-
tries like Brazil and India, where large multinational corporations seeking to 
locate branch plants are effectively using techniques developed in the United 
States to extract large concessions from inexperienced state governments. 
Second, the spread of incentive competition has been facilitated by insti-
tutional innovations in the market for jobs and tax base, especially the rise of 
site consultants, many working for large multinational accounting firms. These 
spatial job brokers extract the potential rents inherent in plant location deals 
from communities and sell them to companies “supplying” jobs. The absence 
of regulation of site consultants—the fact that they are not prohibited from 
working both sides of the market simultaneously and work on a commission 
basis—worsens the quality of information open to the “buying” community in 
an incentive market where firms have a monopolistic position to begin with.
Third, ideas and politics weigh heavily in the game of incentive competi-
tion. Three distinctive views of the problem vie for attention. Some economists 
argue that all subnational incentives for individual firms should simply be out-
lawed (or taxed away by national governments) because they distort competi-
tion. Other economists, building on the famous Tiebout “voting with their feet” 
celebration of independent local governments in metropolitan areas, argue that 
incentive competition is healthy and efficient. Yet other economists believe 
that well-structured incentives can produce beneficial regional economic de-
velopment. For this group, the challenge is how to structure them to achieve 
local and interregional welfare in an imperfect market. We unpack these three 
views, each grounded in economic reasoning, and show how they are variously 
espoused by protagonists and brokers in the market for jobs. We also explore 
the insights of political scientists who contribute an understanding of political 
imperatives and motivations to the mix. As a group, with some nuanced dis-
agreement, the authors espouse the third, middle-ground position. 
Fourth, opportunity costs are given very short shrift in the drama of incen-
tive competition. All energies, in the exciting and often very rapid (and some-
times secretive) bidding to attract or retain a plant or office, are focused on the 
particular terms. Media, political, and policy discussions rarely weigh the par-
ticular incentive, its cost over the long term and hypothetical benefits, against 
alternative uses of the same resources for the community. Tax expenditures in 
particular seem costless, since they are not included in budgets explicitly and 
are only paid out over the long term. Several of the papers argue for unified and 
long-term economic development budgets that clarify for decision makers and 
citizens the true costs of each package offered and the foregone opportunities 
to allocate the resources involved to other private sector developments such as 
viii
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incubators and venture capital funds for local start-ups, to education and job 
training investments in the existing workforce, or to infrastructure and ameni-
ties that would make the region more attractive to both firms and workers as a 
place to do business and live. 
Fifth, reforms that rein in the competition for capital and ensure that it 
serves legitimate job-creating ends are possible, have been pioneered in a num-
ber of nations, regions, and localities, and are espoused by a growing move-
ment of diverse constituents. The European system, which prohibits company 
subsidies except under very strict conditions and then only if permitted by the 
European Commissions’ regulatory agency, effectively limits subsidy compe-
tition by discouraging most offers from ever being made. It requires a fairly 
large regulatory apparatus. However, American experts and admirers largely 
agree that a similar national regulatory system for the United States is politi-
cally very unlikely in the near future. Instead, pioneering innovations at the 
state and local levels are more likely to be successfully built into modifications 
to current law at all levels in the federal system. 
The authors in this volume present a broad set of such workable reforms, 
including regulation of site consultants; mandated transparency in negotia-
tions, bids, and deals; better structured deals (e.g., shorter-term incentives, 
pay-as-you-go arrangements); performance requirements and clawbacks for 
subsidized firms; and adoption of unified economic development budgets. In 
these carefully structured and hard-fought reforms, the authors conclude, lie 
the solutions to the excesses of subsidy competition. Successful reform will 
preserve subnational governments’ abilities to tailor and pursue economic de-
velopment goals to maximize benefits for their communities while eliminating 
the uneven playing field that results in disappointing employment or tax base 
outcomes or impoverishment of the local treasury.
We thank the Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs and its Dean, J. Brian 
Atwood, for the resources to hold the conference as part of the Institute’s 
Signature Studies initiative, and to Professor Robert Kudrle and Jill Buckley 
for shepherding it through the process. Thanks to my Humphrey Institute col-
leagues for their feedback from a seminar on this topic, especially Joe Ritter. 
The Project on Regional and Industrial Economics’ two extraordinary assis-
tants, Michael Leary and Katherine Murphy, handled all the arrangements for 
the conference and guided the book manuscript through its preproduction stag-
es. Research assistants Christina Connelly and Katherine Nesse did prodigious 
amounts of literature review and contacted numerous worldwide experts. Our 
thanks to Kevin Hollenbeck, the publications director at the Upjohn Institute, 
for his efficient handing of the book preparation and production process, and 
to Allison Hewitt Colosky and Richard Wyrwa for copyediting and marketing 
work. 
ix
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We are grateful to the session chairs and official commentators on papers 
at the conference, some of whom also helped us update the papers. For the ses-
sion on Kenneth Thomas’s paper: George Latimer, former mayor of St. Paul, 
Minnesota; William Testa, vice president, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago; 
Roderick Meicklejohn, head of competition policy section, directorate-gen-
eral for economic and financial affairs, European Union; Stephen Quick, 
Inter-American Development Bank. For the session on Peter Fisher’s paper: 
Matt Kane, Northeast-Midwest Institute; Art Rolnick, vice president, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis; Frank Mauro, executive director, Fiscal Policy 
Institute, Albany, NY; and Senator John Hottinger, Minnesota State Senate. 
For the session on Adinda Sinnaeve’s keynote: Chris Farrell, Minnesota Public 
Radio; and Roy Malmrose, U.S. Trade Representative’s Office, Washington, 
DC. For the session on Timothy Bartik’s paper: Rebecca Yanisch, Chandler 
Group Executive Search, Inc.; Laura Kalambokidis, professor of applied eco-
nomics, University of Minnesota; Robert Isaacson, research director, Minnesota 
Department of Employment and Economic Development; and Steve Mercil, 
Minnesota Investment Network Corporation. For the session on Rachel 
Weber’s paper: Sean Kershaw, president, Minnesota Citizen’s League; John 
Chell, executive director, Arrowhead Regional Development Commission; 
Tracy Gray-Barkan, research/policy analyst, Los Angeles Alliance for a New 
Economy; and Bruce Maus, president, Corporate Real Estate, Inc., Eagan, 
Minnesota. For the session on the paper by Udo Prestchker of the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris (not included in this vol-
ume; accessible at www.hhh.umn.edu/projects/prie/c4c_papers.html): Curtis 
Johnson, CitiStates Group, St. Paul, Minnesota; Virginia Carlson, professor 
of urban and regional planning, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee and 
the Brookings Institution; Mark Ritchie, president, Institute for Agricultural 
and Trade Policy, Minneapolis; and Enrique Dussel Peters, professor, gradu-
ate school of economics, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Mexico 
City. For the session on William Schweke’s paper: Joel Kramer, executive di-
rector, growth and justice, Minneapolis; Robert Lynch, professor of econom-
ics, Washington College and the Economic Policy Institute; Nancy Straw, 
president, West Central Initiative, Minnesota; Kris Jacobs, executive director, 
JOBS NOW Coalition, St. Paul; and Dr. Joel Yudken, economist, AFL-CIO, 
Washington DC. For the session on Greg LeRoy’s paper: Dave Hage, editorial 
board, Minneapolis Star-Tribune; Andrew Isserman, professor of economics 
and urban planning, University of Illinois, Urbana–Champaign; David Minge, 
Circuit Court, former U.S. Congressman, Minnesota; and Lee Munnich, direc-
tor, state and local policy program, Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs. 
Many others made contributions to this project through their participation 
in the conference and willingness to speak with us at various stages and share 
x
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their insights and their written work: Melvin Burstein, former vice president and 
general counsel, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis; Joe Cortright, direc-
tor, Impresa Consulting, Portland, Oregon; Paul Cheshire, professor, London 
School of Economics; Robert Chirinko, professor, Emory University; Clelio 
Campolina Diniz, professor, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais; Kevin 
Fletcher, economist, International Monetary Fund; Michael Luger, professor, 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Kenan-Flagler Business School; 
Elizabeth Lynn, assistant director, McCune Foundation; Ted Moran, assistant 
professor, Georgetown University; Clarisse Morgan, counsellor, rules division, 
World Trade Organization; Phedon Nicolaides, professor, European Institute 
of Public Administration in Maastricht (Netherlands); Alan Peters, professor, 
University of Iowa; Michael Schuman, former director, Green Policy Institute; 
Beth Siegel, president, Mt. Auburn Associates, Somerville, Massachusetts; 
Tom Stinson, state economist, Minnesota Department of Finance; Robert 
Stumberg, professor, Georgetown University, Harrison Institute for Public 
Law; Robert Tannenwald, vice president, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston; 
Bill Waren, adjunct professor, Georgetown University, Harrison Institute for 
Public Law; Al Watkins, science and technology program coordinator, World 
Bank; Daniel Wilson, economist, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco; and 
Fiona Wishlade, director, European Policies Research Centre. 
Above all, my thanks to the authors of the papers in this volume for the 
quality of their work, the original ideas they contributed, the time they spent 
on this project, and the feedback they gave for our overview. I hope that the 
volume as a whole makes a substantial contribution to an understanding of the 
historical trends and institutional and behavioral context for incentive competi-
tion, and that the ideas and experience shared herein will help to encourage ac-
tive, efficient, equitable, and environmentally sustainable local economic de-
velopment practices while conserving public resources and avoiding the waste 
in beggar-thy-neighbor competitions. 
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Incentive competition is on the rise. It is costly, generally inefficient, 
and often ineffective even for the winning regions. Yet some regions do 
very well by attracting large, new facilities that create sustained jobs, 
bolster the tax base, and have multiplier effects. The nation states of Eu-
rope have developed an effective regulatory system that curtails abuse, 
but the United States, Canada, and Australia have grappled with forms 
of cooperation and regulation less successfully. Incentive competition 
is spreading to developing countries, especially as responsibility for 
and fiscal capacity to support economic development have devolved 
to subnational levels of government. Local governments also compete 
for mobile capital, export-oriented as well as retail. Incentive competi-
tion for capital is an increasingly important public policy issue, because 
it consumes considerable resources, alters the spatial distribution of 
economic activity, and entails large opportunity costs for citizens and 
businesses. 
In this chapter, we argue that incentive competition cannot be ad-
equately approached in a game theoretic, microeconomic fashion. The 
phenomenon deserves a historical explanation that probes national and 
global institutional and political changes shaping the rise and character 
of bidding wars. Our treatment is thus interdisciplinary, incorporating 
insights from economics, economic history, geography and regional 
science, political science, political sociology, and urban and regional 
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planning. This chapter is both an original interpretation of the origins 
and analytics of the “regional market for jobs and tax capacity” and an 
introduction to and framing of the contributions in the volume. 
We first show that incentive competition is proliferating, not just in 
the United States and other OECD countries, but also in large, devel-
oping countries with federal power sharing, such as Brazil, India, and 
China. Many more state and local governments have been thrust into 
such competition worldwide, and the total amount spent on incentive 
competition has been rising rapidly. Incentive competition is also wax-
ing among nations, and we explore briefly how the policy and institu-
tional environment differs in these cases. 
In an effort to analyze the source of this trend, we offer an institu-
tional and political interpretation of the rise of incentive competition. 
To economic and geographic causes such as falling transportation and 
communication costs, vertical disintegration of firms, and a greater spa-
tial division of labor within firms, we stress three additional develop-
ments: the rise of site consultants who broker deals between firms and 
governments; the spread of devolution across the globe, with its delega-
tion of responsibility for economic development to subnational govern-
ments; and the significance of politics and political calculus on the part 
of participating governments. 
We then contrast three different approaches to incentive competi-
tion, each with its own economic logic and cast of characters. First, we 
review the relatively benign view that incentive competition is a healthy 
way for communities to compete for mobile firms with optimal pack-
ages of public services at tax prices and that the outcome is efficient. 
We review the prisoner’s dilemma approach, which views incentive 
competition in game-analytic terms and concludes that it has at best a 
zero sum and at worst a negative efficiency outcome. We offer our own 
model, what we call the “market for jobs and fiscal capacity” approach, 
in which information asymmetries not only disadvantage government 
competitors for jobs but are created and maintained as rent-producing 
devices through the intermediation of the site consulting industry. For 
each of the three competing theories, we identify the conceptualiza-
tion of the market in which incentives are negotiated, the actors and 
their assumed behavior, market outcomes, normative underpinnings, 
and strengths and weaknesses from both analytical and policy points 
of view. 
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Our model, with its explicit institutional and political dimensions, 
favors the retention of local government’s ability to allocate resources to 
and regulate economic development activity but advocates reforms that 
will improve the performance of the market for jobs. This position, in 
contrast to the “leave it alone, it is good” or the “tax or regulate it away” 
recommendations of the other approaches, is compatible with most of 
the findings and recommendations of other authors in this volume. 
We then ask what is known about the outcomes of incentive com-
petition, referring to various contributions in this volume and others’ 
work. We find it quite mixed. In some cases, incentives can and do cre-
ate jobs and enhance the tax base in ways that are efficient, equitable, 
and environmentally benign. But microeconomic theoretic approaches 
limit the assessment of outcomes too narrowly, and the political drama 
of incentive competition tends to crowd out other economic develop-
ment paths. We challenge the implicit premise that external investments 
of plants or facilities are the only route to regional economic develop-
ment, reviewing the evolution of export base theory. Endogenous en-
trepreneurial activity, investments in human capital and amenities, and 
even reshaping local consumption patterns can yield significant long-
term job growth. Bidding wars divert decision-makers’ attention from a 
broader portfolio of economic development tools and options. Incentive 
packages thus incur large opportunity costs. We argue for a unified eco-
nomic development budget as a policy innovation for evaluating and 
improving incentive offers. We support many of the reforms spelled out 
by the other authors in this volume. 
IS THE GEoGRAPHIC CoMPETITIoN FoR  
CAPITAL INCREASING?
Many writers and economy watchers contend that the spatial com-
petition for capital is increasing and more intense than ever. In this vol-
ume, both Kenneth Thomas and Timothy Bartik make this statement, 
echoing notable book-length treatments by Bluestone and Harrison 
(1982); Noponen, Graham, and Markusen (1993); and more recently 
Friedman (2006). Little hard evidence is offered for this view beyond 
the surge in transnational capital flows and internationally traded com-
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modities, concentrated deindustrialization, and an appeal to our com-
mon experience. Thomas’s argument is that greater fluidity of capital 
across regional and national borders increases the number of sites that 
are possible for any particular investment and thus makes the problem 
less manageable for competing governments.
Yet worldwide, regional and local communities with responsibil-
ity for their own economic development perceive that the competition 
for mobile capital, linked to the expectation of extraregional exports, 
is increasing. Many communities are directly affected when compa-
nies show an interest in sites and ask what can be done to help them; 
those that have not been so lucky are interested in becoming candi-
dates. Does a review of national and subnational government behavior 
around the world suggest that competition for mobile physical capital 
has increased? Have governments increased their involvement in bid-
ding wars, and has the size of packages offered increased? Our answer 
is a cautious “yes.”
In the United States, the evidence is fairly strong that incentive 
competition has increased since the 1960s. “Bidding wars” for specific 
plants or facilities have become widespread, with incentive packages 
escalating in total worth. In addition, firms already operating in juris-
dictions are now asking for comparable concessions just to remain open 
and retain jobs. LeRoy (2005) has done a masterful job of documenting 
hundreds of individual cases of successful and failed incentive competi-
tions in the United States over the past 20 years.
Hard evidence of an increase in numbers of governments involved 
and size of incentives is harder to come by, because of the complex-
ity of modeling and testing for change over time. However, two recent 
studies suggest that incentive competition in the United States has in-
creased over the past few decades. Using state-level data on manufac-
turing income, capital and labor and their tax-adjusted prices, Chirinko 
and Wilson (2006) show that investment tax incentives have become in-
creasingly common and increasingly large over the period 1963–2004. 
Peter Fisher, in Chapter 3, cites data showing that in the 1990s, the aver-
age incentive package available to new business investment in 20 U.S. 
states increased from 10 percent to 30 percent of gross business taxes.
The competition for mobile capital in the United States is not solely 
a late twentieth century phenomenon. In the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, communities across the United States competed for agri-
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cultural capital, railroad lines, grain mills, meatpacking plants, and 
steel mills, as well as farmers and workers (Sbragia 1996). Fascinat-
ing histories have been written about the competition for mobile fa-
cilities, public and private, in certain sectors and in entire regions. For 
example, Lotchin (1984) reveals how California cities competed for 
large military bases in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
and Markusen et al. (1991) show how Colorado Springs out-competed 
other U.S. cities for the army air bases, the Air Force Academy, and 
the Space Command from the 1930s to the 1980s. Cobb (1993) reveals 
how southern states crusaded for industrial development by attempting 
to lure branch plants in the period from 1936 to 1990. But the character 
of this competition has changed. In the following section, we address 
the postwar emergence of an organized U.S. “market” for mobile plants 
and the jobs and tax base that they bring, the product of institutional in-
novations that are now spreading to other continents.
Other countries with federal systems have long experienced similar 
subnational competition for large capital investments, but the stakes 
have ballooned in recent decades. Australia has a long history of com-
petition for capital among states, led by its major East Coast cities (Ber-
ry 1984). Lagging regions such as South Australia used subsidies to lure 
major East Coast suppliers—in the auto industry, for instance—in the 
post-World War II era (Wanna 1980). In 2003, following Rupert Mur-
doch’s News Corporation’s extraction of A$100 million in concessions 
to build the $430 million Fox Studios development in Sydney, all but 
one of Australia’s state governments, Queensland, signed an agreement 
to end investment bidding wars, pledging to exchange information on 
projects where companies attempt to play one state against the other 
(State of Victoria 2003). Queensland, the fastest-growing region, re-
fused to participate because at the time it was successfully bidding cor-
porate headquarters and facilities away from Victoria and New South 
Wales with undisclosed deals. In 2006, five states signed a five-year 
renewal, agreeing to cooperate against multinational efforts to pit them 
against each other, to provide each other with an annual report on at-
traction activities, and to construct a mechanism where concerns about 
breaches can be raised. Queensland again refused to join, and thus the 
agreement does not include efforts by states to use tax cuts or other in-
centives to lure business from interstate rivals (Hughes 2006). 
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Regional competition for capital may be waxing in Europe as well. 
The European states, as Adinda Sinnaeve describes in Chapter 4, made 
a historic decision to rein in the competition for capital among member 
states and locations within them. In the 1957 Treaty of Rome that formed 
the European Union, they agree to ban most subsidies to business for 
plant locations except under certain circumstances. Underdeveloped re-
gions are permitted to attract businesses with incentives, and certain 
types of inducements—for job training and R&D, for instance—are 
permitted. The regulatory system is highly effective, especially at de-
terring incentives from being offered. Modest reforms are contemplated 
(Wishlade 2004), but by and large, the regime is robust.
Nevertheless, as European countries devolve economic develop-
ment responsibility to lower levels of government, a response to the 
demand for autonomy on the part of regions (e.g., Spain) and central 
government fiscal fatigue, the phenomenon of incentive competition 
may reemerge. The European Union regulatory scheme does not extend 
to local governments’ use of their own resources or taxing powers to at-
tract new plants or facilities, unless national governments compensate 
them for such incentives, and court cases are now pressing regions’ 
rights in this regard (Nicolaides 2005, 2006). Yet to date, such subna-
tional discretionary powers are quite limited, and the conditions set by 
the courts on their use are quite restrictive. 
Since the early 1990s, the American-style regional competition for 
capital is proliferating in developing countries, especially within large 
countries with federal systems of governance such as Brazil and India, 
and in China. Nowhere has it been fiercer than among Brazilian states 
in their competition for 22 new assembly plants planned and built by 
foreign auto companies since 1995. Despite Brazilian laws forbidding 
the reduction of state taxes to attract business, fiscal competition has 
been rampant and has resulted in excessively large incentives packages 
that radically relocated the industry away from Sao Paulo to four neigh-
boring states (Rodriguez-Pose and Arbix 2001; Varsano, Ferriera, and 
Afonso 2002). The cost per job created appears to be much higher (on 
the order of $54,000 to $340,000 per job) than in the United States 
(Oman 2000), and incentives have induced 40 percent more auto-
making capacity in Brazil than would otherwise have been built (Far-
rell, Remes, and Schulz 2003). India, where economic development 
responsibilities and fiscal tools have been devolving to the states, is 
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hosting greater fiscal competition and larger tax incentives packages 
(Venkatesan 2000; Schneider 2004).
In China, recent fiscal reforms give cities and regions greater re-
sponsibility for local economic development. Cities can now launch 
large development projects and retain the resulting income (rents, tax-
es), and they can customize their investment to the specifications of 
individual foreign investors. Although they cannot engage in bonding, 
they can form partnerships with banks and foreign investors, and have 
done so to finance huge infrastructure projects. Concomitantly, a fierce 
battle for competitive status has broken out, with cities ranked nation-
ally on their success in attracting capital. Xu and Yeh (2005) describe 
the proliferation of this competition and its dangers, in that Chinese cit-
ies (and banks) face only soft budget constraints; if returns do not mate-
rialize, the nation state is required to bail them out. This creates condi-
tions, they argue, for excessive and inefficient investments. In reality, 
enormous differences in natural resources, accessibility and physical 
infrastructure dominate the locational calculus of mobile firms in China 
(Yeung 2003).
Incentive competition occurs between nations as well as within 
them. Smaller countries increasingly believe that they must compete 
for mobile capital with each other. They have been protagonists in high-
profile bidding wars, as in the famous shopping expedition of John 
DeLorean to Puerto Rico, Ireland, and Northern Ireland to site his auto 
plant. The winning total incentive package can add up to as much as 75 
percent of the total investment cost of a project (Guisinger 1995). In 
the 1990s, newly independent and democratic Eastern European coun-
tries competed for European, Japanese, and American plants, often with 
little assurance that such incentives deals might be effective (Helinska- 
Hughes and Hughes 2003). Following the fall of the Berlin wall, East-
ern European countries such as Poland and Bulgaria offered special lo-
cation incentive packages with very mixed results. Critics argue that 
these countries would have been better off investing in the overall busi-
ness environment and infrastructure and that their use has eroded the 
tax base without significantly attracting investment (Sorsa 2003). As 
these countries join the EU, they must bring their practices in line with 
the EU’s regulatory framework.
A small but important literature documents and addresses grow-
ing incentive competition among Canada, the United States, and Mex-
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ico both before and after the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) (DeMont 1994; Jenkins 1987; Leyton-Brown 1979–1980). 
An increase in the size of subsidies to the auto industry in the United 
States and Canada is documented by Thomas (1997), who attributes it 
to fiercer competition for auto plants. Several policy researchers have 
made the case for a European-type commission in NAFTA to regulate 
incentive competition among the three countries (Graham and Warner 
1994; Pastor 2001).
Although we do not address incentive competition between nations 
in this volume, some policy initiatives at multilateral and bilateral lev-
els have begun to address it. East Asia is a focal point for strategy and 
experimentation. A study of Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam found 
that incentives are expensive and not very effective (Fletcher 2002). 
Another policy analyst concluded that competition among countries in 
Southeast Asia for inward investment may be unavoidable, but that na-
tional incentive offers should be streamlined and designed to limit the 
drain on budgets and the potential for corruption (Tseng 2002). Anoth-
er considers the Asian-Pacific region ripe for an investment code that 
would put limits on incentive levels, simplify incentive instruments, 
create greater transparency, and evaluate the results of incentives (Guis-
inger 1995). 
Investment competition between nation-states is distinguished from 
the subnational focus of our study in that the former is governed by in-
ternational organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. Each of 
these organizations has an interest in reining in the use of subnational 
tax incentives and subsidies to minimize trade distortions. The WTO 
has opposed export or local content performance requirements in return 
for incentives and allows other countries to apply countervailing du-
ties against export subsidies, while the IMF and World Bank encourage 
borrowers to reduce subsidies (Guisinger 1995). In a carefully reasoned 
paper, Schweke and Stumberg (1999) anticipate that subnational eco-
nomic development could become illegal in the new global policy envi-
ronment. However, a recent WTO World Trade Annual Report focused 
on the issue of subsidies acknowledges that some subsidies can benefit 
society and offset the negative externalities of economic activity and 
that both national and subnational governments have legitimate objec-
tives in using them, including for economic development. The WTO 
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remains concerned that such subsidies may be trade-distorting. The 
report notes that few governments fully meet their notification obliga-
tions under the WTO, contributing to a serious lack of information and 
transparency on the use and effect of subsidies, a situation aggravated 
by lack of common definitions of subsidy practices (WTO 2006).
There undoubtedly will be future tussles over WTO policies toward 
subsidies at all levels of government. If EU-type reasoning is followed, 
a case might be made for allowing developing but not developed na-
tions to use incentives, analogous to the permissiveness the EU rules 
show to underdeveloped regions in Europe. Currently, the WTO esti-
mates that 21 developed countries spend almost $250 billion on sub-
sidies of all types, almost 85 percent of all countries’ subsidies. The 
average ratio of subsidies to GDP is lower in developing countries than 
developed, though there are large variations within each country group 
(WTO 2006, pp. 112–114). Developed countries, which have the larg-
est stake in preserving subsidies, appear to have successfully argued 
within the WTO that many subsidies are not primarily trade-motivated 
but are designed to build infrastructure, foster new industries, promote 
research and develop new knowledge, protect the environment, redis-
tribute income, and help poor consumers (WTO 2006, p. xxii). 
To summarize, then, incentive competition is on the rise, as demon-
strated in the energies devoted to it by subnational governments and the 
size of incentive packages. It is most common in nations with federal 
structures that share taxing and economic development powers with 
state and local governments. Although analogous competition occurs 
among nation states, it is better regulated and subject to international 
organizational scrutiny. Technological change has obliterated many for-
mer barriers to interglobal location, enabling such competition. But in-
centive competition is also very much shaped by important institutional 
and political changes, to which we now turn. 
INSTITUTIoNAL AND PoLITICAL SoURCES oF 
INCENTIvE CoMPETITIoN
In regional bidding wars, the principal actors are state or local gov-
ernments and private sector employers. Incentive packages are put to-
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gether by the governmental unit, in response to an expression of inter-
est, and sometimes demands, by the potential employer, who may state 
that he/she also has other potential sites in mind. Each set of actors 
operates in a historically evolved institutional context that conditions 
their options and responses (Markusen 2003). In this section, we argue 
that two important institutional changes have altered this environment: 
the rise of site consultants as a third party in the process, and increas-
ing devolution of economic development responsibilities from central 
to subnational governments. In addition, the motivations of regional 
political leaders exacerbate the intensity of bidding wars, with negative 
social and economic results.
American regional scientists and public finance economists were 
long puzzled by a seemingly paradoxical phenomenon: despite dozens 
of surveys of the determinants of firm plant location that placed geo-
graphical tax differentials very far down on the list of factors that mat-
ter, state and local governments continue to feel that they must offer 
incentives and lower tax burdens. Firms surveyed from the 1950s well 
into the 1980s dismissed the importance of taxes as an interregional 
siting factor—instead, transportation costs, raw material access, labor 
costs, land costs, infrastructure, and access to markets dominated their 
locational calculus. But in the past decade or so, firms are now more 
likely to claim that taxes matter, and empirical estimates suggest that 
they do matter in terms of differential job creation (Bartik 2007; Wasyl-
enko 1997). Why this shift?
Falling transportation and communications costs are one contribu-
tor, as noted by Bartik in Chapter 5. These ease the friction of distance 
and make other determinants—land costs, labor costs, and infrastructure 
more important. Yet these costs have been falling for at least two cen-
turies as sequential transportation breakthroughs (steam ship, railroad, 
trucking, containerization) and communications breakthroughs (tele-
graph, telephone, radio, and radar) without triggering much incentive 
competition until recently. Corporate vertical disintegration and greater 
geographical separation of sequential stages in the production process 
also have contributed, creating a spatial division of labor in which rou-
tine manufacturing or final assembly can be located in far-flung sites for 
either cost or market access reasons, while management, research and 
development, advance manufacturing, and other functions are placed 
elsewhere (Fröbel, Heinrichs, and Kreye 1979; Markusen 1985). 
Markusen.indb   10 2/27/2007   12:40:00 PM
Institutional and Political Determinants of Incentive Competition   11
Our view is that these explanations contribute to but are inadequate 
for fully accounting for the spread of subsidy competition and the size 
of recent incentive packages. Two recent institutional forces are central 
to this process. First, an entrepreneurial innovation in the site selection 
process has altered the institutional environment: the rise of the site 
location consultant. Even though firms did not consider tax differentials 
important, they were in a position to extract concessions or “rents” from 
regions in the negotiating process. Research on defense industry loca-
tion over the decades demonstrates that company leaders were often 
completely oblivious to the potential profit they could make by relocat-
ing their facilities elsewhere and selling existing sites, often adjacent to 
major airports, for tremendous returns—engineers dominated manage-
ment circles, and to them, real estate was just an unimportant happen-
stance (Markusen et al. 1991). We hypothesize that this attitude toward 
local government and its tax/service offerings prevailed for U.S. firms 
until the emergence of site consultants. 
The rise of site consultants as brokers in the location process is a 
fascinating story. The Fantus Corporation pioneered this line of work 
in the 1930s and dominated the field until the late 1970s, by which 
time they had relocated 4,000 plants, mostly to low wage, antiunion, 
low business tax and nonurban sites in the south. Fantus, named after 
its industrial real estate founder, specialized in comparative analysis 
of potential sites for companies looking to locate new branch plants or 
offices, When son-in-law Leonard Yaseen took over the business, he 
began to charge for the analysis. In the 1950s, when fears of strategic 
bombing were strong, the U.S. government began promoting the dis-
persal of military manufacturing plants, amplifying the market for site 
relocation services. In the same era, Fantus began to help large corpora-
tions investigate overseas locations. Yaseen then suggested that compa-
nies play one location against the other, demonstrating that the tax and 
subsidy savings generated could cover his fee. Working the trade media 
and corporate networking channels, Fantus became a major opinion-
maker in the market for sites. For instance, Yaseen dismissed New York 
City as a place to do business, a function of personal animosity despite 
his location there. In 1975, Fantus authored the first state “business cli-
mate” rankings, setting off state bidding wars. Eventually, Fantus was 
sold to the accounting firm Deloitte & Touche, and other firms entered 
the site selection business (Cobb 1993; LeRoy 2005). 
Markusen.indb   11 2/27/2007   12:40:00 PM
12   Markusen and Nesse
Over time the industry has become more fragmented, split between 
independent consulting firms, large international accounting firms, and 
law firms, but is still quite oligopolistic in character, especially in the 
large plant location business. Its success has been linked to other de-
velopments in corporate governance: the rise of institutional investors 
and their pressuring of management for higher short-term returns, the 
ascendancy of professional managers, and the growth of real estate as a 
corporate asset class.1 
This site brokering business has become institutionalized in ways 
that enhanced the rate of return for site consultants and their clients. The 
emergence of a brokering function diminishes competition among sup-
pliers of jobs and tax base by standardizing the way large corporations 
approach subnational governments (Thomas 2000, p. 31). Site con-
sultants began to hold specialist conferences and create organizations 
like the World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies (Raines 
2003). Trade magazines such as Corporate	Location and Site	Selection, 
supported by advertising dollars from site location firms, encouraged 
negotiating firms to choose several states/cities to approach and play 
off against each other, even if they already had decided on an optimal 
location. They list deal winners and losers in every issue. 
Site consultants began working for the other side, too, marketing 
their services to cities and regions on the grounds that they have knowl-
edge about firm priorities that government officials do not have. When 
hired, consultants gain access to knowledge of cities and states’ fiscal 
circumstances and economic development strategies that they can then 
use in service of their corporate clients (LeRoy 2005). However, site 
consultants’ loyalties almost always lie with the interests of the job-
selling corporation, especially, as is common, when they earn their fees 
on a commission basis. The higher the tax break and subsidy package 
extracted, the higher their fees. In real estate sales, where this lopsided 
relationship is also pervasive, many states have banned such dual agen-
cy. In Chapter 8, Greg LeRoy argues that site location consultants have 
come “to occupy a space where they defy norms about professional eth-
ics and the proper representation of opposing parties,” noting that com-
missions can run up to 30 percent of the value of acquired subsidies. 
Our argument, then, is that a concerted institution-building process 
has introduced a new set of players, site consultants, into the spatial 
competition for jobs. As we argue in the next section, their success can 
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be attributed to economic rents that can be extracted from job-hungry 
governments, especially when information asymmetries can be exploit-
ed and even created. 
A second institutional change contributes significantly to the feroc-
ity of subsidy competition among subnational governments. Over the 
past 20 years, national governments have engaged in a process of devo-
lution, abandoning the practice of regional policies aimed at balancing 
uneven development and relegating responsibility for economic devel-
opment to subnational governments. More and more countries, large 
and small, are creating federal systems of shared powers, following the 
apparently successful models of the United States and Germany, where 
multipolar urban systems (Markusen and Gwiasda 1993) ameliorate pri-
vate city-centric rural to urban migration and create competition among 
subnational governments. In the United States, the federal system has 
long dampened enthusiasm for the type of national regional policies 
practiced in Europe—the territorially based Congress (in contrast to a 
party-based Parliament) acts as an informal resource distribution sys-
tem instead (Markusen 1994).
Devolution has complex sources of political support. Many state 
and local governors and politicians welcome greater control over pub-
lic and private investments decisions, especially if their regions have 
suffered from neglect from a former political regime, as in such di-
verse settings as Cataluña, Wales, Chile, Nicaragua, and South Korea. 
In some cases, devolution is tied to powerful political movements for 
greater autonomy, including the assertion of cultural identity. Econo-
mists preoccupied with efficiency in location government spending and 
taxation, à la Tiebout (1956b), argue that public services can be better 
tailored to regional and local preferences under decentralized structures. 
Devolution has been favored and strongly incentivized by international 
organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank as a means of fiscal 
discipline for national governments in developing countries where re-
gional policy often provided fertile ground for corruption and wasteful 
spending. National leaders often see devolution as offering relief from 
expensive (and sometimes inefficient) regional programs and a budget-
saving windfall. Concern for uneven development, for the cumulative 
causation process so elegantly analyzed by Myrdal (1957) and Kaldor 
(1970), and for the distributional consequences of mobile investment, 
including the inefficient underutilization of local infrastructure in de-
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clining regions (Markusen 1979), is much less often articulated in na-
tional economic policymaking in the early twenty-first century. 
However, devolution is neither a simple nor universally successful 
way of deploying public responsibility for economic development. In 
the United States, the implicit role model, state governments have had 
powerful tools for raising revenues and engaging in public infrastruc-
ture provision since the Constitution was drafted in 1787. In general, 
they have in turn delegated revenue-raising and bonding powers to lo-
cal governments. As a result, subnational governments have consider-
able but uneven resources to bring to bear on economic development. In 
many contemporary instances of devolution, central governments give 
their states and localities economic development responsibility but do 
not complement them with adequate resources or revenue-raising pow-
ers (Llanes 1998). Furthermore, most subnational governments have 
little expertise or experience with economic development, exposing 
them to greater information asymmetries in bargaining with multina-
tional corporations and their site consultants. As a result, devolution 
may quicken incentive competition among states and localities while 
exacerbating disparities in economic outcomes, as shown by Markusen 
and Diniz (2005) for Latin America, and Schneider (2004) for India, 
where the wealthiest states usually win such competition. 
Politics are also important. Scholars have long contended that eco-
nomic development practice cannot be understood without an apprecia-
tion for political structure and interest group politics. Molotch (1976) 
made the seminal and durable case that localities develop “growth ma-
chines” comprised of groups who own local assets or make their living 
selling or maintaining them and who do not have options for expand-
ing or relocating elsewhere. In general, Molotch argued, these groups 
will develop inordinate influence in local politics and push for policies 
that induce aggregate population growth. In a survey of European cit-
ies, Gordon and Jayet (1991) document the rise of recognizable urban 
growth machines in Europe, and Cheshire and Gordon (1996) offer a 
pessimistic view of the ability of territorial agreements to rein in such 
competition. More recently, Lovering (2003) offers a theory of the re-
gional service class as a group with high stakes in the attraction of out-
side capital. These political economy theories predict that subnational 
governments will overinvest in incentives that help owners of local-
specific assets at a net cost to local residents.2
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A number of policy analysts have offered behavioral explanations 
for why state and local politicians will espouse and energetically pur-
sue large incentive packages even when they are risky, unnecessary, 
damaging to the fiscal future of the locality, displacing, or place ex-
traordinary burdens on constituents to fund future services. For one, 
politicians are motivated by the desire to be reelected, which relies on 
name recognition and on contributions from individuals and businesses. 
These often lead to high-profile, large commitments to and ribbon-cut-
ting ceremonies for new plants and facilities, often in the richest, fast-
est-growing areas, even when economic development programs passed 
by legislatures contain explicit language that favors smaller firms and 
poorer regions (Dewar 1998; Luger and Bae 2005; Wolman and Spitz-
ley 1996). For another, local officials may want to be seen as proactive 
in economic development matters and fear that nay-saying will provide 
fodder for opponents in future elections or saddle the region with a bad 
reputation among the site consultants who they see as gatekeepers to 
job-creating investment (Reid and Gatrell 2003; Wolman 1988). Brazil-
ian state governments are subject to similar political distortions, affect-
ing incentive competition and leading to bankruptcy (Rodriques-Pose 
and Arbix 2001).
These institutional features caution against treating the spatial mar-
ket for jobs as a conventional market. On neither side of this market 
are the participants operating from simple microeconomic demand and 
supply positions. Politicans, as demanders of jobs, are motivated by 
features of the political process as well as the collective welfare of their 
constituents. Companies, as suppliers of jobs, rely on site consultants 
to massage the market in their interests; they act as surrogates for firm 
managers. In the following section, we review the various models that 
others have used to conceptualize subsidy competition and offer a third, 
institutionally grounded view. 
ANALyTICAL APPRoACHES To INCENTIvE CoMPETITIoN
Schematically, analyses of and policy implications toward spatial 
incentive competition can be divided into three camps. One argues that 
incentive competition is an efficient way of allocating public resources 
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to economic development because it sets up a competition among units 
of government for mobile capital. This approach approves of the sta-
tus quo and is opposed to any attempt to regulate or eliminate such 
competition. A second camp argues that incentive competition is inef-
ficient because it distorts the location of productive capacity from what 
it would have been in the absence of subsidies, and recommends that it 
be outlawed or taxed away at higher levels of government. A third camp 
argues that subnational governments should and do have responsibility 
for economic development but that contemporary excesses are associ-
ated with asymmetries in the market for jobs that should be regulated. 
Next, we lay out the logic of each of these positions, comparing how 
each conceptualizes the market for subsidies, how policy posture fol-
lows from these, and which economic and political agents are aligned 
with each.
Tiebout-Type Models of Spatial Competition for Firms
The “let it be” camp conceives (often implicitly) of the siting pro-
cess and subsidy bargaining between units of government and firms as 
taking place in a spatially differentiated market for public services, in 
which firms seek a set of public services, inputs into their production 
process, at the lowest possible tax price. Each competing government 
offers a supply of such services at a tax price. The market is thus struc-
tured as a straightforward competition between site and service-offering 
governments and site-searching firms. Since there are many demanders 
and suppliers on both sides of the market, the resulting allocation of 
firm investments will optimize the use of scarce public sector resources 
and maximize overall local welfare, as firms with different public ser-
vice needs will be drawn to the specific communities that offer these at 
the lowest cost.
This model is an analog of the famous Tiebout (1956b) argument in 
favor of fragmented local governments. In Tiebout’s model, households 
searched across metropolitan local governments for the utility-maxi-
mizing mix of public services (schools, public safety, and so on) at the 
lowest tax price. The Tiebout argument has been used as a post facto ra-
tionale for the efficiency of competing local governments in U.S. met-
ropolitan areas, a form of state-level devolution that dates back to the 
late nineteenth century. Although it has been hotly contested, especially 
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on equity grounds (Markusen 1974), the theory has proven to be as ro-
bust as the proliferation of local jurisdictions. In the United States, the 
National Governors’ Association, although it has many times debated 
the issue, has repeatedly rejected any attempts to curtail subsidy com-
petition (Kayne and Shonka 1994). Similarly, in Europe, Tiebout-type 
arguments that tax competition can be welfare-improving have been 
used to oppose tax harmonization among EU states (Varsano, Ferriera, 
and Afonso 2002).
The Tiebout-like approach has several virtues. One is its acknowl-
edgement of the linkage between taxes and services received by firms. 
In various other approaches, and in practice, this link is broken, and 
the notion that firms’ taxes pay for services rendered disappears. The 
procompetition approach is also appealing because it offers a way of 
disciplining public officials whose behavior may otherwise not be in the 
interests of taxpayers.
On the other hand, this approach is highly simplistic. It assumes that 
the market for public services is transparent and that all parties have 
access to full information. It ignores the fact that, in reality, bargaining 
takes place as a time-constrained drama between a single firm and (or 
so communities believe) multiple bidding jurisdictions. It cannot easily 
cope with the fact that from a community’s point of view, firms aren’t 
just public service consumers and taxpayers, but are also suppliers of 
jobs. Finally, it operates from a single, selective optimality criterion—
efficiency. Many citizens and practitioners of economic development 
care as much about equity, and in some cases, environmental impacts, 
as they do about efficient resource allocation. 
Prisoner’s Dilemma Approaches
The second position, the “suppress it” view, argues that subsidy 
competition is inefficient because it wastes resources by luring firms 
away from sites they would otherwise favor. In addition, some econo-
mists also argue that as a result of shortfalls in revenue associated with 
tax giveaways, public goods such as education, parks, and public infra-
structure will be undersupplied (Burstein and Rolnick 1995; Zodrow 
and Mieszkowski 1986). Burstein and Rolnick make both these argu-
ments in their call for Congress to tax away state and local business-
specific tax and subsidies. Others reason that the mix of public services 
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will be skewed by incentive competition to favor business interests at 
residents’ expense—too many business centers and airports but not 
enough parks or libraries (Keen and Marchand 1997). 
Economists making these arguments conclude that incentive com-
petition is at best a zero-sum proposition, because little or no net new 
investment is created across regions, but more likely to be negative, 
because of public goods under-provision. Following such competition 
to its logical end, one economist notes, could mean that if every govern-
ment copies the bids of every other government, the firm will end up 
where it would have gone anyway, no net new investment will be cre-
ated, and all governments will have reduced taxes so that public spend-
ing is suboptimal (Graham, 2003, pp. 69–71). 
That is a general equilibrium approach, but theorists working on 
this problem often conceptualize it as a “prisoner’s dilemma,” a single 
event, or game, in which a government (a prisoner) is bidding against 
other governments (other prisoners) for a single plant or facility. They 
would all be better off if they offered nothing, or the same package, the 
logic goes, but since they do not know each others’ bids, a “race to the 
bottom” is likely (Oates 1972). 
The use of the prisoner’s dilemma game to characterize spatial com-
petition for capital has a long history (Thomas 2000). Cooper (1972) 
first used it to characterize subsidy competition between countries, 
followed by Guisinger (1985). Quite sophisticated formulations have 
recently been offered, including Wohlgemuth and Kilkenny’s (1998) 
modeling of state governments’ optimal response to a firm’s threat to 
relocate, taking into account both asymmetrical information and the 
fact that other firms in the state may, if the relocation buy-off succeeds, 
demand similar tax and subsidy relief. 
The prisoner’s dilemma model and its predicted outcomes are useful 
in demonstrating that firms can extract rents in return for their decision 
to locate new facilities or even to retain current employment. Indeed, 
the increasing exploitation of such rents may itself have exacerbated the 
mobility of capital, lowering the cost of relocation for firms. It is also 
useful in highlighting the information asymmetry that encumbers most 
bargaining, and it raises the interesting question why governments do 
not collude by sharing intelligence on bids to avoid rent extraction. It 
underscores the plausibility of overall welfare loss from incentive com-
petition. It also captures how many governments perceive the situation, 
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although such perceptions may themselves be a product of the popular-
ization of the model by journalists and site consultants. 
But there are problems with the prisoner’s dilemma framework. It 
is a highly stylized, simplistic formulation. It is an event-based model, 
which makes it difficult to evaluate strings of repeat games, especially 
since the cast of characters may change (Wood 2003). Rachel Weber, 
in Chapter 6, makes the point that certain jurisdictions may accumulate 
skill through repeat games that improve their prospects and bargaining 
power. (Firms that employ site consultants pay them to accumulate such 
skills on their behalf.) Repeat games may also help competing govern-
ments learn the virtues of collaborating, as game theory predicts more 
generally (Dixit and Skeath 2004, Chapter 11) and as demonstrated in 
the European and Australian cases we discuss above. A central theme of 
Thomas’s (2000) seminal book, Competing	for	Capital, is that iteration 
makes it possible for governments to cooperate to regulate investment 
competition, Ironically, some national governments (e.g., Australia) 
have recently adopted competition policies that consider such collabo-
ration potentially “anticompetitive.”
The prisoner’s dilemma model cannot easily encompass institution-
al changes in interests, power, and actors, including the rise and behav-
ior of site consultants. It does not permit information asymmetries to be 
constructed. In its more simplistic formulations, it allows bidders only 
to give or not give firm-specific subsidies. Yet, the model’s assump-
tions can be modified to permit such intermediate positions (Buchholtz 
1998; Thomas 2000). Harder to build into this model are the other paths 
governments might follow to attract firms: lowering the overall tax rate, 
improving infrastructure, investing in schools or research and develop-
ment, worker retraining, and provision of amenities. 
Some versions of the prisoner’s dilemma model predict that win-
ning governments will actually be worse off (e.g., Graham 2003). But 
others show analytically that use of a prisoner’s dilemma model does 
not necessarily produce a “winner’s curse” (Thomas 2000, Appendix). 
Bartik, in Chapter 5, argues that the jobs and tax base created can more 
than cover the costs of incentives if offers are carefully crafted. He also 
argues that losing bidders may be better off not being saddled with ex-
cess debt and shrinking tax revenues. When modelers begin relaxing 
assumptions, the welfare losses and gains from incentive competition 
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become less clear, with some winning and some losing (Varsano, Fer-
riera, and Afonso 2002). 
The remedy indicated by the simplistic application of this model—
taxing away subsidies and tax breaks nationally—is a relatively conser-
vative notion. It is driven by a focus on interregional efficiency rather 
than the welfare of individual regions. As Bartik notes, some economists 
making this argument (Burstein and Rolnick 1995) have no complaint 
with across-the-board tax reductions for all business, even though these 
could be highly inefficient from the point of view of the public sector 
and would create particularly difficult circumstances for economically 
distressed local areas.
Finally, the prisoner’s dilemma model has difficulty comprehending 
the complexity of the market for investment. In actuality, government 
decision makers have multiple constituencies with competing claims, 
and their motivations are more complex than the model suggests. An in-
genious corrective for this deficit is offered by Basinger and Hallerberg 
(2004), two political scientists who note that the empirical evidence for 
the race to the bottom is actually quite weak. They argue that political 
institutions and organizations mitigate the predicted downward spiral. 
Modifying the prisoner’s dilemma model by allowing domestic politics 
to modify governments’ behavior, they argue that governments may be 
resistant to requests for tax breaks. For instance, ruling parties may have 
strong commitments to social programs or be ideologically opposed to 
tax cuts. Both Thomas and LeRoy in this volume make the case that 
mobilized citizens can make a difference in politicians’ willingness to 
engage in incentive competition or in the type of deals struck. 
The Market for Jobs and Tax Capacity Approach
A less elegant but more complex view is that regional governments 
are preoccupied with creating jobs and amplifying tax capacity. While 
the two approaches reviewed above are rooted in public finance and 
microeconomics, this view is more attentive to institutional structure 
and behavior and common among economists, geographers, planners, 
and other researchers working on economic development. The market 
in which governments face firms seeking sites can thus be considered a 
market for jobs and tax base, rather than for public services or for capital 
investments. State and local governments offer incentives in return for 
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promised jobs, revealed in both the rhetoric accompanying announce-
ments of sitings and in efforts to hold firms to their job-creating com-
mitments with clawback provisions or penalties for nonperformance, 
though the latter are often weak. In a similar analysis of the “market for 
economic development,” Weber (2002a) uses an institutionalist trans-
actions cost framework to conceptualize this process. 
Jobs thus generated are socially valuable, in that they lower local 
unemployment, raise local labor force participation, enable skill ac-
quisition, and have progressive effects on the local income distribu-
tion (Bartik 2001, 2004; Courant 1994). The jobs created also generate 
higher incomes for residents, who in turn spend the additional income 
on local goods and services that generate yet other jobs and are invested 
in housing that generates real estate taxes. Jobs and expanded tax capac-
ity are valued by residents, by politicians for their announcement value, 
as we argued above, and by the local growth machine as well. Compet-
ing governments can be characterized as competing for jobs and tax 
base, and firms looking for sites as supplying them. The firms pursue 
incentives as a rent-seeking activity (Weber 2002a; Wolkoff 1992). In 
what follows, we focus on job creation and less on tax capacity, because 
it applies more generically to international as well as domestic cases, 
and because the institutional setting for incentive competition at the 
submetropolitan level is more particularistic, involving the retail sector 
and the growing role of planners and local government officials in real 
estate development (Weber 2002b). 
Evidence for the pivotal role of jobs in such bargains comes from 
a remarkable study by Gabe and Kraybill (2002), who argue that firms 
have an incentive to overannounce the numbers of jobs they will create 
to increase the size of incentives offered. In a study of 366 Ohio estab-
lishments’ expansions between 1993 and 1995, they found that those 
that received incentives overannounced employment targets but created 
no new jobs (and actually led to a reduction in the overall number of 
jobs), while those that did not receive incentives accurately forecast 
their job expansion and did create new jobs. Gabe and Kraybill, citing 
Krueger (1974), suggest that the puzzling job decline in establishments 
winning incentives might be explained by firm reallocation of resources 
away from internal efficiencies in production and toward rent-seeking. 
We view incentive competition as taking place in a spatial “market 
for jobs” that is an institutional innovation of site consultants who work 
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to maintain information asymmetries that permit rent-taking. As Weber 
argues in Chapter 6 of this book and elsewhere (2002a), the power bal-
ance in the market for jobs is uneven, in part because local governments 
“are embedded in space and not footloose like businesses.” She notes 
that businesses are better able to control the flow of information during 
incentive negotiations and that the size of the incentive package they 
need “to make a project feasible may be much smaller than what they 
would have the public sector believe.” Local governments are not privy 
to actual cost structures and hurdle rates. 
Institutional economists have long understood the importance of 
opportunistic behavior and the role of information asymmetries in fa-
cilitating it (Williamson 1975). Close observers of incentive competi-
tion note that government officials rarely possess accurate information 
regarding an investor’s true intentions (Bachelor 1997; Thomas 2007; 
Weber 2007). Reid and Gatrell (2003, pp. 112–113) argue that compa-
nies that least need incentives have the resources to most effectively 
engage in opportunistic behavior. They cite documented cases where, 
after large incentives packages had been granted on the presumption of 
competition, corporate executives admitted that other sites were never 
seriously considered. 
LeRoy (2005) details how site consultants encourage candidate 
communities to think of themselves as in competition with other com-
munities, sometimes creating high-profile bidding, as in the Chicago/
Denver/Dallas competition for Boeing’s relocating headquarters, but 
often not revealing the identity of competitors. Governments are coun-
seled to keep their bids top secret, the implied sanction being perma-
nent black-balling by the site brokering consultants. Thus, collusion 
among localities is suppressed, while the site consulting brokerages can 
be seen as practicing a sort of informal collusion on behalf of firms to 
maximize the rents that can be extracted. This is why site-seeking firms 
themselves do not invest in site selection but purchase such services 
from a supplier sector.
The way that the site consultant sector organizes and mediates incen-
tive competition reveals the extent to which information asymmetries 
are created and maintained as a condition of rent extraction. Gabe and 
Kraybill (2002, p. 707) document how the state of Ohio interacts with 
the site selection industry. Every year, the state submits to Site	Selection 
magazine its list of firm attractions or expansions in the state with an-
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nounced creation of 50 or more jobs. The magazine then uses this data 
to compare business growth in states across the nation. By creating this 
competition and a data base that solicits state announced job expan-
sions, the site selection industry has created an incentive for states to 
list (and thus to subsidize) as many projects as possible to improve the 
state’s ranking relative to other states. Site consultants, especially when 
acting as dual agents, can horde information that they have on firms’ in-
tentions and on the larger field of competition, including the willingness 
and ability of other communities and states to offer incentives. 
The “market for jobs” approach generally accepts the necessity for 
governments to compete for capital and to use tools at hand in pursuit 
of jobs and community well-being. The policy implications, then, focus 
on how to curtail rent-taking, improve transparency in location deci-
sions, understand why some tools are better than others, and help gov-
ernments understand the complicated current and long-term trade-offs 
associated with developing an incentive offer. 
Among the virtues of the market for jobs approach is this focus on 
institutional factors—on the messy, complicated way that subsidy com-
petition unfolds in reality and how an expanded set of actors (including 
politicians, growth machines, and site consultants) behave under such 
circumstances. It acknowledges the centrality of the desire for jobs as 
a motivation for competing governments. Yet in doing so, it has the 
disadvantage of obscuring the role of taxes as a price for public ser-
vices and neglects the negative long-term consequences of associated 
tax erosion. 
Most of the authors in this book work from a market for jobs and 
tax capacity point of view, although Bartik’s strong defense of state 
and local governments’ legitimate economic development role and 
rejection of higher level prohibitions shares elements of the Tiebout-
based approach. Thomas, using a prisoner’s dilemma approach, con-
cludes that subsidy competition has efficiency, equity, and environmen-
tal drawbacks and should be regulated, but does not believe subsidies 
are always bad policy. Fisher’s chapter summarizes the evidence on 
long-term corporate tax erosion and is in that sense compatible with the 
prisoner’s dilemma implications. All three call for reforms and make 
specific detailed recommendations for reform. 
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Normative Issues
In evaluating the power and usefulness of those three approaches, 
it is useful to acknowledge differences in underlying normative pos-
ture. In general, economists using Tiebout-type or prisoner’s dilemma 
models work from an explicit assumption that economic efficiency is 
the sole concern of economic analysis and rationale for policy interven-
tion. However, in economic development practice, a strong case is often 
made by economists and planners for equity and environmental quality 
norms co-equal with efficiency (Fitzgerald and Leigh 2002). Much of 
economic development practice is framed by an overarching concern 
for jobs, and not just any jobs, but quality jobs and jobs for the hardest 
to employ. Bartik, in Chapter 5, states that more local employment is a 
social good and points out that if all local governments competed in a 
smart way, it is not obvious that their optimal economic development 
subsidies would impose a net efficiency cost on other jurisdictions. 
In this volume, distributional concerns receive careful attention. 
Bartik, Schweke, Weber, and LeRoy all address the creation of quality 
jobs. Bartik (1993) evaluates incentives for their ability to produce jobs 
for existing residents rather than newcomers and finds that in the long 
run, about 80 percent of new jobs in local economies are reflected in 
more population rather than higher employment rates. However, Bartik 
(1991) also finds that spurts of local growth benefit locals at the back 
of the labor queue and less-skilled and African American workers es-
pecially. Schweke specifically addresses the targeting of incentives to 
those regions and individuals most in need of work.
Others—Thomas, for instance—are sensitive to the regressive 
distributional impact of subsidies that favor owners of capital at the 
expense of residents of the community and worsen the income distri-
bution. Fisher, in Chapter 3, gives hard estimates for the degree of re-
gressivity that has accompanied the erosion of state and local business 
taxes overall. Thomas addresses harmful environmental consequences, 
as when subsidies induce building in a floodplain or when negative ex-
ternalities are imposed on neighboring communities. 
In his chapter, Fisher cautions against attributing all observed neg-
ative fiscal trends in recent years to incentive competition. He offers 
three other plausible hypotheses. For one, conservative ideological op-
position to the size of the public sector per se may be contributing. For 
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those who believe government is too large, the strategy is to “starve the 
beast,” first by cutting taxes and then by claiming fiscal responsibil-
ity and the necessity to cut services. For another, there is the durable 
though minority “supply side” theory that contends that growth is only 
possible by lightening the tax burden on business. Third, some conser-
vatives forthrightly attack progressive income taxes, a form of class 
warfare rationalized by the tenuous idea that cutting capital gains taxes 
for individuals will stimulate new business activity in the same state. 
These are important normative and ideological contributors to conflict 
over subnational taxation. In legislatures and city councils where the 
Republican party has dominated (including the national Congress for 
the last decade), business tax base erosion and tax regressivity have 
been on the rise.
Inequities are also possible between firms and among regions. Sub-
sidies to particular firms can also be inequitable between owners of 
capital and their employed workers, when some firms are unfairly sub-
sidized at the expense of their competitors, an argument recently made 
in important U.S. court cases and pressed by nonrecipient firms in their 
bid for similar concessions. Indeed, important cases are currently work-
ing their way through the courts using the Interstate Commerce Clause 
that prohibits restraints on trade as a rationale for striking down incen-
tive packages targeted at interstate firm moves.
In general, too, richer states and localities walk away with the priz-
es, as Varsano, Ferriera, and Afonso (2002) find in Brazil; Schneider 
(2004) in India; and Luger and Bae (2005) in North Carolina. In Chap-
ter 6, Weber describes how this happens at the local level in the United 
States: the more assets a place possesses, the more leverage, expertise, 
and decisional independence it will have and the better negotiating po-
sition it will establish. In contrast, poorer jurisdictions will have to offer 
more to succeed and are much more likely to give away the store to lure 
a plant, often without demanding performance. 
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DoES INCENTIvE CoMPETITIoN yIELD ECoNoMIC 
DEvELoPMENT FoR WINNERS?
A paradox in debate over incentive competition is that there is little 
agreement about whether engaging in it results in benefits for bid-win-
ning states and localities. The evidence, most of it on the U.S. case, is 
mixed. For an initial assessment of the international case, see Guisinger 
(1986). 
Some researchers argue that incentives are too small to matter to 
firms in their choice of location. Their evidence is based on surveys 
in which firms respond to questions about which spatially differenti-
ated factors of product matter most to them in siting plant and facili-
ties (Guisinger 1992; Enrich 1996; Farrell, Remes, and Schulz 2003). 
Greenstone and Moretti (2003) find that cities winning high-profile 
plants in the United States did better than their losing competitors, but 
as Fisher argues in Chapter 3, the researchers assumed that the incen-
tives were decisive rather than bargained for after the fact. 
Up through the late 1980s, the consensus was that economic de-
velopment incentives had at best an ambiguous impact on growth and 
probably little to no impact at all (Eisinger 1988; Peters and Fisher 
2002). Since then, a number of empirical studies have shown that tax 
incentives and other subsidies do make a difference in regional growth 
rates (Bartik 2007; Hines 1995; Newman and Sullivan 1988; Phillips 
and Goss 1995; Wasylenko 1997). The evidence appears stronger for 
job creation than net positive tax effects (Peters and Fisher 2002). Bar-
tik (1994) argues that it is highly likely that incentives are always rev-
enue negative. The causality is so complex, however, that at least one 
researcher, reviewing the U.S. case, has concluded that no one really 
knows what the effectiveness or welfare implications of incentive com-
petition are (Graham 2003, p. 71). 
Even if governments that engage in successful incentive offers sub-
sequently generate more output, jobs, and tax revenues, it does not nec-
essarily constitute economic development. For one thing, it may not be 
positive for the state or country as a whole, if other jurisdictions lose 
jobs and tax base as a result. And there are the distributional conse-
quences as well, where tax burdens are shifted to residents and the qual-
ity of public services declines. Fisher’s chapter shows the long-term 
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erosion in business tax shares of state revenues, from a high of nearly 
10 percent in 1980 to just under 5 percent by 2002. Peters and Fisher 
(2002), in a study of state enterprise zones, show that during just eight 
years in the 1990s, the effective state tax rate on new investment fell by 
30 percent. LeRoy’s (2005) book cites many cases of local governments 
unable to pay for operating expenses and other services following risky 
underwriting of competed projects, including long-term responsibility 
for paying off bonds used to build infrastructure that is subsequently 
unused. Citizens of these jurisdictions are thus now shouldering a high-
er share of the tax burden for public services (without any clear increase 
in the share devoted to them) and are going without services they might 
otherwise have enjoyed. 
Furthermore, even for bid-winning localities whose jobs and tax 
base expand, economic development outcomes might have been more 
positive had those resources been used differently. Each subsidy and tax 
expenditure involves opportunity costs for governments and their citi-
zens. Even better jobs and greater tax capacity might have resulted from 
alternative allocations of economic development resources. To this final 
question we now turn.
IS ATTRACTIoN oF ExTERNAL ExPoRT-PRoDUCING 
PHySICAL CAPITAL THE oNLy RoUTE To JoBS?
So far, we have not tied incentive competition to an important, hal-
lowed theory in economic development—that a region’s overall growth 
is tied to its ability to export to other regions goods and services that in 
return permit it to import the goods and services that it cannot competi-
tively produce. The prominence of export base theory as a conception 
of macro growth at the subnational level has not been seriously ques-
tioned in the half century since it was formulated, though at the national 
level, some national governments have engaged in an alternative import 
substitution strategy, an approach much discredited in recent years. In 
our view, incentive competition is embraced by state and local govern-
ments because leaders believe that only export-oriented activity will 
generate net new jobs. (Intrametropolitan bidding wars for retail jobs 
simply decides who gets the jobs without altering the total created.) 
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In this section we review the history of export base theory, sometimes 
called economic base theory, and evaluate the evidence on its power to 
explain aggregate regional growth. 
Historically, the world economy has experienced large swings in 
openness, followed by significant slowdowns and retrenchments. Eco-
nomic integration is not a unilateral progression over time, nor are ex-
ports reliably the leading source of regional economic growth. In the 
first half of the nineteenth century, economist Douglass North (1966) 
elegantly demonstrated that slave-cultivated southern cotton drove the 
aggregate U.S. capital accumulation and the growth rate. After the Civil 
War, the United States retreated behind high tariff barriers to nurture its 
own manufacturing economy, growing robustly from an internal elabo-
ration of the division of labor, especially the synergy between increas-
ingly capital-intensive agriculture and producer goods manufacturing 
(Hobsbawm 1975). Thus, in successive eras, regional and national 
economic growth has been variously oriented externally or internally. 
Shifts from one to the other are linked to developments in technology, 
especially in transportation and communications, but also to political 
and institutional changes. 
We currently live in an era that is preoccupied with trade. Most 
economists argue that regions must specialize and export more than 
ever before, because the penetration of inexpensive and often high-
quality imports is eroding whole segments of local and regional econo-
mies (Howes and Markusen 1993). Ever since North’s (1955) elegant 
statement of it, indebted to Innis’s (1930) staples theory, the export base 
argument goes more or less as follows. In a trade-integrated world, re-
gions outside of one’s own are superior producers of many goods and 
services locally consumed, and in order to be able to pay for these im-
ports, the region must specialize in certain exportable goods and ser-
vices. In the mid-twentieth century world, with its sophisticated globe-
transcending transportation systems that reached far into little hamlets 
everywhere, the power of this theory was manifest. Economists codi-
fied the theory into the economic base model, ubiquitously used even 
today in multiplier analysis.
Nevertheless, from the beginning, the theory had its critics. In his 
famous debate with North, Tiebout (1956a) pointed out an obvious logi-
cal flaw in the theory: the world economy as a whole does not export. In 
addition, a regional economy’s ability to provide for itself increases as 
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its income from exports grows, resulting in import substitution. Tiebout 
also argued that people have different consumption patterns in different 
regions, complicating the model’s application. But more importantly, 
Tiebout argued for an endogenous theory. Harkening back to Adam 
Smith, he posited that an elaborating internal division of labor could 
spur regional growth without export growth. His theory was brilliantly 
applied by Lindstrom (1978) in her renowned book on the early Phil-
adelphia region, where she showed that a relatively autarchic region 
grew robustly from growing synergies between diversified farming and 
more urban manufacturing industries. Bartik (2004) makes the modern 
case for non-export-oriented sources of job and tax base growth by not-
ing that cases where a new local-serving activity absorbs underutilized 
land or labor, or where it increases overall productivity.
Subsequently, practitioners of economic development vigorously 
debated and experimented with import substitution and export-based 
strategies for regional and national development, especially in the de-
veloping world. Many industrialized countries, among them the United 
States and Japan, nurtured their early industrial economies behind large 
tariff barriers and succeeded in import substitution on a massive scale. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, Latin American countries in particular tried to 
follow this path, but the strategy’s apparent failure brought an emphasis 
on export base strategies back into fashion. 
Yet the evidence on the relationship between overall growth and 
export growth is far from established. In recent decades, economists 
working in international development have begun to question the lead 
role of exports in explaining GDP growth for both developing and de-
veloped countries. As early as the 1960s, Ball (1962) argued that export 
expansion could retard domestic development by siphoning off invest-
ment. Others have argued that exports may be a consequence rather 
than a cause of economic growth. In a number of carefully constructed 
empirical tests, scholars find mixed evidence on both the existence of 
a relationship and the direction of causality. Jung and Marshall (1985) 
found that for 37 developing countries, evidence on the period 1950–
1981 supports the export promotion thesis in only four cases; five coun-
tries reduced exports with growth, while four countries experienced 
export growth with output reduction. Ghartey (1993) concluded that 
export-driven development appears to explain growth in Taiwan but 
not Japan or the United States. In a five-country study, Sharma, Norris, 
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and Wai-Wah-Cheung (1991) found that Japan and Germany experi-
enced export-led growth from 1960 to 1987 but in the United States 
and the United Kingdom, output growth appears to have induced export 
growth. 
Thus, at the national level there is no clear evidence that exports 
drive overall growth. There is equally strong evidence that endogenous 
developments—new product creation first aimed at local markets and 
process innovations that increase productivity—may drive growth and 
prompt export expansion. What about regional growth? Why might lo-
cally oriented economic activity drive overall regional growth in an 
increasingly competitive world? 
Several hypotheses have been advanced. For one, an innovation 
aimed at a local market might turn out to have much broader appli-
cability and become an exported product or service (Cortright 2002). 
Boeing’s original seaplanes, designed for Seattle use, are an example. 
For another, people are also mobile and may choose locations to live 
and work based on amenities, creating more local-serving activities 
paid for with asset income or entitlements (like Social Security) earned 
elsewhere (Nelson and Beyers 1998). Many midsized American met-
ropolitan areas have grown principally from retiree in-migration, and 
many larger cities have grown through immigration not tied to spe-
cific jobs. Third, secular changes in consumption patterns, linked to 
demographic characteristics such as aging or labor force participation 
decisions such as two-parent households, may result in disproportion-
ate demand for local-serving industries. Markusen and Schrock (2006) 
find that over the period 1980–2000, the local-serving occupations in 
the 30 largest U.S. metros outpaced job growth in export base occupa-
tions by four to one. For a more general treatment of the potential for 
local-serving economic development strategies to produce growth, see 
Markusen (2007). 
The evidence is thus not compelling that exogenous growth, linked 
to export demand and the attraction of mobile capital, is more powerful 
than endogenous growth from human capital investments, innovation, 
an elaborating local division of labor, amenities-led population growth, 
or consumption shifts. Exports do matter, but they are not everything. 
If this is the case, decisions about firm subsidies should be embedded 
in a portfolio approach to economic development, in which the short- 
and long-term opportunity costs of particular incentives are weighed 
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against alternative investments that might be superior from a normative 
point of view for the community involved. LeRoy’s chapter includes 
a call for unified development budgets as one way to implement just 
such a portfolio approach. Schweke, St. George, and Rist (1998) did the 
original conceptual work on unified development budgets. To date, the 
best application of the concept is the study published by Mountain As-
sociation for Community Economic Development (2005) for the state 
of Kentucky. 
CoNCLUSIoN AND SUMMARy oF THE CoNTRIBUTIoNS
With the authors in this volume, we conclude that state and local 
governments should, and in many countries do, have the responsibil-
ity for shepherding economic development in their communities. As 
Weber states, taxes and expenditures are among the few tools they 
have to pursue good jobs and long term stability for their constituents, 
along with certain regulatory strategies. The policy challenge is not to 
embrace incentive competition or fully suppress it, but to reform it in 
ways that encourage the benefits to exceed the costs and to achieve nor-
mative goals on efficiency, equity, and environmental fronts. Even the 
European Union, as Sinnaeve articulates, distinguishes between good 
subsidies and bad. 
The chapters in this book are rich in policy recommendations aimed 
at local, state, and national governments, based on careful reasoning 
and empirical evidence. Political scientist Thomas makes the case for 
the excesses of contemporary subsidy competition and tells a sordid 
tale of information asymmetry and political machinations at the local 
level in a particular subsidy case. Although he favors eliminating in-
centive competition with a European Union–type regulatory system, he 
believes this is unrealistic for the United States. Sinnaeve acknowledg-
es the downside of the EU system—it requires a heavy administrative 
burden, struggles with the right balance between rule-making and flex-
ibility, and does not fully suppress illegal aid. Other nations, however, 
might be well-advised to adopt an EU-type regulatory regime because it 
has achieved impressive gains in deterring subsidy offers and eliminat-
ing distorted competition. 
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Bartik reviews the conditions under which incentives are reason-
able, advising the use of cost/benefit analysis for governments engaging 
in negotiations and competitions. He cautions against looking only at 
jobs and tax revenues and suggests including the costs and benefits of 
public services and the prospects for local versus nonlocal hiring. 
Schweke critiques an existing incentive program in North Carolina, 
the William S. Lee Act, that was designed to favor poorer counties but 
has not, and proposes two targeted state tax incentive programs in its 
place. One would kick in during cyclical downturns, creating jobs by 
giving firms tax credits for wages of newly hired workers, spurring a 
substitution of labor for capital. The other would target the highest un-
employment counties in the state by giving employers wage and bene-
fits subsidies to hire unemployed, local workers. These programs would 
induce job creation in regions and among workers who most need work, 
in contrast to the Lee Act, which has subsidized mainly large firms to 
locate in wealthy suburban areas around the largest cities, bringing 
many of their workers with them. Schweke’s proposals demonstrate the 
careful tailoring that must be undertaken to ensure that the reforms, 
rather than prohibitions, will be able to address the inefficiencies and 
inequities of incentive competition. 
Bartik, Weber, and LeRoy offer detailed reforms to improve the op-
eration of the jobs market. These include transparency, performance 
requirements, community benefits agreements, pay-as-you-go deals, 
school board say on TIF and tax abatements (to prevent erosion of pub-
lic funds for schools), unified development budgets, and multijurisdic-
tional tax regime reforms, such as closing corporate reporting loopholes 
and repealing the single sales factor formulation at the state level. We-
ber focuses her recommendations on local public officials and how they 
might improve their bargaining position in deal-making. LeRoy, appre-
ciating the virtues of simple and straightforward remedies, offers fewer, 
simpler laws and stronger enforcement. His set of nine reforms includes 
three innovative ideas: disclosure of state-by-state taxes paid to corpo-
rate shareholders (which would raise the visibility of exploitation of 
differentials in state tax systems), using federal spending as a carrot 
(and a stick) against job piracy; and defining site location consultants as 
lobbyists and regulating them accordingly. 
Although many state and local government and interest group lead-
ers have been seeking incentive competition reform in the United States 
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and elsewhere for some time, there has been a quickening of interest 
and a coalescing of ideas and organizational energy in the last decade. 
As the excesses worsen and governments feel greater pressure to spend 
time and resources in business recruitment, many observers think that 
the time is ripe for significant reform along the lines of the propos-
als offered in this book. A great deal of credit goes to LeRoy and his 
organization, Good Jobs First, which has served as an important clear-
inghouse for information on subsidy competition and applied research 
shop for evaluating outcomes of past deals. 
As the market for jobs goes global and devolution deepens, the site 
consulting industry is entering new territory, especially in developing 
countries. A great challenge for economists, economic development 
practitioners, and activists working on these issues is to cope with this 
internationalization of subsidy competition. State and local govern-
ments in more developed nations may find themselves pitted not so 
much against each other but against competitors yet farther afield with 
whom it is even more difficult to communicate and compare notes. Eco-
nomic development officials, politicians, and the public in developing 
countries where incentive competition is spreading need ideas, help and 
cooperation from experts and organizations that are already success-
fully regulating such competition, as in the European Union, or who are 
slowly winning battles in transparency requirements, deal negotiations, 
court cases, and broader views of economic development strategy and 
tools. We hope that this volume contributes substantially to this effort. 
Notes
 1.  Rachel Weber, personal communication with the author, 2006.
 2. Timothy J. Bartik, personal communication with the author, 2006.
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The Sources and Processes of 
Tax and Subsidy Competition
Kenneth P. Thomas
University of Missouri–St. Louis
Tax and subsidy competition has two structural sources: the need 
of governments for investment, what Winters (1996) calls the “invest-
ment imperative” in his updating of Lindblom (1977); and the mobility 
of capital. Together, they create a dynamic in which governments must 
compete for investment in what, since World War II, has been an ever-
widening market. Today, as virtually all governments engage in this be-
havior, the “market for investment” is one where the “sellers” (potential 
investors) have certain advantages over the “buyers” (governments).1 
First, capital mobility is increasing, making more locations feasible 
sites for any particular investment, thereby intensifying competition. 
Examples range from national and regional governments bidding on 
auto assembly plants, to suburbs fighting to land the sales tax revenue 
that comes from a retail development. Second, while uncoordinated 
sanctioning of adverse government policies occurs, there also exists 
coordination among direct investors through the operations of site loca-
tion consultants. These consulting firms work to extract greater conces-
sions in negotiations over individual projects, and in doing so create an 
atmosphere where governments believe it is necessary to offer incen-
tives to be considered for an investment project at all. Finally, informa-
tion asymmetries favor firms over governments. The latter have little 
idea of what is truly necessary to offer to land a particular investment, 
nor do they know when the next desirable investment opportunity will 
come along (particularly at the level of truly large projects, of which 
there are only about 200–300 annually in the United States). Coordina-
tion of government policies is the logical way to blunt the dynamic of 
competition for investment. Only the European Union, however, has 
proved successful at this; favorable basic laws (the Treaty of Rome) 
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and a centralized monitoring and enforcement capacity have enabled 
the EU to exert some control over the investment-attraction activities 
of Member State, regional, and local governments within its territory 
(Thomas 2000).
This chapter begins with a discussion of why a market for invest-
ment arises in a capitalist system with multiple polities. It highlights the 
investment imperative and documents the growing mobility of capital. 
It argues that the two-sided prisoner’s dilemma that comprises a mar-
ket has been reduced to a single prisoner’s dilemma among the buyers 
of investment due to inherent advantages investors possess. This result 
emphasizes the need for comprehensive, cooperative solutions among 
governments, at the state level to regulate cities’ behavior, and at the 
federal level to regulate states.
The bulk of this chapter analyzes the use and abuse of location in-
centives—those subsidies, of whatever form, that are used to attract 
investment to a particular jurisdiction. It briefly reviews the potential 
efficiency, equity, and environmental drawbacks to these subsidies, and 
then focuses on several case studies that illustrate the main policy di-
lemmas that arise with the use of location incentives. Several impor-
tant themes stand out: backroom deals, lack of transparency and ef-
fective citizen participation, the pernicious influence of site location 
consultants, and the comingling of eminent domain abuse with subsidy 
abuse.
The cases considered all come from the St. Louis metropolitan re-
gion. Missouri has been prominently noted as one of the country’s worst 
abusers of tax increment financing (LeRoy 2005, p. 146), and as one of 
the worst abusers of eminent domain (Berliner 2003, p. 117). The St. 
Louis region is notably more abusive than the Kansas City region, as 
documented by the Brookings Institution (Luce 2003, p. 16; see also 
LeRoy 2005, p. 146).
The chapter concludes with a number of policy recommendations. 
To preview them briefly, they are the introduction of transparency and 
accountability legislation, as pioneered in Minnesota, guarantees of ef-
fective citizen participation in the economic development process, a na-
tional ban on relocation subsidies, and eventual establishment of rules 
about what is and is not an allowable subsidy, along with the means to 
monitor and enforce these rules.
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THE MARkET FoR INvESTMENT
The market for investment consists of governments competing for 
investment and firms competing for investment sites. It arises as a re-
sult of two structural features of the world’s political-economic system. 
First, as it has been for over 500 years, the global economic system is 
capitalist in nature. Since most economic activity is private under capi-
talism, the ability of government to produce the investment it needs is 
limited. Second, the world is a political system with multiple polities. 
This is the ultimate structural basis for the mobility of capital, as Chase-
Dunn (1981, p. 31) argues. Thus, in a capitalist system with multiple 
polities, governments must compete with each other for investment, 
whether the competition takes place between nations or in subnational 
units such as U.S. states, Canadian provinces, and cities. 
Governments depend on private investors for investment because 
without it there is neither economic activity to tax (and hence no way to 
attain their goals, whatever they might be) nor economic outcomes con-
ducive to reelection. This classic formulation of Lindblom (1977) (the 
“privileged position” of business) has been updated by Winters (1996, 
p. 1–41), who extends it to nondemocratic states, and grounds it in more 
general theories of resource dependence. Because securing investment 
is a prerequisite to any goal government might have, Winters calls this 
the “investment imperative.” However, if capital were not mobile, 
governments and firms would simply negotiate over the conditions of 
investment (perhaps only implicitly). The addition of capital mobility 
intensifies this dynamic by forcing governments to compete for invest-
ment with other governments in the same structural situation.
In general, capital mobility refers to the ability of owners of capital 
to place it in a variety of locations (this must be distinguished from 
actual capital movements). For nonfinancial capital (the focus of this 
chapter), we can think of it also as the ability to coordinate production 
over an extended geographical scale. For both financial and nonfinan-
cial capital, these are importantly determined by the costs of transporta-
tion and communications. These costs have been falling dramatically, 
especially since the end of World War II. For example, the cost of in-
ternational phone calls fell in real terms approximately 95 percent be-
tween 1945 and 1990, and international passenger transport costs fell 
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by about 80 percent in the same period. We have, of course, witnessed 
further innovations in both of these areas, and rapidly declining costs to 
use them (Thomas 1997, p. 64–66). 
As mentioned above, the concept of a “market for investment” 
suggests that there is competition among sellers (investors) as well as 
among buyers. In practice, there is a lot more competition for invest-
ment than competition for investment sites. First, capital mobility is 
increasing. This means there is an increasing number of economically 
feasible sites for any given investment, leading to an intensification of 
the bidding wars over each investment, as firms have more options open 
to them and the collective action problem faced by governments be-
comes less tractable (Thomas 2000, p. 27–29).
Second, governments suffer from substantial information asym-
metries in their courting of investment. While a company interested in 
investing in a particular jurisdiction will have gathered a tremendous 
amount of information on that location, its political leaders, etc., the 
government may not even know the identity of the firm they are deal-
ing with; they may only talk to a site location consultant shopping for 
incentives (at least at the early stages). Government officials will not 
know the firm’s true decision criteria, and may not even know whether 
there are sites with which they are competing (Thomas 2000, p. 32). 
Finally, they do not know when the next desirable project will come 
along. Loveridge (1996, p. 152) estimated that there were only 200–300 
large-scale projects annually in the United States, with 15,000 invest-
ment attraction agencies pursuing them.
The third advantage favoring firms over states is that while states 
must organize to achieve cooperative results, uncoordinated action by 
firms may lead to their taking the same action. For example, if a given 
state inaugurates stricter antipollution laws, the likelihood is that any 
firm affected by this will mark that state off its list for future investment. 
This need not require any cooperation or even communication by the 
firms involved; it simply is a logical reaction to the new incentives each 
faces, as Lindblom (1977) has emphasized. In addition to this uncoor-
dinated sanctioning of adverse government policies, the widespread use 
of site location consultants has introduced an element of coordination 
into the behavior of direct investors that bond rating agencies provide 
for bond and stock investors. Sinclair (1994, pp. 144–145) has shown 
that bond ratings are affected by the rating agencies’ preferences for 
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government policies that have no necessary impact on their ability to 
service a loan. Similarly, site location consultants, in addition to trying 
to drive the very best bargain for their clients on each individual invest-
ment, also strive consciously to create a climate in which governments 
believe it is necessary to offer incentives in order to be considered for 
any investment. They do this both in private, preliminary discussions 
about individual projects, and through public comments in the press. In 
this way, location consulting firms help to coordinate the behavior of 
companies seeking investment sites. Moreover, they exacerbate the in-
formation asymmetry discussed earlier, and often receive a percentage 
of the incentive they obtain for their clients, giving them further incen-
tive to drive up incentive packages (Buchholz 1998, Chapter 5).
Taken together, these three factors explain why the market for in-
vestment, a two-sided prisoner’s dilemma in theory like any other mar-
ket, in fact reduces to a single prisoner’s dilemma among the buyers of 
investment. The usefulness of this model is demonstrated in both the 
United States and Canada, where voluntary “no-raiding” agreements 
among states or provinces have been universally unsuccessful (Thomas 
2000, pp. 167–168; 177). The ultimate solution to these bidding wars 
lies in what game theory would call third-party enforcement, which 
means that states must regulate the investment attraction activities of 
their local governments, and the federal government must curb the bid-
ding war among the states. We are, however, a long way from such a 
solution being politically viable, so the next section will consider the 
processes of competition for investment with a view toward illuminat-
ing the near-term reforms that may be achievable.
LoCATIoN INCENTIvES
Location incentives are those subsidies used to attract investment 
to a particular jurisdiction. They can take many forms: direct grant, tax 
break, free land, subsidized loan, etc. Some subsidies that started out 
as incentives to attract investors to a particular state have become so 
widely copied that it is now more reasonable to consider them what 
the EU calls “operating aids,” that is, subsidies for ongoing production. 
The classic example is the sales tax exemption for new equipment. The 
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Council of State Governments (Chi and Leatherby 1997, p. 2) classi-
fies these tax breaks as “incentives,” but their incentive function has 
been completely blunted by the almost total spread of these programs 
throughout the country. A related form of subsidy with locational goals 
is the “retention incentive,” a subsidy given to prevent a firm from leav-
ing its present jurisdiction. New York City, whose companies are fre-
quently targeted by other jurisdictions, awarded over $2 billion in reten-
tion subsidies between 1987 and 2000 (Good Jobs New York 2003). 
Location subsidies are not always a bad policy. However, like all 
subsidies, they can have important potential drawbacks in the areas of 
efficiency, equity, and the environment. In terms of efficiency, subsidies 
can induce firms to locate to inefficient locations, to continue ineffi-
cient production, and can harm efficient unsubsidized competitors. The 
major equity concern is that subsidies go to the owners of capital, who 
receive funds from the average taxpayer. This makes the after-tax, after-
subsidy distribution of income more uneven than it would have been 
in the absence of subsidies. Finally, for an important subset of subsi-
dies, the aided activity has harmful environmental consequences, such 
as building in a floodplain. These factors should give us pause when 
we consider whether a subsidy is an appropriate policy in a specific 
situation (Thomas 2000, pp. 4–5, 169–170). This section now turns to 
several case studies that illustrate the main policy dilemmas that arise 
with the use of location incentives. Rather than discussing high-profile 
national searches, such as those recently conducted by Boeing, I will 
analyze several of the far more common smaller deals funded by mu-
nicipal and/or state governments.
Cases
In 1997, Mastercard International announced its intention to con-
solidate several St. Louis area facilities to a single location, not neces-
sarily in Missouri. A consolidation can lead to an intense bidding war 
because it means that the firm involved is threatening to disinvest from 
one or more locations. As psychologists and game theorists have noted, 
people tend to fear the loss of an existing benefit more than they fear not 
receiving a new benefit of the same size (“hysteresis”) (Hardin 1982, 
pp. 82–83). The auto industry, which has suffered from overcapacity in 
North America for decades, has seen several major cases of head-to-head 
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consolidation, such as GM’s pitting of Arlington, Texas, and Ypsilanti, 
Michigan, against each other (Thomas 1997, p. 127). In the Mastercard 
case, the company was reported to have considered 15 cities altogether, 
with the final decision coming down to a faceoff between Dallas and 
the outer-ring St. Louis suburb of O’Fallon (Saint Louis Post-Dispatch, 
various issues). For Mastercard’s anticipated investment of just over 
$90 million, the state of Missouri put together an incentive package 
worth $42 million, plus several million more in tax abatements from 
O’Fallon and the local Francis Howell School District.2 This example 
highlights several of the points made earlier: Mastercard clearly had a 
better idea of what was going on with the state and local governments 
in Missouri than Missouri government officials knew of Mastercard’s 
intentions and options. There were numerous feasible options for the 
site, so Missouri officials could not simply assume that Mastercard was 
bluffing about the possibility of leaving the state altogether. While press 
reports do not indicate whether Mastercard used a site location con-
sultant, the company apparently used a tactic consultants recommend. 
Without having access to Mastercard decision makers and documen-
tation, it is impossible to say what the lowest amount of subsidy the 
company was willing to accept, but it likely was considerably less than 
what it received.
Much of what currently passes for “economic development” in U.S. 
localities is the subsidization of retail facilities. While Missouri likely 
overpaid for Mastercard, it was at least retaining jobs (and has since 
added several hundred new jobs at the site) that pay on the order of 
$50,000 per year. Retail jobs, by contrast, contain a high proportion 
of low-pay, zero or low-benefit, often part-time jobs. Why economic 
development agencies pursue them so aggressively is difficult to ex-
plain.3 For example, tax increment financing (TIF) is a subsidy widely 
used around the country for attracting retail operations (auto dealer-
ships in California, Wal-Marts everywhere, mixed-use retail/housing 
developments, etc.). In many cases, TIF is close to a straight cash grant 
in its structure: developers receive their money as soon as they have 
paid for the eligible costs specified in a redevelopment plan, while the 
city obtains the money to pay the developer by issuing revenue bonds 
backed by the incremental tax revenue the project is expected to gen-
erate.4 When state law allows a municipality to capture some of the 
sales tax increment, for example 50 percent in Missouri, a Wal-Mart 
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can be shopped around to cities until it finds one willing to give it a 
TIF. Municipal governments have proved generally willing, but often 
have received stiff resistance from citizen organizations that form to 
fight the plan. Similarly, independent developers dangle pet projects in 
front of municipal governments until one bites. Numerous examples of 
sales tax-driven TIFs exist in the St. Louis metropolitan area, including 
the suburbs of Richmond Heights (Galleria), Brentwood (Brentwood 
Pointe, Brentwood Promenade), Maplewood (Wal-Mart), and Des Peres 
(West County Center), the last a case of alleged blight in a city with a 
median family income over $90,000 in 1990 (St. Louis Post-Dispatch 
various issues).
O’Fallon, Missouri (estimated population 65,000), is the fastest 
growing city in the state. St. Charles County, in which it is located, 
has a higher adjusted median household income than any other county 
in both Missouri and Illinois (O’Fallon Journal 2005). Located across 
the Missouri River from St. Louis County, O’Fallon and St. Charles 
County in general are experiencing rapid migration from the city of St. 
Louis and its inner-ring suburbs. Yet officials in the main municipalities 
(O’Fallon, Wentzville, St. Peters, and St. Charles) have been more than 
willing to subsidize retail development, as if it weren’t going to follow 
the residents. St. Peters has used TIF to build a Costco discount super-
center. St. Charles TIF’d the redevelopment of a shopping center lo-
cated just off the exit from the main thoroughfare in Missouri, Interstate 
Highway 70. In 2003, O’Fallon proposed to bulldoze its downtown and 
give the developers involved $47 million in subsidies to build a new 
one at a total cost of $220 million. This case (in which I was an active 
participant, having moved there in 2002) illustrates many of the com-
mon problems seen in competition for investment. The following ac-
count is based on my experience in the battle against this project as well 
as reports in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch and the O’Fallon Journal.
The project began shrouded in secrecy, even from members of the 
Downtown Partnership, a consultative group that had been organized 
by the city. When the city announced the project in March 2003, a ma-
jority of the Downtown Partnership’s members resigned.
To determine if downtown redevelopment qualified for the use of 
tax increment financing, the city hired the consulting firm Peckham 
Guyton Albers and Viets (PGAV). Like its competitors in the St. Louis 
market, PGAV has virtually never seen a TIF project it said did not 
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qualify, and PGAV concluded that O’Fallon’s mixed-use “Downtown 
Plan” qualified for TIF. By contrast, in Kansas City the Economic De-
velopment Council has full-time staff to work for the TIF Commission. 
Of the proposed TIFs studied by the Kansas City City Auditor, 43 per-
cent were discouraged by TIF staff, 24 percent were denied by the TIF 
Commission, and 33 percent were approved (Funkhouser 1998, p. 88). 
The small size of municipalities in the St. Louis area reduces the level 
of expertise available to them and increases the number of competitors 
for any development project. Unsurprisingly, the Brookings Institution 
(Luce 2003, p. 16) found that there are far more abuses of the origi-
nal intent of the TIF statute (i.e., to develop economically deprived or 
“blighted” areas) in the St. Louis area than in the Kansas City area. 
Many of the approximately 100 businesses and 50 homeowners did 
not want to move, and the city made it clear that it would use its power 
of eminent domain if necessary. As has been the case in many other 
instances around the country, subsidy abuse goes hand in hand with 
what might be called “eminent domain abuse,” where rather than taking 
property for infrastructure or other government uses, a city will make a 
legislative finding that a private development project is a “public use” 
and replace one private business with another. U.S. Supreme Court rul-
ings have long directed lower courts to give great weight to legislative 
findings, and up to now they have been virtually impossible to chal-
lenge in court, for eminent domain (most recently in the 5–4 Kelo	v.	
New	London case) or for tax increment financing. However, the Michi-
gan Supreme Court ruled 9–0 in 2004 that such takings were unconsti-
tutional, and the U.S. Supreme Court in Kelo	v.	New	London held that 
states could give property owners greater protection against economic 
development projects if they so desired.5
In Missouri, municipalities are required to do a cost-benefit analysis 
of any TIF project outside Kansas City that is carried out as part of the 
consultant’s determination of the project’s eligibility for TIF. The prob-
lem here, as we see in other examples of competition for investment, is 
that these analyses end at the jurisdictional border. Indeed, they often 
end at the development area’s border, ignoring the effects of subsidized 
competition on sales of other firms, making much of the sales tax in-
crement “phantom increment,” as I called it in testimony before the 
O’Fallon Board of Aldermen. 
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In many cases, elected officials try to thwart citizen participation. 
In Hazelwood, Missouri (an inner-ring suburb of St. Louis), the city 
refused to accept charter amendment petitions, urged people to remove 
their names from them, and passed the ordinances establishing a TIF 
at their last meeting before Christmas, leaving opponents 20 days to 
acquire signatures referring the ordinances to the ballot at the worst 
possible time of the year to do so (they did not get enough signatures 
in time). In O’Fallon, the city threatened to charge people a fee for put-
ting up a “Preserve Old Town O’Fallon” yard sign (it eventually backed 
down), refused to allow signs in Board of Aldermen meetings, and its 
public relations firm set up an Astroturf “citizens’ group” to fight the op-
position Old Town Preservation Committee. However, in the O’Fallon 
case, citizen opposition was so widespread that a majority of aldermen 
were swayed against the project, and the mayor withdrew it in August 
2003.
CoNCLUSIoN
This chapter highlights both the structural sources of competition 
for investment and the concrete policy issues that arise when a city or 
state pursues an investment. There are several policy conclusions we 
should take away from this analysis. First, too much economic develop-
ment activity takes place behind closed doors. In many states, there is 
no way to even find out how much state and local governments give in 
subsidies. The first recommendation, then, is to adopt transparency and 
accountability legislation, as pioneered in Minnesota, which requires 
state and local governments to report all subsidies individually and to 
take sanctions against firms that fail to keep their commitments. If the 
true extent of subsidization becomes widely known, I believe it will 
become a more salient issue than it has been in many states. Some states 
may need strengthening of their Sunshine Laws (in O’Fallon, aggres-
sive use of Missouri’s Sunshine Law yielded a great deal of valuable in-
formation). In addition, there should be a guarantee of a referendum on 
large projects which completely change the character of a city (some-
thing unavailable in O’Fallon’s case due to its classification as a Fourth 
Class city). Second, Congress should enact a national ban on relocation 
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subsidies. Since these merely move jobs from one place to another with 
no benefit to the country as a whole, they are the most egregious type of 
subsidy and one that is widely recognized as a problem. At the time of 
this writing, the case Cuno v. Daimler-Chrysler is before the U.S. Su-
preme Court. If the Appellate Court’s decision is upheld, it would inval-
idate certain investment tax credits in Ohio and other states (Johnston 
2006). Similarly, states should ban the use of in-state relocation sub-
sidies, which has been a problem with TIF use in Minnesota’s Twin 
Cities area (LeRoy and Hinkley 2000). In the long run, I would argue 
that we need to move closer to the European Union’s model of estab-
lishing rules about what is and is not an allowable subsidy, along with 
the means to monitor and enforce these rules. That has been the only 
model of successfully controlling location and other subsidies (Thomas 
2000, pp. 238–240).
Notes
The author thanks the participants in the “Reining in the Competition for Capital” con-
ference for their feedback, along with comments from Dennis Judd, Terry Jones, Lana 
Stein, and Andrew Glassberg.
 1.  The term “market for investment” was coined by Guisinger (1985, p. 13). He 
considers firms to be the “buyers” of investment sites, and governments to the 
“sellers” of those locations. However, due to the structural imbalances described 
below, it is more natural to see the market as truly one for the investments 
rather than the investment sites, making states the “buyers” and companies the 
“sellers.”
 2.  Interestingly, multiple Lexis/Nexis searches of MasterCard and Dallas, as well 
as contact with the business editor of the Dallas Morning News, turned up no 
references to such negotiations in Texas publications. This suggests that while 
the company said it had other options it was considering, it was in fact was only 
considering the St. Louis area. One site location consultant told me he routinely 
recommends this stratagem to his clients. Numerous instances of this practice 
are documented in LeRoy (2005). Note that I reject his contention in Chapter 2 
that subsidies almost never affect location choices. This is inconsistent with his 
acceptance of a prisoner’s dilemma model of avoiding subsidies. If subsidies 
do not increase the probability of landing an investment or cutting a ribbon, a 
prisoner’s dilemma cannot arise.
 3.  It may have to do with the size of the municipality. Smaller governments are usu-
ally not held accountable by their voters for overall macroeconomic outcomes, 
so their economic development efforts are aimed more at tax revenue than job 
creation (Thomas 2000, p. 44n29). However, by the logic of my model, the over-
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all location pattern of retail facilities is likely to be little changed if all munici-
palities use location subsidies than if all refrained from doing so.
 4.  In Missouri, many TIFs, especially smaller ones, are financed on a pay-as-you-
go basis. In such cases, TIF is not equivalent to a cash grant because the stretch-
ing out of payments over time reduces the present value relative to the nominal 
value. See Missouri Department of Economic Development (2005).
 5. See the following pages from the Institute for Justice Web site: http:/www.ij.org/
private_property/michigan/index.html and http://www.ij.org/private_property/
connecticut/index.html (accessed February 2005). 
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3
The Fiscal Consequences 
of Competition for Capital
Peter Fisher
University	of	Iowa
To state and local officials, competition for capital has become the 
driving principle underlying economic development policy, and the pol-
icy tools most readily available are tax cuts and direct subsidies. Thus, 
this chapter is partly about the long-run revenue gains or losses from 
economic development incentive programs. Such programs are invari-
ably touted as measures to expand the tax base and increase revenues, 
and officials generally assume that incentives in the long run more than 
pay for themselves. Is this really the case?
This chapter is also about the ways in which competition for capital 
alters tax and budget policies more broadly. Has the perception by state 
and local officials that they must constantly compete for investment 
and jobs changed the structure of state and local tax systems? Has there 
been a broad shift away from taxes on business? Has this increased the 
regressivity of state-local tax systems? Have budget priorities shifted 
as well? 
CoMPETITIoN FoR CAPITAL: THE PoLICy TooLS
The need for the broader view becomes clear as soon as one attempts 
to determine what constitutes an effort to compete for capital. Let’s 
consider the range of possibilities, from the narrowest to the broadest.
Discretionary incentives
• One-time subsidy packages negotiated with a specific firm.
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• Discretionary grant or loan programs provided out of annual ap-
propriations, where the firm must apply for funding. The pro-
grams could subsidize capital expenditure, provide free public 
infrastructure improvements, or pay for job training. 
• Discretionary tax abatements and tax increment financing. These 
programs require no explicit funding, and so have no annual lim-
its statewide. 
Entitlement incentives
• Investment tax credits, jobs tax credits, or R&D credits under the 
state corporate income tax. Here the firm receives the benefit au-
tomatically, provided the investment is in an eligible sector and 
that the size of the investment or number of new jobs exceeds 
some threshold. There may be geographic targeting: enterprise 
zones are the major example. 
• Local property tax abatements, where they are largely formula 
driven, once eligibility criteria have been met.
Tax cuts
• Competitive tax provisions. These are features of the tax code 
that apply to every corporation (though not equally) and that do 
not require investment or job creation on the part of the business, 
but where there is nonetheless a competition rationale presented 
to justify the tax expenditure. Examples are single-factor appor-
tionment, exemption of inventories from property taxation, and 
exemption of fuel and utilities from the sales tax. These tax pro-
visions are often advertised by economic development agencies 
as reasons to locate in their state.
• Broad-based tax cuts, such as rate cuts, that apply across the 
board to any business. Again, the arguments made in their favor 
may differ little from the more explicit development incentives: 
we have to cut taxes to remain competitive. The arguments may 
be extended beyond taxes that clearly fall directly on business to 
cuts in individual income taxes, for example, or the tax on capital 
gains. 
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Before addressing the broader effects of competition on tax struc-
ture and regressivity, we will explore what we know about the fiscal 
effects of explicit economic development subsidies: the discretionary 
incentive programs and the entitlement tax incentives. We begin by at-
tempting to define what we mean by “fiscal effects” in such cases.
MEASURING FISCAL EFFECTS
What is a fiscal benefit? A particular governmental action (such as 
providing a direct subsidy or cutting a tax) will have a positive fis-
cal effect if, in the long run, it increases business activity and the new 
activity adds more in tax revenues than it causes in additional public 
service costs. There will then be a fiscal surplus to be distributed to the 
rest of the taxpayers as lower taxes or better services or both. (If the fis-
cal surplus materializes only after some period of time, the discounted 
value must be positive.) Public service costs can rise in a number of 
ways, from direct expenditure benefiting new businesses, to increased 
expenditure to serve new populations induced to in-migrate, to rising 
labor costs for government because of upward pressure on wages and 
land prices. 
This formulation ignores the distributional question: How is the 
surplus distributed among the population? As we will see, distribution 
is an important issue, but for now we will focus on measuring the fis-
cal surplus. The logical place to begin is with the direct revenue from 
a new business. When an incentive program is put in place, subsequent 
investment will produce both direct revenue gains and direct revenue 
losses. The investment that would not have occurred but for the incen-
tive produces a gain; the remaining investment produces a loss, to the 
extent that it received the incentives (because they were entitlements 
or because they were awarded on the false belief that they were neces-
sary). As we will see, we have some pretty good estimates of direct 
fiscal effects.
What about the direct expenditure necessitated by new business? 
It is of course very difficult to measure or generalize about the local 
investment in infrastructure, or the ongoing increases in expenditure for 
services such as police and fire protection, that is caused by new busi-
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ness activity. It is a common assumption that these expenditures are not 
large, and that business activity generally produces a sizable fiscal sur-
plus. That’s certainly the argument made for seeking new commercial 
and industrial tax base—that this will permit tax relief for residents. 
Indirect effects are even more problematic. Here we must estimate 
the net fiscal effects of growth in the labor force or reduction in the local 
unemployment rate, including demands for additional services and the 
additional taxes produced by in-migrants or newly employed residents. 
These effects come about not only from the employment in the business 
receiving the subsidy, but new investment also may stimulate business 
expansion in supplying sectors, or in demanding sectors (who previ-
ously had to import inputs).
When new jobs are created in a community, those new jobs must 
be filled by persons in that community’s labor market in one of four 
ways:
 1) By drawing people from the ranks of the unemployed within 
the labor market.
 2) By drawing people into the area’s labor force who were not 
previously seeking work.
 3) By inducing people to migrate into the labor market.
 4) By drawing people away from existing jobs (which are then 
left unfilled; if these jobs are, in turn, filled in one of the other 
ways, such as through in-migration, then the ultimate effect 
of the new jobs is simply in-migration).
In other words, new jobs can have four effects: lowering the unem-
ployment rate, increasing the labor force participation rate, inducing in-
migration, or displacing existing jobs. Research on the effects of “labor 
demand shocks”—a sudden increase in jobs as a result of a new plant 
or plant expansion—indicates that for every 100 new jobs in a region, 
about 7 will be filled from the ranks of the unemployed, about 16 by 
drawing existing residents into the labor force, and the remaining 77 
from in-migration (Bartik 1991, p. 95). These are the long-run effects 
(after several years); in the short run, there may be a more substantial 
reduction in unemployment, but as in-migration continues in response 
to the new job opportunities, the unemployment rate will creep back up 
again. Research also shows that such labor demand shocks will not have 
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a significant long-run effect on wage rates for a given occupation; thus 
there will be little or no job displacement (Bartik 1991, Chapter 6). 
If residential development does not pay its way—and research gen-
erally shows that it does not—then in-migrants represent a fiscal drain 
(Altshuler and Gomez-Ibanez 1993, Chapter 6). The secondary effects 
of incentive-induced growth thus could be negative, since most of the 
jobs will in the long run be filled by in-migration. The remaining jobs, 
filled by existing residents, should produce a fiscal surplus, since those 
residents will presumably be paying more taxes but consuming the same 
(or perhaps less) in services. But this surplus (from 22 percent of the 
jobs) will probably not be enough to offset losses from the remainder.
There is some evidence on the net fiscal effects of concomitant 
expansions in employment and population. A study of Montgomery 
County, Maryland, concluded that for manufacturing facilities, dis-
tribution centers, small office buildings, and even R&D facilities, the 
direct fiscal surplus from the business investment was insufficient (or 
just barely sufficient) to offset the negative fiscal effects of accompany-
ing residential growth (Altshuler and Gomez-Ibanez 1993). Only large, 
white-collar office facilities generated a net surplus. Furthermore, Ladd 
and Yinger (1991) found that population growth produced an increase 
in the cost of city services. This is because as cities grow, labor and land 
costs rise, and congestion increases production costs; these effects out-
weigh the limited cost reductions achieved through economies of scale. 
The issue is not completely settled, however, due to the methodological 
issues that abound in performing a fiscal impact analysis. 
This raises an obvious question: If a new manufacturing or distri-
bution facility under normal conditions does not generally produce a 
large enough fiscal surplus to offset the fiscal losses produced by the 
residential development that follows that expansion, or produces only a 
slight net surplus, how could we expect subsidized business expansion 
to pay for itself?
The upshot is that it may well make sense to focus our attention on 
the direct tax effects of incentives. While pro-incentive or pro-growth 
advocates are fond of adding generous helpings of multiplier effects to 
their analyses, when we consider all of the evidence it seems likely that 
the fiscal consequences of these multiplier effects, and of the effects 
of population growth induced directly by the plant itself, are unlikely 
to be positive. (The exception is probably a project creating high-pay-
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ing, white-collar jobs.) When combined with the fact that we also must 
ignore the direct public expenditure effects of business investment, be-
cause we can’t measure it, the direct tax consequences of incentives al-
most surely provide a more favorable view of the fiscal effects of incen-
tives than would a more comprehensive analysis. If the direct business 
tax effects are negative, it is quite unlikely that the overall effects are 
anything but even more negative.
The way for a community to attempt to ensure that the direct tax ef-
fects are positive is to a) make sure you don’t give away all of your tax 
revenue to get the facility in the first place or b) make sure the facility 
stays around long enough to pay a significant amount of taxes, and c) 
provide incentives only in cases where the incentives are decisive. The 
trend is to provide ever more generous incentives, and we have already 
seen instances where states in effect give away everything, including 
the personal taxes of the employees (Michigan’s Renaissance Zones, 
Pennsylvania’s Keystone Opportunity Zones). And though almost ev-
eryone claims to be successfully applying a “but for” test in their dis-
cretionary incentive programs, given the asymmetry of information in 
negotiating subsidies, it is highly unlikely that this is the case.
So what do we know about the direct tax consequences of subsi-
dies and incentives? We look first at the most publicized subsidies—the 
large, package deals offered to land a particular plant—and then at the 
tax incentives and tax cuts that function as entitlements, where most of 
the research has been focused.
THE PACkAGE DEALS
The large negotiated incentive packages represent the best case sce-
nario for positive fiscal effects because there is a greater probability that 
the incentive package may be decisive. The community is presumably 
exercising discretion, not simply handing out incentives by formula to 
all comers, and there is at least some indication that the community 
would not get the business without incentives, in light of what the com-
peting locations have to offer, in economic advantages as well as incen-
tives. While the costs per job have escalated dramatically, proponents 
may argue that the costs are not really costs at all, because the firm and 
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the employees (and all the multiplier effects) will generate tax revenues 
far exceeding the incentive cost.
Considerable attention has been paid recently to a paper by Green-
stone and Moretti (2003) for the National Bureau of Economic Research 
that purports to demonstrate that communities benefit from offering 
subsidies to large plants. Greenstone and Moretti looked at a sample 
of major facility locations reported in Site	Selection magazine, which 
identified not only the county that “won” the plant but the one or two 
runner-up counties as well. The authors found that the winner and loser 
counties had similar rates of income growth prior to the plant opening, 
but that the winner counties subsequently experienced a statistically 
significant boost in the rate of growth of wages and also of property 
values, as well as government revenues and expenditures. Princeton 
economist Alan Krueger, in a column in the New	York	Times, praised 
the study as “compelling” and claimed it showed that cities that offer 
generous incentive packages and win a large facility “seem to benefit 
from the arrangement” (Krueger 2003). The clear implication is that 
even incentives amounting to hundreds of thousands of dollars per job 
are worth the expense. 
A closer look reveals that this study tells us less than it might ap-
pear with respect to the fiscal consequences of such deals. The results 
in terms of economic growth are not surprising; what they show is 
that, comparing similar counties, the one that gets a new plant does 
better than the one that doesn’t—the growth trends in wage levels get 
a bump up. It would be surprising, in fact, if they didn’t. Nor is it re-
markable that both revenue and expenditure rose in the counties getting 
the economic boost from the new plant; one would expect that popula-
tion growth would require additional services, and local governments 
must balance their budgets. Expenditures, at least in some categories, 
exceeded the increase in population, but we do not know if this reflects 
better services or higher costs of production. In sum, the results do not 
tell us whether the plants generated a fiscal surplus. There could well be 
higher taxes on residents and other firms to support the rising expendi-
tures necessitated by the new plant and its employees.
What about the finding that property values increased? Greenstone 
and Moretti (2003) argue that the net effects of the new plant—the in-
creased job opportunities and increased economic activity generally, as 
well as the cost and revenue effects of the subsidies and increased tax 
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base—will be capitalized into property values. If property values rise, it 
indicates that the net effect of the new plant has been positive. In other 
words, the cost of the incentives was more than offset by the other ben-
efits of the new facility. Note that Greenstone and Moretti do not claim 
that the fiscal benefits exceed the fiscal costs. Local government could 
well be facing increased expenditure demands that exceed the revenue 
gains, forcing higher tax rates for the same level of service; but as long 
as these fiscal losses are more than offset by other gains that translate 
into greater demand for land and housing, property values will rise. 
Greenstone and Moretti (2003) acknowledge that they are looking 
at the local benefits of new plant location, and that state government is 
paying part of the incentive cost. This is not a minor point. In my ex-
tensive research on economic development subsidies with Alan Peters, 
we found that a typical package of state and local grants, loans, tax 
credits, and tax abatements granted to a manufacturing firm (and most 
of the plants in the G&M study were manufacturing) consisted in about 
equal portions of state subsidies and local subsidies (Fisher and Peters 
1998). In enterprise zones, about 59 percent of the typical package in 
the 13 states we studied consisted of state incentives (Peters and Fisher 
2002, p. 112). The important point here is that local property values 
may reflect most or all of the benefits of a plant location, but will defi-
nitely not reflect about half of the costs (more in enterprise zones), since 
state costs will not be capitalized at all into local property values. Fur-
thermore, they assume complete capitalization of local incentive costs, 
which is quite doubtful. Previous studies of property taxes have gener-
ally found only partial capitalization. Their study therefore does not tell 
us, after all, whether the locality earns a fiscal surplus, nor does it tell us 
whether the overall benefits to the state as a whole exceed the state and 
local subsidy costs, which is the most important question. 
So what does the Greenstone and Moretti (2003) study really tell 
us about the wisdom of incentive policy? We don’t know the size of 
the winning and losing subsidy packages, nor do we really know if the 
subsidy offered by the winning county was decisive. We do not know 
whether the firm had already made up its mind where to go on the basis 
of economic considerations and was simply playing one community off 
against another to gain concessions. If the incentives didn’t matter, they 
were not a good deal no matter how much wages and property values 
rose. 
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We do know that even these negotiated incentives are not always 
decisive. For example, a debate raged in Nebraska in the early part of 
this decade over a package of $75 million in tax breaks to induce Union 
Pacific Railroad (UP) to move 1,038 jobs from St. Louis to Omaha. 
While UP told Nebraska officials that they would not move the jobs 
without the incentives, they were telling a different story in St. Louis, 
where company officials stated that the move was motivated by “criti-
cal strategic considerations, not tax incentives,” and that it made sense 
“from a synergy viewpoint” because the company’s IT staff was already 
in Omaha (Hicks 2004). And in Iowa in the early 1990s, when citizens 
took county supervisors to court over a subsidy to a planned IPSCO 
steel plant, the company was asked if it would reverse its decision to 
locate in Iowa if the lawsuit were successful; it said it would not. The 
company admitted publicly that the incentives made no difference. It 
is not often that we are provided such insights into corporate behavior, 
but it would be foolish to imagine that such instances of large incentives 
being granted unnecessarily are rare. 
Furthermore, these are short-run effects: the study looked at the first 
five years after a plant location. The long-run effect on property val-
ues may be lessened as the local housing market responds to the initial 
increase in demand brought about by the expansion of job opportuni-
ties. And the long-run effects could be wiped out altogether if the plant 
leaves. As my colleague Alan Peters has pointed out, many of the major 
disasters in the incentive wars have occurred after five years, including 
the United Airlines facility in Indianapolis that closed, leaving the city 
holding the bag for $320 million in subsidies.
More importantly, the results of these findings for a nonrandom 
sample of the largest package deals tell us little about the fiscal conse-
quences of incentive competition in general, including the more mod-
est one-time deals that are far more numerous, and including all of the 
entitlement incentives. 
ENTITLEMENT TAx INCENTIvES AND TAx CUTS
Let’s turn our attention now to the wide range of tax cuts and tax 
incentives that operate as entitlements. Here there is not even a pretense 
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of the firm making a “but for” determination. There is simply a belief or 
hope that the tax cuts will stimulate some growth that would not have 
occurred otherwise. But here we also have a more researchable ques-
tion: Do places that offer lower taxes, or tax incentives, grow faster than 
other places, controlling for all the other factors that influence invest-
ment and location decisions? 
This question has been extensively researched. We need not review 
that literature here, except to say that some have argued that a consen-
sus position has emerged that the interstate elasticity of economic ac-
tivity with respect to taxes on business is somewhere between −0.1 and 
−0.6, with the most likely figure −0.2 or −0.3 (Bartik 1991; Wasylenko 
1997). This position is not without its challengers. But let’s proceed 
for now with the assumption that −0.2 or −0.3 is a reasonable estimate. 
This means, for example, that a 10 percent cut in taxes would produce a 
2–3 percent increase in economic activity. What does this tell us about 
the fiscal gains or losses from incentives or tax cuts?
Bartik (1994) has argued that the fiscal effects of tax cuts are bound 
to be negative. He shows that tax revenues will increase approximately 
by the percentage increase in jobs induced by the tax cut, and decrease 
approximately by the percentage reduction in the tax rate. (The truly in-
duced jobs produce revenue gains; the tax cut on all the jobs that would 
have been there anyway [the noninduced employment] produces rev-
enue losses.) He then arrives at the formula for the net change in revenue 
per new job, expressed as a function of the elasticity E: 
        
Revenue gain (or loss) per new job = revenue per job × (1 + 1/E).
For the revenue per job term, Bartik substitutes the national average 
state-local direct business tax revenue per job across all business sec-
tors in 1989, which was about $1,620. Assuming an elasticity of −0.3, 
the average fiscal effect of a new job would then be −$3,780. Updating 
this estimate to 2003, we find that business tax revenue per job is now 
probably between $3,000 and $3,700, depending on which taxes are 
included.1 Using Bartik’s elasticity figure again (−0.3) and the lower 
revenue figure, annual revenue losses for each new, induced job would 
be about $7,000. If one agrees with Wasylenko (1997) that −0.2 is a 
more likely elasticity, and uses the higher revenue figure ($3,700), the 
fiscal losses more than double, to $14,900. 
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Let’s be clear what these numbers mean. If a state embarks on a pro-
gram of tax incentives that ends up attracting 100 new jobs that would 
not have been there but for the incentives, the state and its local govern-
ments should expect to have $700,000–$1,490,000 less in business tax 
revenues each	and	every	year (assuming an elasticity of −0.2 to −0.3) 
than they would have had without the tax incentive program. All this to 
provide an estimated 77 jobs to people who have migrated to the state 
and 23 jobs to existing residents who otherwise would have been unem-
ployed or not in the labor force. 
The importance of Bartik’s formulation is that it effectively under-
cuts the arguments of public officials and development practitioners 
that job creation is not only good policy, it is free policy—we can create 
jobs and add revenue at the same time. But let’s look at the competi-
tion for business as if communities were offering sites at varying “tax 
prices,” where a tax price is the cost to the business of a unit of public 
services. The problem for communities is that in this competition for 
capital, they are operating on an inelastic demand curve. Basic eco-
nomic analysis tells us that when you cut price in the face of inelastic 
demand, you lose revenue. 
States and communities that respond to the competitive environ-
ment by offering ever more generous incentives, as has been the pat-
tern for the past two decades, on the grounds that this generosity will 
be rewarded with more investment, are in effect saying, “We lose a 
little more on each plant, but we’re going to make it up in volume.” Of 
course, larger incentives are more effective, but total fiscal losses rise 
proportionately. This is because the gains from additional induced jobs 
continue to be offset by ever larger losses from all the jobs that would 
have been there anyway but now are paying little in taxes. It can be 
shown that the percentage of new jobs that are actually induced can 
be found by multiplying the elasticity by the percentage cut in taxes 
(Peters and Fisher 2002, Appendix C). With an elasticity of −0.3 and a 
fairly typical incentive package amounting to a 30 percent cut in taxes, 
only 9 percent of the new jobs arriving in a community will be attribut-
able to the tax cut. The incentives provided to the other 91 percent are 
a pure waste of money. 
If we are evaluating the fiscal consequences of incentives, however, 
we would want a formulation that measures the effects of cuts in mar-
ginal tax rates on the gross flow of economic activity (annual establish-
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ment births, for example). Most of the research on taxes and business 
activity, however, has measured changes in the average level of business 
taxation and changes in the level of employment. My own research with 
Alan Peters (Peters and Fisher 2002, Appendix C) has shown that cuts 
in marginal tax rates have identical long-run effects to cuts in average 
tax rates only under the fairly restrictive condition that the marginal rate 
cuts are constant and permanent. But most incentives are neither; they 
are one-time grants or the equivalent in tax expenditures, or they are of 
limited duration, and generally front-loaded (the percentage abatement, 
for example, declining over time). 
We have also shown that one cannot generalize from the fiscal ef-
fects of providing an incentive for one firm, to the fiscal effects of adopt-
ing an ongoing incentive program that will apply to the stream of estab-
lishments entering the community in all future years. Here communi-
ties face an additional problem (beyond the inelasticity of demand): the 
firms they do succeed in attracting don’t stay forever. The argument for 
incentives rather than permanent cuts is made on fiscal grounds: they 
are front-loaded or temporary precisely because officials count on the 
firms paying the full rate in the future. 
But local officials appear to routinely overestimate the longevity 
of business establishments. There is in fact a substantial gross flow of 
establishments into and out of communities every year. Data from the 
Census Bureau’s Standard Statistical Establishment List show that on 
average during the early 1990s, establishment births and moves into a 
particular zip code (approximating an enterprise zone) averaged about 
9.5 percent of the existing number of establishments per year; rates of 
establishment deaths or moves out were about 1.5 percentage points 
higher (Peters and Fisher 2002). Non-enterprise zone zip codes showed 
even higher rates of establishment births and deaths. Such high rates of 
turnover imply average lifespans that are not all that long. 
There are only a few studies of the survival rates of business estab-
lishments. One study showed a median survival time of about 8.3 years 
for dependent establishments (branch plants) in goods-producing sec-
tors (Boden 2000). This overstates the case to the extent that the surviv-
al distributions in the study cited were driven by large numbers of new, 
small businesses—the mean employment size was about 16—while in-
centives are generally focused on larger firms and branch plants. Stud-
ies have consistently found that the larger the initial employment size, 
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the higher the survival rates. Data from the tax abatement program in 
Ohio, however, for 1,581 abatement agreements established between 
1990 and 1997, shows that the median size establishment granted abate-
ments for the creation of jobs was only about 70 employees, not as large 
as one might think.2 Another study, moreover, indicated that the median 
survival rate even for larger establishments (over 50 employees) was 
only in the neighborhood of eight years (Joel Popkin and Company 
1991). And this is at the national level, where only births and deaths 
matter. At the local level, relocations would reduce these rates. 
What is the significance of this? Property tax abatements are often 
spread over an 8- to 10-year period, and states often grant generous 
tax credits that are not refundable and therefore cannot be used up in 
the first year but must be carried forward (sometimes for as long as 10 
years), eliminating tax liability in all of those years. If the median life 
expectancy of a new establishment in a community is about 8 to 10 
years, this means that over half of the establishments granted abate-
ments or credits will no longer be around to pay the full tax rate. 
Even these estimates of the direct revenue losses from tax incen-
tives or business tax cuts are overly optimistic. The reason is that they 
are based on research showing the elasticity of business activity with 
respect to tax cuts, holding	all	else	constant, including the level of pub-
lic services. State and local governments must balance their budgets, so 
that business tax cuts, in practice, must be accompanied either by reduc-
tions in services or increases in taxes on other property or individuals. 
There has been substantial research showing that business activity is 
responsive to service levels as well, and some have even argued that tax 
increases accompanied by spending increases on nonwelfare services 
would have a positive effect on growth (see Bartik 1996; Fisher 1997). 
Thus, in the real world, incentive programs that come at the expense of 
public services would not generate even the modest levels of induced 
investment assumed above. The elasticities would be lower, probably 
close to zero, which means the direct fiscal effects are much higher 
(remember that with an elasticity of −0.1, the average annual loss rises 
to $33,500 per job). With a zero elasticity, of course, the net total fiscal 
effect is simply the total expenditure on incentives, since there are no 
induced jobs. 
Some readers might say at this point, “But wait—you keep talking 
about elasticities of −0.2 or −0.3, or even lower, but those are interstate 
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or intermetropolitan elasticities; we know that taxes have much larger 
effects on location within a metropolitan area.” It is true that economists 
have long argued that taxes are most likely to alter location decisions 
within a given metropolitan area, since the other determinants of loca-
tion (labor cost, utilities, access to markets) will be the same throughout 
the area, leaving room for differences in less significant costs (such as 
local property tax differentials) to tip the balance. It is also true that 
the empirical research has generally borne this out, though there are 
far fewer studies and a wider range of elasticities. But all this tells us 
is that incentives are most likely to work precisely where they are least 
justified—moving jobs around within the same labor market. And while 
the higher elasticities (above 1.0) mean that a particular locality may in-
deed gain revenue, this will come at the expense of its neighbors. Even 
worse, to the extent that the state contributes to incentive packages, 
state government will be paying cities to engage in a beggar-thy-neigh-
bor strategy. Surely the sensible way to approach the fiscal issue is to 
ask whether a state and the state’s local governments, in the aggregate, 
gain or lose. And the answer is that they lose. 
Incentive programs in the last 20 years have assumed a life of their 
own; they are viewed as essential policy in good times and bad, in poor 
states and rich states. And state and local officials see themselves in a 
never-ending arms race. The results have been documented in terms of 
the escalating cost per job of the most publicized incentive battles for 
large facilities. But the same thing is happening, albeit much more qui-
etly, with the more routine incentive programs that function as entitle-
ments. In my research with Alan Peters we have modeled the state and 
local tax systems and incentive programs in 20 states, and were able to 
measure the average effective tax rate on a new plant built by a multi-
state manufacturing firm in each of these 20 states in 1990 and 1998. 
We also measured the effect of state and local tax incentives in lowering 
this effective rate. The results are shown in Figure 3.1.
The effective tax rate before incentives declined during this period 
by about half a percentage point, but the rate after incentives declined 
even more, by 1.3 percentage points. In just eight years, in other words, 
there was a 30 percent drop in the effective tax rate on new investment. 
Over this eight-year period, the average incentive package rose from 
about 10 percent of gross state-local taxes, to about 29 percent (Fisher 
2002).
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THE LARGER CoNSEqUENCES oF CoMPETITIoN 
We turn now to the effects of competition on tax policy more gen-
erally. It is clear from debates about tax policy in the last decade that 
competitiveness arguments are at the forefront. 
How have these arguments changed business taxation and state/lo-
cal taxes and budgets?
The Decline of the Corporate Income Tax
One of the most significant trends in the past 20 years has been the 
shift in apportionment formulas away from the standard three-factor 
towards formulas that weight sales more heavily.3 As recently as 1980, 
only five states weighted sales more heavily; by 1999, this number had 
increased to 33 (Stark 2002). The most common formula in 1999 in-
Figure 3.1  Effective Corporate Income Tax Rates on Manufacturing 
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volved double weighted sales (24 states); four states used single-fac-
tor apportionment (100 percent on the basis of sales) exclusively, and 
another four allowed it as an option or allowed it for certain sectors. 
These measures are invariably touted as a means to make the state more 
attractive to exporting firms, and this argument continues to be used as 
more states consider moving towards single-factor apportionment. 
The effects of single-factor apportionment are to reduce state tax 
revenues. Massachusetts, which adopted single-factor in 1996, lost an 
estimated $182 million in FY2001 as a result, while Illinois lost $95 
million in FY1999 and Pennsylvania lost $89.7 million in FY2002 from 
their triple-weighted sales formula (Gavin 2001; Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts 2001; Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 2001). 
What is the end result of the proliferation of incentives, the shift 
toward single-factor apportionment, and other measures that cut the ef-
fective state/local tax rate on business? The clearest picture emerges 
when we look at the decline in corporate income tax revenues as a share 
of total state/local tax revenue. Figure 3.2 shows that this share peaked 
near 10 percent in 1979–1980, dropped to around 8 percent through 
the rest of the 1980s, and then began a precipitous decline to around 6 
percent during the most recent 6–7 years.
Corporate income tax revenues have also declined as a share of 
gross state product (GSP). Figure 3.3 below shows that this share de-
clined substantially over the past 25 years, falling from 0.51 percent in 
1980 to 0.27 percent by 2004.
During the past 25 years there has also been a decline in the aver-
age effective state/local corporate income tax rate, as measured by total 
state-local corporate income tax collections divided by corporate prof-
its. These estimates are shown in Figure 3.4. The reason for the uptick 
in rates in 1999–2001 is not obvious.4 The decade-to-decade trend re-
mains pretty clear, however. The rate averaged 5.6 percent in the 1970s, 
6.9 percent in the 1980s, and 5.1 percent from 1990 through 2002. 
Is all of this decline in the corporate income tax due to competitive 
pressures to cut rates, pursue exporting firms through heavier weight-
ing of sales factors, and adopt ever more generous credits and exemp-
tions? No, it isn’t. Some of the decline is due to the increasing use of 
pass-through entities: S corporations and limited liability companies 
(LLCs). One study estimated that the rise of LLCs appears to have re-
duced state corporate income tax revenue by about one-third (Fox and 
Luna 2003).
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Another factor that cannot be ignored is the increasing use of tax 
avoidance schemes. The most notorious of these are the passive invest-
ment companies (PICS) whereby a firm establishes a shell subsidiary in 
Delaware and transfers rights to the store name or logo or trademark to 
the subsidiary. The subsidiary then charges royalties to the parent firm’s 
operating establishments across the country for use of this intangible 
property, effectively transferring profits from states where the firm actu-
ally has a presence (because the royalty expense is deducted from profits 
in those states) to Delaware, which does not tax royalty income (Maze-
rov 2003). Even here, competitiveness arguments are made. When the 
governor of Iowa proposed closing this loophole (which costs the state 
an estimated $25–$40 million annually), legislative leaders rejected the 
idea on the grounds that it was a tax increase on business, and the Iowa 
economy could not afford to drive business out of the state by increas-
ing taxes. Profit shifting and other tax avoidance measures appear to 
have accounted for about a third of the decline in corporate tax revenue 
in Iowa from 1980 to 2004 (Fisher 2006).
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The Shift Away from Business Taxes
State and local tax policy since 1980 has shifted the composition 
of taxes away from taxes with an initial impact on business. The share 
of state and local taxes paid by businesses declined from 46.5 percent 
in 1980 to 44.0 percent in 1990 and to 40.7 percent in 2000, before ris-
ing back to 42.5 percent in 2003 (as the recession and earlier income 
tax cuts eroded personal income tax revenues dramatically) (Bradley 
2003). State and local taxes paid by business also declined as a percent 
of personal income, from 4.9 percent in 1980 and in 1990, to about 4.4 
percent in 2000 and in 2003. The pattern is the same if one measures 
the burden relative to private sector GDP. Importantly, the taxes with 
an initial impact on business that have shown growth since FY2000 
are overwhelmingly the taxes that are most likely to be shifted forward 
to consumers—property taxes (much of which are on rental property) 
and sales and excise taxes—and the payroll taxes, which are generally 
thought to be borne by employees (Bradley 2003). 
The Increasing Regressivity of State and Local Taxes 
Has the decline in the importance of the corporate income tax, and 
the shift away from business taxes generally, affected the distribution 
of the state local tax burden? We do know that state and local tax sys-
tems are, by and large, quite regressive. In 1989, the lowest 20 percent 
of families by income paid, on average, 10.2 percent of their income 
in state and local taxes, while the top 20 percent paid only 7.5 percent, 
and the top 1 percent just 5.5 percent. And indeed they have become 
more regressive in the past 15 years: by 2002 the effective tax rate on 
the bottom two quintiles had risen by about a percentage point. The ef-
fective rate on the top 20 percent, by contrast, had fallen slightly, from 
7.5 percent to 7.3 percent, and the tax rate for the richest 1 percent had 
fallen from 5.5 percent to 5.2 percent (see Table 3.1). 
What happened between 1989 and 2002? In the early part of the de-
cade, many states raised taxes to solve budget shortfalls brought about 
by the recession. The tendency was to increase regressive taxes, mostly 
sales. When the economic boom of the latter 1990s started producing 
large surpluses, states cut taxes, but instead of rolling back the regres-
sive increases of the early 1990s, they slashed the only progressive tax 
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at the state and local level—the personal income tax. The result was a 
substantial shift in tax burdens by the end of the decade from the highest 
to the lowest income taxpayers, and an increase in overall regressivity. 
This trend continued during the recession and budget crises of 2001–
2003. Many states increased taxes during this period, but 62 percent of 
the state tax increases from late 2001 through 2003 were in regressive 
taxes. State sales and excise taxes were increased $9.9 billion during 
this period, while individual income tax increases amounted to $3.4 bil-
lion, and corporate income taxes to $3.7 billion (Johnson, Shiess, and 
Llobrera 2003). This trend did not continue into 2004–2005, however, 
as state revenues recovered. Over those two years, state personal and 
corporate income taxes were increased by about $1 billion but sales tax-
es were cut (by a similar amount). At the same time, 10 states increased 
tobacco taxes, which are quite regressive, by a total of about $1.6 bil-
lion (Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government 2004, 2006). 
Has competition for business played a role in these trends? While 
the corporate income tax is no longer a significant source of state rev-
enue, there is evidence that the battleground has shifted to the personal 
income tax. Increasingly, one is hearing arguments that the top personal 
income tax rate is too high, or that personal income taxes in general 
must be cut in order to attract business. There has been little research 
directly addressing the question of whether or not interstate differences 
in personal income tax rates affect economic growth, but there is reason 
to be highly skeptical. For corporations, at least, even if they treated 
personal taxes as a labor cost—which is quite doubtful—differences 








20% Top 20% Top 1%
1989 10.2 9.4 8.8 8.4 7.5 5.5
2002 11.4 10.3 9.6 8.8 7.3 5.2
Change (%) +1.2 +0.8 +0.7 +0.4 −0.1 −0.3
Table 3.1  State and Local Taxes as Shares of Family Income
NOTE: Tax burdens are shown after the federal offset; that is, these are the net burdens 
on families after taking into account the deductibility of state and local taxes on fed-
eral returns for those who itemize (generally higher-income taxpayers).
SOURCE: Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (2003, pp. 118–119).
Markusen.indb   76 2/27/2007   12:40:05 PM
The Fiscal Consequences of Competition for Capital   77
costs (see Fisher and Ditsler 2003). It simply defies logic that location 
choices would be altered by such small differences in the after-tax cost 
of living of a firm’s employees, or that a corporation would move its 
facilities to a neighboring state so that its CEO could save a little in state 
income taxes. Yet these arguments are being made. 
These trends have not produced major shifts in the composition of 
state-local tax systems, other than the decline in the corporate income 
tax. The typical state tax system relies primarily on a mildly progres-
sive personal income tax and a regressive sales tax that includes a lim-
ited number of services in the tax base. Such a tax system (particularly 
if the income tax is not indexed) will become more progressive over 
time if left to its own devices, as inflation pushes people into higher tax 
brackets and the average income tax rate rises slowly, while the shift in 
consumption patterns from goods to services, combined with increasing 
internet purchases of goods, steadily erodes the sales tax base. Thus the 
effects of recent tax policies—cutting income taxes and business taxes 
in good times and raising regressive taxes in bad times—will not neces-
sarily show up as a dramatic shift from income to excise taxes. 
other Shifts in State and Local Revenue Sources and  
Spending Priorities
It would be reasonable to hypothesize that the competition for busi-
ness investment and jobs has had other effects on state and local bud-
gets. Has it shifted revenues increasingly to current charges, which are 
among the most regressive of financing tools? In the 12 years from fis-
cal years 1991–1992 to 2003–2004, current charges as a share of own-
source general revenue of state and local governments increased sig-
nificantly, from 17.1 percent to 19.7 percent.5 In no small part this was 
due to rising tuition at public universities; some 34 states raised tuition 
for the 2003–2004 year by more than 10 percent (Johnson, Shiess, and 
Llobrera 2003, p. 14).
Have state budgets increasingly focused on spending that more di-
rectly benefits business, such as infrastructure (streets, airports, water, 
sewer) and police and fire protection, and away from social services, 
education, and natural resources? While such effects may be occurring, 
we do not have a good counterfactual—what would spending priorities 
have been in the absence of the climate of competition? If these effects 
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have been occurring, they have not yet revealed themselves in notice-
able shifts in overall spending since the start of the 1990s. 
THE RoLE oF CoMPETITIoN FoR CAPITAL 
What have we concluded so far?
• The one-time package deals negotiated by states and cities may 
or may not be a good deal fiscally for local governments or for 
state governments; the Greenstone and Moretti (2003) paper 
certainly has not established that they are, and there is good rea-
son to believe many of these incentives have been granted un-
necessarily.
• Entitlement incentives and tax cuts are quite costly to state and 
local governments, and this is probably where the bulk of eco-
nomic development expenditure is found. Given the lack of 
responsiveness of economic activity to differences in taxation, 
state and local governments must spend large amounts of tax 
revenue for small gains in employment, and when the tax cuts 
are accompanied by service cuts it is likely that even these small 
gains disappear. Incentive wars and corporate income tax cuts in 
the name of economic development show no signs of abating.
• The corporate income tax is in danger of disappearing at the state 
level, and business taxes in general have declined somewhat in 
importance.
• State and local tax systems have become more regressive; tax cuts 
in the latter 1990s were almost entirely focused on the income tax, 
while tax increases during the recessions of the early 1990s and of 
2001–2003 were concentrated on regressive consumption taxes. 
Governments are making increasing use of charges for services.
Let us not be too hasty, however, in attributing all of these fiscal ef-
fects to interstate and interlocal competition for capital. If we are look-
ing for culprits, there are other plausible candidates. First of all, there 
are the “starve-the-beasters,” to use Paul Krugman’s term to describe 
the apostles of the strategy favored by Ronald Reagan’s budget director, 
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David Stockman (Krugman 2003). The idea here is first to pass large 
tax cuts (because they are demonstrably popular) without specifying 
any service reductions, and then to slash spending on the grounds that 
we cannot afford to finance (selected) services. We shrink Leviathan 
by starving it. While this is arguably the underlying motivation behind 
Republican-led federal tax cuts since the early 1980s, it is clear that 
there are many in state legislatures who have been pursuing the same 
strategy in recent years.
If starving the beast is the underlying agenda, then competitiveness 
arguments are merely a convenient public rationale. A starve-the-beast-
er does not have to believe that tax cuts “work,” though he may believe 
so. He has merely to convince others that this is a plausible argument.
Another potential culprit at the federal level, as Krugman (2003) 
points out, is the supply-sider. Here, tax cuts are favored on the grounds 
that by relieving the tax burden on investment, we will generate more 
of it, whether by expansion of existing firms or attraction of new ones. 
The economic growth that ensues will generate sufficient new tax base 
to ultimately pay for the tax cuts. The Bush administration has in fact 
built quite optimistic supply-side growth effects into its models for pro-
jecting the size of the federal deficit. 
At the state level, supply-side arguments (that business tax cuts will 
pay for themselves) are even less plausible due to the openness of a 
state economy. One hears the supply-side arguments anyway; the fact 
that past tax cuts have not only failed to pay for themselves but are 
major contributors to the current fiscal crises of the states goes unac-
knowledged. The supply-side position is even, on occasion, bolstered 
by a demand-side argument—that putting more money into the hands 
of business and consumers via tax cuts will stimulate demand for the 
state’s products and spur growth. This despite the obvious problem that 
states must balance their budgets, so that every dollar put into the econ-
omy through tax cuts is taken out by spending cuts. And if the spending 
leakages that occur with tax cuts are greater than the leakages associ-
ated with budget cuts, the demand-side effect could be negative. 
A third potential culprit is the attack on income redistribution, oth-
erwise known as class warfare. A substantial chorus of voices from the 
right has been calling for a reduction in progressive taxes, and they are 
fond of pointing out how much the rich pay (invariably focusing ex-
clusively on the federal income tax as if that were the only tax anyone 
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pays). Again, if this is the underlying motivation for cuts in taxes on 
business, then competitiveness arguments are merely a more publicly 
acceptable rationale, not the real reason. Attacks on progressivity are 
dressed up as policies to promote jobs for the unemployed. Incredibly, 
competitiveness arguments have even been put forth to advocate for 
cuts in state taxes on capital gains and for elimination of state inheri-
tance taxes. Conservative think tanks have been promoting the idea 
that cuts in state personal income taxes, and capital gains taxes in par-
ticular, will stimulate venture capital investment and entrepreneurial 
activity in	 that	state. Inheritance taxes are blamed for the closing of 
family businesses.
 It is, of course, impossible to disentangle the effects of these four 
possible factors driving the reduction in business taxes: the perceived 
need to be “competitive,” the starve-the-beast attack on the public sec-
tor, the supply-siders’ notion of self-financing tax cuts, and the attempt 
to augment the success of the private economy in redistributing income 
upwards. There is abundant circumstantial evidence, however, that the 
starve-the-beast strategy is widely embraced on the right. There is also 
evidence for the attack on income redistribution, as can be seen by what 
has happened over the past 15 years to state and local tax systems. It 
is difficult to argue that the overwhelming trend towards increases in 
regressive taxes on consumption, coupled with reductions in progres-
sive taxes on income and inherited wealth, can be explained solely by 
economic development concerns. 
In the end, the most plausible hypothesis, I would argue, is that 
there is a complex of strategies and agendas and beliefs that have been 
working in concert (and, yes, there is evidence that this has been a 
coordinated effort, through such groups as the American Legislative 
Exchange Council) to produce increases in incentive packages and 
incentive entitlements, cuts in business taxes, and cuts in progressive 
personal taxes. The result is a fiscal crisis for state and local govern-
ment (not to mention an enormous federal deficit) and an increasingly 
regressive tax system. 
There are indeed those who truly believe the supply-side arguments, 
and those who truly believe the competitiveness arguments, and some 
of these folks may not also subscribe to the belief that any cut in gov-
ernment spending is a good thing, or that the rich need tax relief. Still, 
it is certainly very convenient and useful, if one is a starve-the-beaster 
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or reverse Robin Hood, that there are such true believers, in right-wing 
think tanks and state legislatures and in the press, for they have been 
providing excellent cover. They keep the debate focused on questions 
such as, “Do tax cuts spur growth?” where one can always find an ar-
gument or statistic to support the position that they do. Journalists and 
public officials are, by and large, simply not equipped to sort out the 
valid claims from the spurious ones, and competitiveness and supply 
side assertions are simply repeated so often, and with such impunity, 
that the public comes to believe that these arguments are valid and are 
made in good faith.6 
Whether or not competition for capital is in fact driving all of these 
fiscal changes (i.e., whether or not it is the real cause), it is clear that 
it is the driving issue whenever there are public debates about taxes 
and budgets. Advocacy organizations around the country—nonprofits 
working at the state and local levels on tax and budget issues, on child 
and family policy, on poverty, housing, education, and workforce de-
velopment—continually find themselves up against the tax competi-
tiveness argument. An alleged threat to competitiveness can effectively 
put a stop to attempts to fund social programs, to forestall the weaken-
ing of business regulation, or to adopt more progressive tax policies. 
Whether it is a useful counterstrategy to engage the debate on these 
terms—to continue to present the evidence on the tax competition is-
sue, as if one is really just participating in a discussion about economic 
development policy among citizens and politicians with common goals 
and values—is a question for another chapter, or another day.
Notes
 1.  Total state and local taxes paid directly by business were $404.3 billion in fiscal 
year 2003, according to Cline et al. (2004). Private nonfarm employment was 
about 108,592,000, yielding taxes per job of $3,723 (USDOL n.d.). 
 2. Analysis by the author of the State of Ohio’s enterprise zone agreement data-
base.
 3.  Corporations must apportion their overall profits to the states in which they do 
business in order to determine what share of total profits is taxable in a given 
state. Each state has its own rules for apportionment, the traditional approach 
being three factor apportionment, where the firm takes a simple average of three 
ratios: property in state X divided by total firm property, payroll in state X over 
total payroll, and sales to state X over total sales. Single factor apportionment 
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uses only the sales ratio, and thus rewards domestic firms that export and penal-
izes foreign firms that sell in the state. 
 4.   The federal corporate rate also rose in 1999, jumped up in 2000, then fell some-
what in 2001 and 2002, just as the state rate did. This suggests that the explana-
tion lies in the determination of federal taxable income, not in changes in the way 
states taxed the part of that taxable income that was apportioned to each state. 
In other words, something happened to increase the share of corporate profits as 
measured by NIPA (the denominator in Maguire’s tax rates) that becomes tax-
able income (which determines the numerator, along with tax rates, which we 
know did not rise). IRS corporate tax return data shows that the explanation does 
not lie in lesser use of deductions from net income in 1999 and 2000. Instead, 
a larger share of NIPA profits ended up as taxable income. In part, this was due 
to many more returns with net losses in 2000, which are combined with returns 
showing positive profits to arrive at aggregate NIPA profits (thus lowering the 
denominator), yet it is only the returns with positive profits that generate taxable 
income and taxes (the numerator). It is also possible that the IRS clamped down 
on abusive tax shelters in 1999 and 2000, notably the use of LILO (lease in, lease 
out) schemes, and it is taking a few years for corporate tax departments to find 
new ways to shelter profits.
 5.  U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Survey of Governments.
 6.  I recently spoke at a large public hearing on the state budget about the fact that 
our tax policies were driven largely by mythology, and was amazed to find that 
for most people this was the first time they had ever heard anyone argue that tax 
cuts might not be a good thing for the economy. I had heard the competitiveness 
argument, for cutting services rather than raising taxes, put forth twice by public 
officials just that day—in a newspaper report that morning and on a radio inter-
view on the way to the hearing.
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When asked whether subsidies are good or bad, economists gener-
ally give so many different answers that the conclusion can only be: it 
depends. It depends on the objective, the type of subsidy, the benefi-
ciary, the economic context, etc. Precisely because it depends on many 
factors, the European Union (EU) has set up a control mechanism for 
subsidies, or state aid, as the EU calls it, with a view to distinguish the 
“good” from the “bad” subsidies and make sure that only good subsidies 
are granted. This raises two questions: how to determine what a good 
subsidy is, and how to organize a functioning control mechanism.
The following contribution aims to explain in a nutshell how the 
EU system works, what its main features are, and what alternative ap-
proaches could be developed. (For a general overview of the EC State 
aid rules, see, for example, Bilal and Nicolaides [1999]; Biondi, Eeck-
hout, and Flynn [2004]; D’Sa [1998]; Hancher, Ottervanger, and Slot 
[1999]; Heidenhain et al. [2003]; Nicolaides, Kekelekis, and Buyskes 
[2005]; Quigley and Collins [2003]; Sinnaeve [2001].)
SyNoPSIS oF EU STATE AID CoNTRoL
Why State Aid Control?
State aid control in the EU has existed for almost half a century 
now. Its inclusion in the EC treaty was quite remarkable and novel as 
there were no other examples of comparable state aid disciplines at the 
time.
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Among the reasons for introducing state aid control one could first 
refer to general economic arguments against subsidies: the risk of a 
subsidy race, where EC member states might outbid each other and 
transfer problems from one country to another. This would not only 
be a waste of public money, but in the long term, if companies rely too 
much on state intervention, it could weaken the competitive position of 
European industry. 
The inclusion of state aid rules in the EC treaty is also closely linked 
to the establishment of a common market, where goods and services 
can circulate freely. After the gradual abolition of tariff and nontariff 
barriers to trade, the granting of state aid is one of the few remaining 
tools for national governments to protect their national industry. Barri-
ers to trade that have been dismantled in the integration process should 
not be replaced by other barriers in the form of state aid. Therefore, 
strict control is necessary also from a common market perspective. At 
the same time, as markets become more integrated the distortive effects 
of state aid are more visible and more directly felt by competitors in 
other member states, thus requiring state aid disciplines.
Finally, it is important to underline that the state aid provisions were 
inserted in the competition chapter of the EC treaty. The logic of the 
treaty is to ensure undistorted competition regardless of whether distor-
tions are caused by the behavior of businesses, for which the antitrust 
rules were adopted, or by the action of the state. State aid control should 
thus be seen in the light of its role to avoid unjustified distortions of 
competition. (For a comparison of EU and the United States in the ap-
plication of competition policy against state intervention in the market, 
see Ichikawa [2004, p. 555].)
The Definition of State Aid
The treaty uses a rather wide definition of state aid. (For an over-
view of recent developments regarding the definition of state aid pursu-
ant to Article 87 [1] EC Treaty, see Winter [2004, p. 475].) It includes 
all advantages selectively granted by the state or through state resources 
that distort competition or threaten to distort it and affect trade between 
member states, e.g., grants, loans at nonmarket conditions, state guar-
antees, all types of tax advantages, and the sale of land at nonmarket 
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conditions. This notion is broadly comparable, although not identical, 
with that of a subsidy under the WTO rules.
The selectivity criterion (i.e., whether an aid measure is specific or 
selective) is determined at the level of each member state. This implies 
that if member states apply different levels of taxes, this is not consid-
ered to be state aid. If, however, they lower the tax rate or grant other 
types of tax advantages only to certain sectors, certain types of enter-
prises (such as small and medium-sized enterprises [SME] or coordina-
tion centers for multinational companies), or enterprises located in a 
certain area within the territory of a member state, this would constitute 
state aid and must respect the relevant conditions.1
The Substantive Rules of State Aid Control
What does the EU control mechanism look like? The treaty starts 
from the principle that state aid is incompatible with the common mar-
ket, unless it falls under one of the exceptions of the treaty (Article 87). 
The Commission has the power to decide whether or not this is the 
case. The exceptions are formulated in a very general way (they refer, 
for example, to broad concepts such as the development of regions with 
an abnormally low living standard or serious underemployment, and 
the development of certain economic activities). As a result, the treaty 
gives the Commission wide discretion to develop criteria for the ap-
proval of certain types of aid and design a state aid policy. This policy 
will necessarily evolve in the same way as the common market and the 
EU objectives.
The basic principles, however, remain the same: the aid should con-
tribute to the achievement of EU objectives in such a way that the distor-
tion of competition is justifiable. Aid by definition distorts competition. 
The reason why it can nevertheless be authorized lies in the fact that 
it promotes other EU objectives, such as regional development, R&D, 
employment, etc., which outweigh the distortion in a proportional way. 
In other words: if market forces alone are sufficient to attain the EU 
objective, no aid should be granted, but where the benefits to the EU as 
a whole exceed those that would result from undistorted competition, 
authorization is justified.
It is clear that these general principles need to be embodied in more 
operational criteria. The Commission has therefore translated the prin-
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ciples into concrete assessment criteria, which are laid down in frame-
works and guidelines.2 These quasi-legislative texts define the condi-
tions under which aid projects can be authorized for different types 
of aid, specifically aid for regional development, promotion of SME, 
employment, R&D, environmental protection, training of workers, 
restructuring of enterprises in difficulties, and provision of risk capi-
tal—to mention the most important objectives. They aim at ensuring 
greater legal certainty for member states and companies, predictability, 
and equal treatment.
For each of these horizontal objectives, a number of precise condi-
tions define under which circumstances aid can be granted. Normally 
a maximum aid intensity will be determined. This is the maximum 
amount of aid, expressed as a percentage of the eligible costs. These 
percentages are further modulated according to the size of the aid bene-
ficiaries (small enterprises can, as a rule, receive higher amounts of aid) 
and the region where they are located (higher aid is allowed in poorer 
regions). (On regional aid, see also Battista [2005]; Nicolaides [2003, 
p. 543]; and Wishlade [2003].) For example, a company setting up a 
new plant in a poor Portuguese region can receive a higher aid amount 
than if it had established its new plant in the Netherlands. If the com-
pany is a small enterprise, it can also get an SME bonus. If, however, a 
member state wants to grant the company a straight tax break without 
any condition, this will normally not be authorized by the Commission 
because there is no direct counterpart for the aid (such as new invest-
ment or job creation).
State Aid Procedures
In procedural terms, Article 88 of the EC treaty establishes a mech-
anism of prior control, based on the notification obligation and the 
standstill clause. (On state aid procedures, see Sinnaeve and Slot [1999, 
p. 1153].) Member states have to notify in advance all their aid projects 
to the Commission and may only implement them after the Commis-
sion has given its green light.
Simple cases are decided after a preliminary examination within 
two months starting from the receipt of a complete notification. For 
more complex cases that raise doubts about their compatibility with the 
common market, the Commission will open a formal investigation after 
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the preliminary examination. In this second phase, all interested parties, 
in particular the aid beneficiary and its competitors, have the opportu-
nity to present their comments on the aid project.
If member states do not respect these procedural obligations, the 
aid is granted unlawfully and the Commission can at any time start an 
investigation, e.g., following a complaint by a competitor or ex offi-
cio. If the Commission finds that the unlawful aid is incompatible with 
the common market, it will order its reimbursement, with interests. Aid 
grantors (and aid beneficiaries) thus run a serious risk if they do not 
follow the rules.
SoME REFLECTIoNS BASED oN THE EU ExPERIENCE
Strengths of the EU System
One of the main strengths of the EU regime is obviously the fact 
that it has the legal and institutional framework for conducting state aid 
control; it has the following necessary means at its disposal to make the 
control system work: 
• an independent authority (the Commission) to set and enforce 
the rules under the control of the EC Court of Justice. 
• the legal and administrative mechanisms to organize the system 
of prior notification and authorization. 
• flexibility, that is, the option to adapt the rules if changes in the 
economic environment or in the priorities of the EU require so. 
For example, if Europe underinvests in R&D, that will be taken 
into account when the rules on aid for R&D are revised; if on the 
other hand certain sectors suffer from overcapacity or serious 
structural problems, a more restrictive aid policy will be adopted 
(see, for example, European Commission [2002]). When mem-
ber states recently started to use the provision of venture-capital 
as a tool to assist enterprises, the Commission adopted a com-
munication in order to clarify in what circumstances such actions 
Markusen.indb   91 2/27/2007   12:40:06 PM
92   Sinnaeve
would fall within the scope of the state aid rules and what condi-
tions had to be respected (European Commission 2001).
• the necessary acceptance by all the actors involved (governments, 
industry, public at large) and the recognition that aid disciplines 
are needed in a common market like the EU. Of course, state aid 
control is also subject to criticism, but not more than any other 
policy. What contributes to this acceptance is the fact that the 
state aid regime still leaves sufficient room to member states for 
developing their economic policies including subsidies. There is 
no general interdiction of state aid; member states can still grant 
all types of aid (except export aid and local content aid, forbid-
den under the WTO rules), they only have to respect certain con-
ditions. The more distortive the aid is, the stricter the conditions 
will be, but the approach is balanced and makes sense from a 
common market perspective.
Not all of these features of the EU regime are necessarily indispens-
able, but they certainly facilitate the functioning of the system.
Can the EU system then be called a success? Probably, since it has 
fulfilled the objectives rather well. The most distortive types of aid are 
under control. Very strict conditions are applied to 
• operating aid, i.e., aid typically granted without any condition 
or counterpart, which relieves an enterprise of the expenses it 
would itself normally have to bear in its day-to-day management 
or its usual activities (Siemens	v.	Commission 1997).
• aid to large enterprises in rich areas of the EU.
• sectoral aid. The Commission’s policy favors aid with horizontal 
objectives (e.g., SME development, R&D, and worker training) 
and takes a strict approach on sectoral aid, limited to particular 
sectors of the economy, such as steel.
• aid to enterprises in difficulty. While it used to be normal for the 
state to intervene in order to save jobs, such intervention now is 
only allowed under very strict conditions. The company must 
first provide a viable restructuring plan, and it must make a sig-
nificant contribution and reduce its capacity on the market in or-
der to compensate for the distortion. Furthermore, the one-time 
last-time principle applies according to which restructuring aid 
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is allowed only once. These conditions are important because 
restructuring aid is one of the most distortive types of state aid. 
The fact that both the Commission’s decision and/or its nonim-
plementation can be challenged before the Court offers an ad-
ditional guarantee in order to ensure that the said conditions are 
respected and enforced. 
In brief, the most distortive types of aid are under control, and in ad-
dition, the rules normally also ensure that aid is not the main reason for 
a company to make certain decisions. For example, the aid allowed can 
rarely be so substantial that a company would decide to delocate merely 
because of that aid. Other factors, such as infrastructure, presence of 
trained workforce, general tax levels, and administrative procedures 
to be complied with, are more decisive. But if a company considers 
several alternative locations for a new plant, all of which meet its spe-
cific investment requirements, it may choose the site in a disadvantaged 
area, because it can get a comparatively higher aid amount there. This 
is fully in line with the EU’s “cohesion policy.”
Weaknesses of the EU System
Like any system, EU state aid control also has its weaknesses, some 
of which have been tackled already, others would require further reform 
action.
A first problem is the high administrative burden that results from 
the notification obligation. If the Commission had to assess every sin-
gle measure, however small and unimportant, this would be unfeasible 
and an inefficient use of resources. Therefore, the obligation of prior 
notification has been softened. Member states can notify so-called aid 
schemes, which define the general conditions under which a certain 
type of aid will be granted. If the scheme complies with the rules, it will 
be approved for a certain number of years and the individual applica-
tions of the scheme do not need to be notified anymore. Furthermore, 
in recent years a number of block exemption regulations have been ad-
opted for certain less distortive types of aid. (On the block exemptions, 
see Sinnaeve [2001, p. 1479].) They exempt, for example, aid for SME, 
and aid for employment or training of workers under well-defined con-
ditions from the notification obligation. Block exemptions liberate the 
Commission from a number of routine cases, so that the Commission 
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can concentrate on the more problematic cases. However, they also 
shift part of the responsibility to the aid grantors, which now have to 
control themselves whether their aid projects fulfill the conditions of 
the block exemption. Therefore, in order to avoid a weakening of the 
control system, increased ex-post monitoring, as well as the vigilance 
of competitors, who can complain to the Commission or go to national 
courts if the conditions of a block exemption are infringed is of utmost 
importance.
Block exemptions are also a good illustration of a second difficulty, 
that is, finding the right balance between the need for legal certainty, 
with simple and predictable rules, and the risk that such predefined 
rules leave no room to take account of the merits of each individual 
case. In theory the Commission has a wide discretion to decide in every 
case whether a subsidy is good or bad. However, member states and 
enterprises call for clear and transparent assessment criteria, which also 
ensure equal treatment. The Commission has over the years replied to 
this justified request by establishing rather precise rules for most types 
of aid. Once established, these rules bind the Commission and thus in 
practice considerably reduce its discretionary power. This leads to a 
situation where member states feel obliged to consider only aid mea-
sures fitting within the established criteria, even if other creative new 
projects might be equally defendable or even more efficient to achieve 
the objectives. Vice versa, the Commission cannot prohibit measures 
that fulfill the criteria of its block exemptions or guidelines, even if a 
particular case does not seem very convincing. This permanent tension 
between individual discretion and legal certainty is, however, inherent 
to all legislation and unavoidable. Like any legislator, the Commission 
is challenged to find the right balance in this respect.
A third difficulty worth mentioning is the fact that the EU control 
mechanism is not designed to ensure that aid measures are economi-
cally efficient. This fact should probably not be called a weakness, as it 
is simply the consequence of how the system was conceived: State aid 
policy is part of competition policy and its first aim is to limit distor-
tions of competition. The paradox is that the most distortive aid may 
also be the most efficient in terms of achieving the goal of the aid pro-
vider. For example, tax holidays are likely to attract investments, but 
they distort both competition and the level playing field between enter-
prises too much to be acceptable in a common market. Conversely, aid 
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schemes that do not create significant distortions might get a Commis-
sion approval, even if they are not so efficient, such as because the aid 
is too small to have an effect (a small tax advantage for the recruitment 
of new workers may not create any jobs which would not have been 
created anyhow). The Commission is reluctant to take a position on 
the efficiency of a proposed aid measure, also in view of the division 
of powers between member states and the Commission. Ultimately it 
is up to member states to decide how they pursue an economic policy 
adapted to their own situations and spend—or waste—money.
This does not mean, however, that efficiency plays no role in the 
assessment of state aid. If aid were completely inefficient it would not 
normally be authorizable, as it could hardly be considered to be in the 
interest of the EU. To some extent efficiency requirements are thus in-
corporated in the conditions for authorization. They ensure, for exam-
ple, that 1) for any aid there must be a significant counterpart from the 
company, such as job creation; 2) the enterprise must make a substantial 
own contribution (aid can never finance the whole project); and 3) if 
aid is granted for investment or job creation, the investment or the jobs 
must effectively be maintained for a certain number of years. But these 
criteria are defined at a general level and are not conceived to select 
the most efficient measure in a particular case. The Commission thus 
will not analyze whether other measures might be more appropriate and 
more efficient than state aid. That is left to member states.
In this respect the question may be raised whether more prior and ex 
post assessment should be done before and after aid is granted. For ex-
ample, member states should more often make a study concerning what 
type of economic measures would be most appropriate before having 
recourse to state aid. Currently this indispensable preliminary question 
is often ignored. Similarly, during the operation of an aid scheme, a 
study of its impact could be useful so that adjustments could be made 
in case the objectives are not reached. But here a time problem exists: 
aid schemes have a limited duration of normally five years. Before the 
effects can be seen and a study can be completed, the scheme often 
already comes to an end. In any event, it could be argued that, as a mini-
mum, some kind of ex post assessment on the effects of aid measures 
should be required. That way, aid grantors could benefit from the expe-
rience when considering new aid measures or the extension of existing 
ones. At the same time the Commission would be better equipped to 
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evaluate and adapt its own policy. The Commission has recently made 
attempts to encourage member states to carry out such assessments, as 
with the “Scoreboard project,” which is published online.3 The Com-
mission also is reflecting on how to introduce more economic analysis 
in its assessment of state aid (Hancher 2005, p. 425). However, leaving 
aside some ad hoc initiatives, it can be argued that so far, not enough 
emphasis is put on this aspect.
A final problem is the volume of illegal aid. It must be recognized 
that a significant number of aid measures is still granted without autho-
rization (Nicolaides 2002, p. 249). This is explained partially by the fact 
that local and regional aid providers especially lack awareness of the 
rules or infringed the notification obligation because they believed that 
their measure did not constitute state aid—given the relative unclarities 
left by the state aid definition it is often far from obvious what is aid 
and what is not. It may also be the result of a deliberate decision of the 
granting authority to take the risk. 
Many of these cases are discovered by the Commission, either be-
cause competitors complain or because politicians publicly announce 
what action they took to stimulate the local industry. But certainly a 
number of aid measures will always remain unknown. Is this a real 
problem? One should not overestimate it. First, if there is a big distor-
tion and a real competition problem, this cannot be hidden. Competi-
tors will know and will complain to the Commission. Secondly, there 
is a powerful remedy: if the illegal aid does not fulfill the conditions 
for ex post authorization, the Commission will order its recovery, with 
interests. And reimbursement can go back for 10 years. The recovery 
procedure may be long and cumbersome, because it is the member state 
who has to recover from the beneficiary and the latter may exhaust all 
remedies under national law against the reimbursement. But the juris-
prudence of the EU is such that ultimately reimbursement will have to 
take place. And although repayment can, of course, not always fully 
redress the distortion of competition, especially after several years, 
the recovery rules are an important deterrent to prevent the granting of 
clearly incompatible aid. Moreover, compared to the WTO rules, for 
example, they definitely increase the efficiency of the EU system. The 
recovery tool is therefore, despite some weak points, a strength of the 
EU state aid policy.
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THE EU SySTEM AS A MoDEL?
Since the EU experience is overall quite positive, the question arises 
of whether and how it could be a model for other jurisdictions. Again, 
the answer should probably be: it depends. One has to recognize that 
EU state aid control is linked to the common market and competition 
policy. The system as such can therefore probably only be successfully 
transposed to groups of countries or regions with a comparable level of 
economic integration and also the political will to entrust an indepen-
dent authority with the power to determine the common interest of all 
members, with all the repercussions this may have on economic, social, 
environmental, and other policy areas.
Such groups of countries exist. For example, the EFTA Surveillance 
Authority fulfills the same role as the European Commission for Nor-
way, Iceland and Liechtenstein (in the past also for Austria, Finland, 
and Sweden) (Antoniadis 2002, p. 157). This example proves that EU 
state aid control is not unique.
Another interesting, somewhat different example of subsidy control 
is that, of the 14 accession candidates, 10 meanwhile became members 
of the EU on May 1, 2004.4 In view of the importance attached to state 
aid policy, the EU concluded with these countries, well before acces-
sion, bilateral agreements on the basis of which they were required to 
respect the State aid regime of the EU, as a kind of preparation for ac-
cession. The practical implementation of this obligation was not easy, 
since none of the accession candidates had any experience with State 
aid control. They all set up separate State aid authorities from scratch 
and created the necessary legislative framework to comply with this 
new task. Obviously this process was not completely successful for all 
countries, but it proved its value, not only as a transitional solution in 
the run up to EU accession, but also as a model for state aid control at 
the national level. It has shown that state aid control, not by a suprana-
tional authority but at the national level, can work, provided the state 
aid authority has the necessary legal framework, administrative capac-
ity and functional independence from the grantors of state aid. The state 
aid authorities should function in a comparable way as competition au-
thorities. In federal states, such a system might be an option in order to 
avoid interstate or even intercity bidding wars.
Markusen.indb   97 2/27/2007   12:40:06 PM
98   Sinnaeve
Organizing state aid control by an independent state aid authority 
does not necessarily mean that the system must be a copy of the EU, 
which is admittedly rather heavy. Both in terms of procedural enforce-
ment and of substance, a “light” version can be imagined. For example, 
procedurally one could exempt all the less-important cases and set such 
a threshold that only the big cases are subject to control, in order not 
to overload the system. One could also replace the general prohibition 
with exceptions after prior authorization by its opposite: all aid is al-
lowed unless it is forbidden. Or one could replace it by a system where 
enterprises or other regions have a right to complain if they suffer from 
subsidies granted elsewhere (a sort of actionable subsidies within a cer-
tain jurisdiction). In regard to the substantive rules, one could envisage 
only some basic, minimum criteria (e.g., define specific objectives for 
which aid can be granted and the conditions which the recipient must 
achieve, put a cap on the aid amount, etc.), or detailed rules for the most 
problematic types of aid. 
The alternative to organize state aid control without a separate state 
aid authority, for example, through legislation by which all aid grantors 
are bound, is probably more difficult. In such regime, the rules would 
have to be agreed by national, regional, or local governments, which 
would weaken the whole mechanism and in practice be very difficult if 
the rules should go beyond some minimum conditions. Furthermore, in 
a system without independent authority to apply, with a certain margin 
of discretion, the predefined rules to a concrete case, there would be 
no flexibility. The rules would have to be exhaustive, and their regular 
update in function of economic developments would be cumbersome. 
Moreover, the question arises as to who would control and enforce the 
rules? Presumably, in the absence of a central state aid authority, the 
rules should be enforceable through the courts, but that would again cre-
ate problems. Therefore, this alternative seems to be less promising.
Ultimately, to what extent the EU system can be a model depends 
thus on the situation and the objectives one pursues. Creating an inde-
pendent authority to set and enforce the rules is certainly a big step but 
an easier starting point for a well-functioning system. However, other 
less ambitious options should not be disregarded, even if they would 
just consist of some general minimum requirements, as that would still 
be better than having no rules at all. 
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CoNCLUSIoN
To make a proper evaluation of the EU system, one would in fact 
have to compare the current regime with a situation without any state 
aid control. Only such a hypothetical comparison would demonstrate 
the full impact of the system. 
While it is obviously not possible within the scope of this chapter 
to go through this exercise, it may be expected that, in broad terms, it 
would reveal that:
• The EU system strikes a reasonable balance between limiting 
distortions of competition caused by aid, and allowing measures 
that promote EU objectives; since all aid, and especially the most 
distortive types of aid, are subject to conditions, the distortions 
are kept to an acceptable level.
• Since the rules are rather precise and transparent, many cases 
will never be proposed in the first place. Member states are gen-
erally well aware of the basic principles; therefore, they will plan 
their interventions accordingly and not propose any “unworthy” 
projects. Any discussion with the Commission will then more 
be on the details of the project than on the broad characteristics. 
An important part of the impact of the EU system therefore lies 
in all the potentially distortive measures that were never even 
considered, or were withdrawn when it became apparent that no 
approval could be expected.
To conclude, the EU regime perhaps is not perfect, but it works well 
and there seems to be no reason why many elements of it would not be 
useful also in a different context.
Notes
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and should not be attributed to 
the European Commission.
 1.  For the definition of an SME, see European Commission (2003). On the applica-
tion of the definition of state aid to tax measures, see Luja (2003) and Rossi-Mac-
canico (2004, p. 229).
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 2. An overview of the currently applicable rules can be found at http://europa 
.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/legislation (accessed August 9, 2006).
 3. http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/ (accessed August 9, 
2006).
 4. On May 1, 2004, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithu-
ania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined the EU. Bulgaria and Roma-
nia are expected to join in 2007. Turkey and Croatia are also candidate countries. 
See Schütterle (2002, p. 79; 2005, p. 255).
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Solving the Problems of 
Economic Development Incentives 
Timothy J. Bartik
W.E.	Upjohn	Institute	for	Employment	Research
How can economic development incentives best be reined in? I 
agree with most students of this issue that economic development in-
centives are often wasteful. But this chapter maintains the position that 
some incentives are socially beneficial.1 The challenge is to design re-
forms that encourage dropping wasteful incentives and keeping those 
that are socially beneficial. 
To design incentive reforms, we must first agree on the causes of 
current U.S. incentive practices. This is the focus of the next section. 
What are the social benefits and costs of incentives? Why are incentives 
so often wasteful? Answering these questions allows us to address the 
problems leading to wasteful incentives, while encouraging beneficial 
incentives. 
My conclusion is that some incentives are beneficial for two rea-
sons: 1) because corporations are becoming more footloose, they are 
becoming more responsive to incentives; and 2) increased local em-
ployment rates yield social benefits. However, incentives are often 
wasteful for two reasons: 1) local policymakers often overestimate the 
benefits of incentives, and 2) the local debate over incentives is domi-
nated by business interests. Unlike some students of this issue, I do not 
think that incentives are excessive because a state government ignores 
an incentive’s “spillover costs” for other states. 
Based on this analysis, I conclude that incentive reform should fo-
cus on improving the local decision-making process for incentives. Lo-
cal decisions about incentives will be improved by a more democratic 
process with full information, a budget constraint on incentives, better 
benefit–cost analysis, incentive designs that target new business activ-
ity that brings social benefits, and performance requirements. Federal 
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policy can encourage better information about incentives, help finance 
efficient incentives in economically distressed regions, and encourage 
cooperative economic development policy in metropolitan areas that 
cross state lines. 
THE FoRCES LEADING To INCENTIvES 
Before discussing the forces leading to incentives, I should define 
what I mean by incentives. In this chapter, I focus on the type of incen-
tive that looks most like legalized bribery of the rich: cash or near-cash 
assistance provided on a discretionary basis to attract or retain business 
operations owned by large businesses. Such cash or near-cash assis-
tance includes property tax abatements, discretionary credits under the 
state’s corporate income tax, low-interest financing, and free land or 
buildings. This type of incentive deserves the most attention because, 
out of the total resources for economic development, such incentives 
comprise the largest share. For example, in Michigan such incentives 
are about three-quarters of all resources devoted to economic develop-
ment programs (Bartik, Eisinger, and Erickcek 2003).2
Other incentives to large businesses are close substitutes for cash 
assistance. Incentives to attract or retain large businesses may also in-
clude customized services, which help meet the needs of an individual 
business, such as information on potential sites, help with state or lo-
cal regulations, customized training for new or existing employees, and 
expedited provision of site-related public infrastructure, such as access 
roads. Customized services are sometimes almost equivalent to cash; 
for example, in some cases “customized training” is writing a check to 
the company to train its own employees. Another close substitute for 
discretionary cash incentives are business tax breaks provided as an 
“entitlement” under state or local tax laws, such as investment or em-
ployment expansion tax credits that go by legal right to all businesses 
that meet the tax law’s criteria. Discretionary tax incentives, such as 
property tax abatements, may become so routine that they are almost 
equivalent to “entitlement” tax breaks. Reforms to cash incentives for 
large businesses may lead to increased use of these other incentives. 
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Economic development programs also provide assistance to new 
businesses and small and medium-sized businesses, including many 
high-tech businesses, which is intended to be an “incentive” for the 
growth of such businesses. Assistance to small and medium-sized busi-
nesses includes cash assistance, such as loans or equity finance, and 
grants for research and development. Assistance to small and medium-
sized businesses may also include customized services, such as infor-
mation on how to start up a business, or make an existing one more 
profitable (e.g., industrial extension services, and small business devel-
opment centers). Reforms to incentive programs for large businesses 
may also affect these other programs. 
Is there a good rationale for state and local governments to offer 
economic development incentives to attract or retain large businesses? 
Is there a good rationale for why such incentive use appears to be ris-
ing over time? One plausible rationale is that incentives are increas-
ingly perceived as a necessary cost incurred to produce social benefits. 
It seems increasingly plausible that incentives might help attract or re-
tain business, and thereby produce benefits such as greater employment 
rates and a stronger state and local fiscal situation. I will argue that 
these statements are true, but that incentives’ costs are often large while 
incentives’ benefits are often modest. 
Incentives may increasingly affect business location decisions be-
cause businesses are increasingly footloose. As shown in Figure 5.1, 
over the past 100 years, transport and communication costs have de-
clined. Cheaper transport of inputs and outputs, and the greater ease 
of using communications and computers to coordinate business activi-
ties at distant locations, allows business activities to be sited at a wider 
variety of locations. Because businesses have many more sites that 
are acceptable options from a transport and communications perspec-
tive, businesses are much more sensitive to local costs, such as wages 
and taxes. Wages are a larger share of costs than taxes, but taxes and 
the incentives that offset them are more immediately controllable by 
government. 
Declining transport and communication costs help explain why re-
search increasingly shows a statistically significant but modest effect 
of state and local tax rates on economic development. Reviews of the 
literature suggest that the long-run elasticity of a state or metropolitan 
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area’s business activity with respect to state and local taxes is between 
−0.2 and −0.3 (Bartik 1991a, 1992; Wasylenko 1997), which means that 
a 10 percent reduction in effective state and local business tax rates (for 
example, a reduction of the state corporate income tax rate from 5.0 to 
4.5 percent, accompanied by similar reductions in other state and local 
business taxes), with state and local public services held constant, will 
increase the long-run level of local business activity by 2 or 3 percent.3
Such an effect on business activity is not huge. If the state and local 
tax cuts are financed by cutting public services, the result may be lower 
business activity. The elasticities are not large enough to produce a Laf-
fer Curve, in which cuts in tax rates would raise the tax base enough to 
increase revenue. The estimates imply that the gross cost of creating a 
job through lower business tax rates is a sacrifice of $10,000 annually 
per job in lower business tax revenue. The higher business tax base 
would offset only about a quarter of this “static” revenue loss, resulting 



























Figure 5.1  Relative Transportation and Communication Costs
NOTE: The figure sets transport and communication costs equal to 100 for the first year 
for which such cost data are available in the UN report. Each type of cost therefore 
uses a different base period. This allows all the data to be placed on one graph.
SOURCE: These data are derived from United Nations Development Programme 
(1999, p. 30). This particular presentation was developed by Rodrigue, Comtois, and 
Slack (2004).
Markusen.indb   106 2/27/2007   12:40:07 PM
Solving the Problems of Economic Development Incentives   107
$7,000 per year in foregone business tax revenue. At a 10 percent real 
discount rate, the present value cost in foregone business tax revenue is 
$70,000 per job created.4 Still, for state or local officials searching for 
some way to affect the local economy, lowering taxes seems one of the 
few options. 
These figures are for business tax cuts for an entire state or metro-
politan area. Research suggests that a business tax cut by an individual 
suburb within a metropolitan area, holding the taxes of other jurisdic-
tions constant, has much larger effects, perhaps 10 times as great per 
dollar of incentive. That is, a 10 percent cut in an individual suburb’s 
business taxes, such as a cut in the business property tax rate from 2 
percent to 1.8 percent, will increase that individual suburb’s business 
activity by 20 percent, largely by capturing business activity from other 
jurisdictions in the same metropolitan area. These larger effects make 
sense because individual jurisdictions within a metropolitan area are 
closer substitutes for one another than different states are for one anoth-
er, as jurisdictions within the same metropolitan area offer more similar 
access to markets and inputs. The research is mixed on whether busi-
ness tax cuts for large central cities have significant effects on business 
location (Bartik 1991a, 1992; Haughwout et al. 2003). 
What implications do these estimated effects of state and local busi-
ness tax cuts have for the effects of incentives? Few studies directly 
estimate the effects of incentives. However, under the assumption that 
a “dollar is a dollar,” tax incentives for a large business should have 
similar effects on its location decisions to an equal dollar-sized busi-
ness tax cut. Therefore, the effects of incentives on the probability of a 
particular branch plant locating in a state should, on average, be such 
as to yield the same expected gross dollar cost per job as business tax 
cuts. For example, the highest incentive offers, according to Fisher and 
Peters (2002), are equivalent to an annual subsidy of about $2,800 per 
worker inside some enterprise zones.5 To be consistent with the busi-
ness location literature, reducing business taxes via an incentive offer of 
$2,800 per job for a branch plant, compared to no incentive offer, would 
increase the probability of a new branch plant choosing the state by 
about 0.3.6 This implies that for every 10 plants offered such an incen-
tive, the incentive would be decisive for about 3 of them. The incentives 
given to the other 7 plants would have no effects on business location or 
employment growth. The only effect would be an extra cost to state and 
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local governments of these unneeded 7 incentives. Unless economic 
developers can somehow determine which of the 10 plants “needs” the 
incentive to tip its location decision, this loss on 7 of the 10 plants is 
a necessary cost to tip the location decision of the other 3 plants. For 
smaller, more “normal” incentives, an even lower percentage of loca-
tion decisions would be tipped by incentives. Fisher and Peters’ figures 
imply that the mean state/local economic development incentive out-
side of enterprise zones is equivalent to an annual subsidy of about 
$300 per worker. Such an incentive would be expected to affect the 
location decision of only 3 out of 100 subsidized companies.7
The benefits of greater job growth in a metropolitan area occur in 
the form of earnings increases for local residents who get jobs as the 
local employment rate increases, earnings increases for local residents 
who move up to better-paying jobs with a tighter local labor market, 
local property value increases, profit increases in local businesses that 
have a head start in serving a larger local market, and tax base increases 
for state and local governments.8 These benefits must be netted against 
costs of greater local job growth, including the value of the foregone 
nonwork time for local residents who gain jobs, the costs of additional 
public services required by expanding employment and population, and 
environmental costs. 
We have reasonable estimates of the magnitude of these benefits 
and costs and how they are affected by differences in local conditions 
and the type of job growth (Bartik 1991a, 1993). A 1 percent increase 
in local employment is associated in the long run (more than five years) 
with an increase of 0.8 percent in local population, implying that 8 out 
of 10 new jobs in a metropolitan area go to persons who otherwise 
would have lived elsewhere. This 1 percent job increase is also associ-
ated with a 0.2 percent increase in the local employment rate (employ-
ment to population ratio), as local residents increase their labor force 
participation as they acquire better job skills with their greater job expe-
rience. One percent extra job growth in the long run is associated with 
average real wages moving up by 0.1 to 0.2 percent, but due entirely to 
local residents moving up to better-paying occupations; the real wages 
of particular occupations are unchanged, with occupational wages just 
matching increases in local prices. At low unemployment rates, when 
jobs are easy to get, the value of time spent unemployed, which econo-
mists call the reservation wage, may be 90 percent of the market wages, 
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which would imply a cost of foregone nonwork time of 0.18 percent in 
a low unemployment labor market due to 1 percent extra job growth. 
The required public services due to growth should, in the long run, 
increase about the same as the tax base for employment growth that is 
accompanied by the same population growth and involves no occupa-
tional upgrading. But as detailed above, the employment growth due to 
the “labor demand” shock caused by economic development policies 
will raise employment rates and increase real wages due to occupa-
tional upgrading. If employment rates go up, tax revenues should in-
crease faster than public spending needs for three reasons: 1) business 
growth by itself brings tax revenue greater than public services, esti-
mated as $1.70 in taxes per dollar of required public services according 
to one source (Oakland and Testa 1996); 2) increased employment rates 
should reduce required state spending for transfers, reducing welfare 
spending by about 6 percent for a 1 percent increase in employment 
growth (Bartik and Eberts 1999), and unemployment benefit outlays by 
about 3 percent (Bartik 1991b); and 3) increased employment rates will 
raise personal tax revenues per capita, by a percent equal to the percent 
increase in the employment rate. Increases in real wages, such as those 
caused by the occupational upgrading due to increased labor demand, 
will also raise personal tax revenues, which should go up approximately 
proportionately with the increased real wages. In the short run, public 
service costs associated with growth will go up less than the percentage 
increase in employment and population if there is excess capacity in 
local infrastructure. On the other hand, if new infrastructure is required, 
and the depreciation cost of the current infrastructure is not reflected in 
local budgets, then most estimates suggest that additional public service 
costs will significantly exceed new tax revenues in the short-run (Alt-
shuler and Gomez-Ibanez 1993). 
One percent extra employment growth will increase local property 
values by 0.4 percent. However, the present value of the increased earn-
ings from growth are at least triple the size of the property value gains 
(Bartik 1991a, 1994b). In addition to increases in property values due 
to increased land demand, the value of “brownfield” property that is 
cleaned up as part of an economic development project may also go up 
due to removing this development barrier. Other local asset values will 
also change: locally owned businesses that have some comparative ad-
vantage in selling to a local market will increase their profits, whereas 
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locally owned businesses that sell to an external market may lose profits 
due to increased wages and rents. 
Other than brownfield clean-up, most environmental effects of 
growth are likely to be negative, but will vary greatly with project 
details. In addition, changes in community character that accompany 
growth may be viewed negatively by the original local residents. 
The net effects of greater job growth are likely to be progressive, 
as lower-income groups are more likely to be initially nonemployed 
or employed in low-wage jobs. Therefore, most estimates suggest that 
the lowest income quintile probably has earnings gains that are three 
or four times greater, in percentage terms, than the earnings gains of 
the average family, and income gains that are around twice as great, in 
percentage terms, as the real income gains of the average family (Bar-
tik 1994b). However, the actual dollar effects on earnings and income 
of the lowest income quintile are less than that of the average family, 
as many low-income individuals are disconnected from the labor mar-
ket (Bartik 2001, Table 5.3). The progressivity of increased job growth 
is considerably less than the progressivity of redistributive social pro-
grams, which deliver their greatest dollar benefits to the lowest income 
quintile (Bartik 1994b). 
The bottom line from this analysis is that for an average incentive 
project in a low unemployment local labor market, benefits and costs 
are of similar magnitude (Bartik 1991a, p. 183). The chapter’s appen-
dix and its accompanying table present some illustrative calculations. 
There is sufficient uncertainty about the estimated effects of taxes on 
growth, and growth on local economic variables, that whether the net 
benefits are positive or negative is unclear. Benefits and costs will vary 
greatly with project particulars. 
Social benefits of incentives are greater if the project overcomes 
“market failures” that impede the use of local resources.9 For example, 
social benefits are greater if the project helps overcome involuntary un-
employment or underemployment that impedes workers from being em-
ployed or being employed in higher-wage jobs. Social benefits will be 
greater if local employment rates increase more, or local residents move 
up to higher-paying jobs to a greater extent, or if the local labor market 
is more depressed. An increasing local employment rate provides more 
earnings benefits to local residents, reduces the need for social services 
to the nonemployed, and reduces the public services costs and envi-
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ronmental costs associated with increased population. An increase in 
higher-paying jobs for local residents increases earnings benefits, and 
increases fiscal benefits by reduced social services and increased taxes. 
In a more depressed local labor market, the nonemployed will be more 
desperate for jobs and have lower reservation wages. 
Social benefits will also be greater if the current public infrastruc-
ture is underutilized, which allows increased employment and popula-
tion growth to increase tax revenue without a commensurate increase 
in public infrastructure costs. This is more likely in a local area that 
has been sufficiently economically distressed that it has lost population 
and employment from some previous peak. Social benefits will also be 
greater if the project overcomes regulatory and other barriers that pre-
vent brownfields from being productively used. 
But policymakers should also be aware that social benefits of 
growth will be much reduced under any of the following circumstances: 
low-unemployment local labor markets; lower wages of the new jobs; 
fewer local workers for the new jobs; significant public infrastructure 
or environmental costs. For example, estimates suggest that if the job 
growth is in industries that pay 10 or 15 percent less than the aver-
age industry controlling for worker characteristics, then the job growth 
may produce no earnings benefits for local residents (Bartik 2004b). If 
there are zero earnings benefits from additional employment growth, 
and consequently little if any fiscal benefits, it is highly unlikely that an 
incentive package will pass a benefit-cost test unless it has extremely 
low costs per job created. 
Therefore, incentives can affect business location, and increased 
job growth can yield important social benefits. We would expect in-
formed state governments, or metropolitan agencies concerned with 
economic development, that are maximizing the well-being of all their 
residents, to only offer incentives if the benefits outweigh the costs. 
These calculations would consider that only a fraction of incentive of-
fers would prove decisive, and only a fraction of newly created jobs 
would go to local residents. Policymakers would consider the circum-
stances of the local economy, the environmental costs or benefits, the 
quality of the new jobs, and who is hired for those new jobs. So, what 
is the problem? 
The problem is that many incentives currently being offered in the 
United States have costs that exceed benefits. For example, in 2001 Chi-
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cago awarded large incentives to the Boeing Corporation for relocating 
its headquarters, even though the jobs would go to relocated workers, 
which eliminates many of the labor market benefits. 
One cause of wasteful incentives is ignorance. Policymakers as-
sume that all growth is good. They assume that all incentive offers are 
decisive. It is often assumed that benefits can be measured by looking 
at the earnings and tax base associated with the new business activity. 
This assumption forgets that only a portion of the new jobs go to local 
residents and the unemployed, and that new public expenditures will be 
required. 
But there may be reasons for ignorance. As Upton Sinclair (1935) 
said, “It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his 
salary depends upon his not understanding it.” Local economic devel-
opment decisions have been dominated by local business interests, in-
cluding Chambers of Commerce, newspapers, banks, and real estate 
developers. From these groups’ perspectives, the benefits of economic 
development are the increase in the value of their property, including 
the value of local business assets, and this increase in local capital val-
ues is closely related to the earnings and tax base increase of the new 
plant. Furthermore, the costs of the incentives, including the incentives 
that do not work, will be borne largely by the general public. There 
is truth to the observation by Logan and Molotch (1987, pp. 50–51) 
that, “For those who count, the city is a growth machine, one that can 
increase aggregate rents and trap related wealth for those in the right 
position to benefit.” 
Unlike some analysts of incentives, I do not think the fundamental 
problem is that a state government (or a metropolitan-wide economic 
development authority) fails to take into account the negative effects of 
its incentives on other states. If all states had rational incentive regimes, 
on the margin investors in each state would be charged a tax rate net 
of incentives that would reflect the marginal public service and envi-
ronmental costs, net of any employment benefits, that the investment 
caused. Under those conditions, a state’s incentive that attracts a mar-
ginal plant that would have otherwise gone to another state causes no 
net cost for that other state. Of course, states don’t usually have rational 
incentive regimes, and so it is likely that attracting this marginal plant 
would cause net social costs (or benefits, depending upon the net effect 
in the other state) for the state that otherwise would have received this 
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investment. But this “externality” is not the fundamental problem, rath-
er it reflects the fundamental problem: each state lacks, from its own 
self-interested perspective, a rational incentive regime that maximizes 
the interests of all state residents. 
Critics who argue that incentives negatively affect other states also 
argue that states are offering incentives so excessive that the social costs 
of attracting these new plants exceed the social benefits. If this is the 
case for all states, then if state X attracts a plant that would have gone 
to state Y, state X is doing state Y a favor by saving it from a wasteful 
incentive. 
This analysis so far has considered economic development deci-
sions by a state or an entire metropolitan area, and asks whether a state 
or metropolitan area acting rationally has the proper incentive to con-
sider all benefits and costs. The analysis is different when we consider 
economic development decisions for an individual suburban jurisdic-
tion. For an individual suburban jurisdiction attracting a new plant, the 
main effects on the jurisdiction itself are effects on the jurisdiction’s tax 
base and the jurisdiction’s environmental quality. The net fiscal costs 
of providing public services to additional households attracted by the 
new business activity will mostly be incurred by other jurisdictions in 
the metropolitan area, or by the state government, as most workers in 
an individual suburban jurisdiction do not live there. The employment 
benefits of increased employment rates and promotions to better-paying 
occupations will also mostly be received by residents of other jurisdic-
tions. The decisions of individual suburban jurisdictions about incen-
tives have no strong reason to fully reflect all these social costs and 
benefits. 
ALTERNATIvE INCENTIvE REFoRMS 
Given this economic context, what incentive reforms are desirable? 
This section evaluates the merits of possible reforms. Although some 
reforms are mutually exclusive, others could be combined. 
Maintain traditional state and local policies towards business, 
but remain competitive in the global economy. State and local gov-
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ernments would maintain their traditional business tax systems and not 
offer any incentives or other business cost reductions to improve the 
local business climate. As mentioned previously, this traditional sys-
tem imposed state and local taxes on business that exceeded the public 
services to business, with $1.70 in business taxes per dollar of public 
services to business (Oakland and Testa 1996). 
For most state and local areas, I doubt whether this alternative will 
prove politically viable. The mobility of business is increasing. Most 
state and local areas will sometimes experience high unemployment 
that will lead to public demands for action, and this high unemployment 
will also increase the benefits of growth. There is enough evidence that 
business taxes and incentives affect local growth that business interests 
will be able to argue for reduced taxes or increased incentives to reduce 
unemployment. The argument for doing something will win out over 
the argument for doing nothing. 
Localism. Rather than competing for mobile capital, local areas 
could “just say no,” eliminate incentives for mobile corporations, and 
rely on locally generated capital. The best articulation of this approach 
is in Michael Shuman’s (2000) book, Going	Local, although this ap-
proach appeals to many American community activists. Shuman advo-
cates community corporations with voting shares controlled by local 
residents, with these community corporations making the local econ-
omy more self-sufficient by producing goods and services that replace 
imports of goods and services from other local areas. 
The main problem with this approach is that greater reliance on 
local capital and local production would significantly reduce an area’s 
real per capita income. There are static and dynamic gains from trade 
and capital mobility. Local areas should be free to pursue this option, 
but local residents should understand the costs. 
Develop unique local assets that yield economic rents. Local ar-
eas can develop unique assets that make their area significantly more 
valuable to large businesses than these businesses’ next best alternative, 
so that these large businesses receive what economists call an “econom-
ic rent” from the local area. This “economic rent” would allow business 
taxation in excess of public service costs without offering incentives to 
attract or retain these large businesses. One unique local asset would be 
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a unique cluster of industries that increases productivity by resulting 
in more new ideas, and greater availability of specialized inputs such 
as workers with special skills (Rosenfeld 2002a,b). Another unique lo-
cal asset would be distinctive local amenities that attract what Florida 
(2002) calls the “creative class,” the professional and technical workers 
who enhance productivity for many high-tech businesses. 
The problem is that for most local areas, it is difficult to develop 
unique industry clusters or local amenities. Businesses will have many 
options of similar metropolitan areas that offer advantages from indus-
try clusters and local amenities. There are then no economic rents for 
local areas to exploit, and offering incentives must at least be seriously 
considered. 
Lower overall business tax rates. Faced with businesses with many 
location options, localities can respond by lowering overall business tax 
rates rather than offering special incentives. This low-tax alternative to 
incentives is favored by many conservative critics of incentives. 
The problem is that this change would significantly reduce tax rev-
enue, forcing difficult choices on state and local governments about 
raising household taxes, or cutting public services or transfers. These 
problems would be particularly acute in economically distressed local 
areas. 
Lower marginal tax rates on new business operations. Rather 
than cutting business tax rates across the board, state and local areas 
could give tax credits or deductions for business investment or employ-
ment expansion. Compared to overall business tax reductions, this re-
sults in less of a short-run or medium-run revenue loss. Reductions in 
taxes on new business operations are similar to incentives, but would be 
provided as an entitlement to all businesses meeting the law’s criteria, 
rather than in a discretionary manner to approved businesses. 
Providing tax breaks as an entitlement, rather than at discretion, in 
theory encourages a state or local government to analyze the impact 
of the tax break in toto. In practice, such tax breaks are not reviewed 
closely. In addition, entitlement tax breaks, compared to discretionary 
tax breaks, do not allow the advantages of being selective, such as se-
lecting projects in which assistance is more likely to tip the location 
decision, or the location has greater benefits. 
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Make discretionary incentives truly selective. As mentioned be-
fore, many discretionary incentives are provided so automatically to 
projects that they become equivalent to a tax break provided as an en-
titlement. Economic developers can be forced to become selective by 
requiring the number of incentives be capped, or better, that the dollar 
volume of incentives be capped. Criteria can be required for selecting 
incentive winners from incentive applicants, such as evidence that this 
incentive will tip the location decision, and benefit-cost analyses of the 
projects. Michigan’s “MEGA” program, for example, which provides 
large tax credits to attract or retain businesses, has limits on the annual 
number of projects. It requires that all projects present data showing 
that a non-Michigan site would be more profitable without the incen-
tive, and that all projects be subject to fiscal impact analysis.10
Capping incentive volume limits incentive costs. Political debate 
on the incentive cap may lead to a broader debate about the incentive 
regime. Whether government officials can determine if the incentive 
is needed to tip the location decision is more questionable. However, 
requiring businesses to legally certify, with official financial figures, 
that without the incentive the business would have located elsewhere, 
might discourage some egregious cases where clearly the incentive was 
irrelevant to the location decision. Finally, models can be developed 
to provide reasonably accurate estimates of the labor market and fiscal 
benefits of a new facility. 
Transparency. The details of incentives and incentive offers can 
be required to be clearly publicly disclosed. This disclosure promotes 
broader public debate. If the incentive offers are reported in a consistent 
fashion nationally, the disclosure may also give economic developers 
a more accurate knowledge of what alternatives are open to business 
location decision makers, which should improve the bargaining posi-
tion of economic developers. Businesses already know what they have 
been offered by different local areas, but economic developers do not. 
The national collection of this information would allow better research 
on incentives. Finally, transparency is essential for any incentive regu-
lation by the federal government or supranational organizations. The 
European Union requires public disclosure of incentives by its member 
states, and disclosure and transparency are encouraged by international 
trade agreements. 
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Metrowide economic development programs, not within-metro 
competition. State governments can require that incentives not be pro-
vided by individual local governments, but only by the state as a whole 
or by metrowide organizations or coalitions. As discussed previously, 
local governments that are a small part of the local labor market will 
not consider many important social effects of business growth when 
offering incentives, such as the labor market benefits throughout the 
metropolitan area, and the fiscal effects of increased metropolitan popu-
lation. This makes it unlikely that incentive policies conducted by small 
individual local governments will be optimal. A metrowide perspec-
tive would seem to be a minimum requirement for incentive policy to 
consider the full range of economic and fiscal effects. One limitation 
of state governments in this regard is that some metro areas cross state 
boundaries, a subject considered below. 
Better benefit-cost analyses. State legislatures can require that 
all economic development incentive offers be subject to a prospec-
tive benefit-cost analysis to estimate whether their incentive offers are 
efficient. This analysis would estimate employment benefits, including 
what proportion of the new jobs would likely go to local residents, par-
ticularly unemployed local residents; wage effects, including the wage 
rate paid on the jobs for workers of given credentials versus current 
local jobs held by local residents with similar credentials; fiscal effects, 
including local as well as state effects, effects on required public ex-
penditure as well as taxes, and analysis of the capacity of existing in-
frastructure to accommodate job growth; and environmental effects. If 
the estimates are high quality, they increase the likelihood of the right 
incentive choices. Even imperfect estimates would encourage debate on 
some relevant issues about incentives. 
Job quality and other project standards. As suggested by Greg 
LeRoy and the organization “Good Jobs First,” as well as others, states 
could require that all projects awarded incentives meet some minimum 
standard for job quality (LeRoy 1999; Nolan and LeRoy 2003; Purinton 
et al. 2003). In theory, concerns about job quality are already addressed 
as one component of the benefit-cost analysis. Decisions should be 
based on the net benefits of the incentive, not just on whether the project 
met a job-quality standard. However, as a check on the incentive deci-
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sion-making process, it might be wise to identify in advance some mini-
mum standards for projects, under the assumption that projects failing 
to meet standards would be unlikely to pass a benefit-cost test. Projects 
that did not meet these minimum standards would have to go through 
a special review process to be approved. These minimum standards 
would give economic developers a summary of what types of projects 
they would be encouraged to pursue, and would give the public and 
policymakers extra assurance that there is some selectivity involved in 
the benefit-cost analysis process. Benefit-cost analysis is too often a 
“black box” dominated by technical experts. Standards may help clarify 
what the analysis process is trying to do. 
More up-front incentives. Studies indicate that corporate execu-
tives use very high real discount rates in making investment decisions, 
averaging 12 percent (Summers and Poterba 1992). For business loca-
tion decisions, this implies that the portion of the property tax abate-
ment provided 10 years from now is almost completely irrelevant to the 
location decision, because the business decision maker is focused on 
shorter-term profit objectives. On the other hand, most studies suggest 
that governments should use social discount rates much lower than 12 
percent. To serve the public interest, governments should have a longer 
time horizon than corporate executives. 
As a result, it is possible to have a greater effect on business loca-
tion decisions at a lower cost by providing a greater proportion of the 
incentive up front. Up-front incentives also force state and local politi-
cal leaders to immediately deal with incentives’ costs, rather than pass 
on costs to their successors. However, providing more up-front incen-
tives brings to the forefront the issue of whether the incentive can be re-
covered if the location decision does not provide the promised benefits, 
for example, if the company relocates. To provide more incentives up 
front, a greater proportion of the incentive can be provided as custom-
ized training or infrastructure, or tax incentives can be made larger but 
shorter term. 
Clawbacks. The net benefits of an incentive regime increase when 
some of the incentive can be recovered if the business receiving the 
incentive does not provide the planned social benefits, for example, if 
the business relocates or the number of jobs created falls short of pro-
Markusen.indb   118 2/27/2007   12:40:08 PM
Solving the Problems of Economic Development Incentives   119
jections.11 This can be dealt with by legally binding “clawback” pro-
visions, which recover some portion of the up-front incentives if the 
business does not meet performance goals. State use of clawback pro-
visions is increasing, with the number increasing from 9 to 17 between 
1992 and 2002 (Peirce 2002). It is believed that local use of clawbacks 
is also increasing. Surveys of local governments show that 59 percent 
of local governments claim they “always” require a performance agree-
ment as a condition for incentives, and an additional 30 percent of local 
governments claim they “sometimes” require a performance agreement 
(Bartik 2004a). 
The main potential problem with clawbacks is that if they are unduly 
onerous, they may be a disincentive to attracting businesses. However, 
if they are designed with incentives so they are clearly related to the 
social benefits associated with the business, then businesses that expect 
to make a long-term investment in the community should not perceive 
clawbacks as a huge disincentive to their location decisions. 
Redesign incentives to focus more on the social benefits of bus- 
iness growth.12 As discussed above, the largest portion of the so-
cial benefits of growth arise from increasing local employment rates. 
Increasing such rates provides the unemployed with greater job experi-
ence, puts upward pressure on local wages, and increases local taxes 
more than public spending needs. Local employment rates are most 
likely to go up when the new business hires the unemployed, and least 
likely to go up when the new business hires in-migrants. The rates may 
go up when the new business hires local residents who are already em-
ployed, as this creates a job vacancy that may be filled by the local 
unemployed. 
Therefore, incentives will be more targeted on the projects with 
greatest social benefits if the amount of the incentive is based on whom 
the business hires. Incentives should be somewhat greater for projects 
that hire local residents, and considerably greater if the business hires 
the unemployed.13 More benefits of greater employment experience oc-
cur in the first year of employment, so it would be justifiable for greater 
incentives to be provided for the initial hiring of the unemployed and 
their first year of employment, and somewhat smaller incentives for 
subsequent years. In addition to targeting incentives on projects that 
provide greater social benefits, such incentives will encourage busi-
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nesses to do more hiring of the unemployed. Such hiring incentives will 
be more effective if tied to local programs that attempt to screen and 
train potential hires from among the unemployed, which I discuss next 
(Bartik 2001, Chapter 8). Finally, tying incentives to the provision of 
social benefits is an automatic “clawback,” as the incentive that is not 
paid until the benefit is delivered does not need to be “clawbacked” if 
the benefit is not delivered. 
Tie incentives to participation in “first source” hiring pro-
grams.14 Many local governments have some nominal requirement for 
local hiring by businesses receiving incentives, but frequently these 
requirements are unenforced because of fears of discouraging busi-
ness locations. A few cities, such as Portland (Oregon), with its now-
defunct JobNet program, and Berkeley, with its First Source program, 
have tried to encourage local hiring without adversely affecting busi-
ness locations. These programs combine a moderate requirement—that 
businesses “consider” hiring workers referred by the program—with a 
public service to help businesses overcome the many difficulties they 
face in finding productive workers to fill jobs with few formal creden-
tial requirements. Studies suggest that one-quarter of new hires in small 
and medium-sized firms are producing less than 75 percent of what the 
employer anticipated after six months on the job (Bishop 1993). These 
difficulties may occur in part because job performance is so dependent 
on “soft skills,” such as showing up at work on time and getting along 
with co-workers and customers, and these soft skills are hard to observe 
in the normal hiring process. Because normal hiring so often is disap-
pointing to employers, a program that can train and screen qualified 
workers, who are then considered for hiring by employers receiving in-
centives, can potentially help businesses find productive workers. Local 
public agencies may have some comparative advantage over private 
businesses, particularly private businesses from out of town, in work-
ing with neighborhood groups, churches, and social service agencies 
to find productive workers for jobs with low credential requirements. 
Local public agencies may also be better able than businesses to mobi-
lize resources for training from local workforce agencies and the local 
community college. 
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Focus incentives on in-kind up-front services such as custom-
ized training and access roads and other infrastructure. Customized 
training and infrastructure are incentives that inherently are concentrat-
ed up front and therefore have the advantages of up-front incentives 
mentioned previously, including a greater effect on location decisions 
per present value dollar of incentive. They also can be at least partially 
clawed back, without legal proceedings, as the infrastructure and most 
of the trained workers will remain in the local area even if the busi-
ness relocates or downsizes. Customized training can be designed to in-
crease the likelihood that a greater proportion of those trained and hired 
are local residents who otherwise would be unemployed (see Batt and 
Osterman [1993] and Osterman and Batt [1993] for some examples in 
North Carolina’s customized training programs). Finally, both custom-
ized training and infrastructure can be justified as making public ser-
vices more effective, rather than unjustifiably treating some businesses 
more favorably than others. For example, public infrastructure, such as 
highways, is supposed to be provided in response to demand. Providing 
access highways as part of an incentive package is only an “incentive” 
because the access highway is expedited to the top of the “to do” list. It 
could be argued that making the provision of highways more responsive 
to changes in demand makes government more responsive. It could also 
be argued that training programs can increase their quality by becoming 
more customized to the needs of both those receiving the training and 
those organizations that will demand the skills of those trained. 
Federal intervention in incentive policy. In theory, federal in-
tervention could be used to require or encourage all of these recom-
mendations for more effective incentive policy. However, absent some 
rationale for why there is a national interest in incentive policy, there 
is no reason to think that federal intervention will be any wiser than 
state and local incentive policies. There is some reason to think that 
federal intervention would make things worse. The federal government 
has less knowledge about local labor market institutions, which might 
be important, for example, in designing customized training programs. 
The federal government will also have less of other “local knowledge”: 
less knowledge about job needs of different groups, the hiring practices 
of local employers, the problems caused by particular environmentally 
contaminated properties, the capacity of particular local infrastructure, 
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etc. In addition, the federal government is likely to be less responsive to 
local needs. Because the benefits and costs of incentive policies depend 
on the details of the local labor market and local fiscal structure, effec-
tive policymaking depends on an intimate knowledge and responsive-
ness to these details. Federal intervention is at a disadvantage. 
Federal government intervention in incentive policy is particularly 
likely to be casually reckless if it is free of cost constraints, accomplish-
ing its goals by regulating or taxing state and local incentives it wants 
to prevent rather than subsidizing incentives it wants to encourage. For 
example, some have proposed having Congress ban or heavily tax in-
centives (Minge 1999; Burstein and Rolnick 1995). As argued previ-
ously, some incentives have social benefits, and assuming the “federal 
incentive tax” was not easy to evade, a uniform tax would discourage 
these beneficial incentives. For example, an economically distressed 
city may find that economic development incentives are part of the best 
policy package for its economic revitalization. If a federal incentive 
tax prevents these incentives, that distressed city may have to adopt an 
inferior revitalization package—for example, one that tries to make the 
city competitive by lowering overall business tax rates and making cuts 
in redistributive public services. However, in practice I would suspect 
that most federal incentive taxes would be easy to evade, so this policy 
would serve little purpose except political posturing. 
In theory, federal intervention could be more selective than a uni-
form federal incentive tax, which would make the intervention more 
beneficial. For example, Congress could only impose the federal incen-
tive tax on incentives provided by affluent local areas. However, I am 
skeptical that Congressional intervention would be so enlightened.15 If 
Congress is able to gain revenue, or at least not lose revenue, by regulat-
ing state and local economic development activities, I suspect that this 
unfettered intervention would be just as likely to discourage efficient 
economic development programs as inefficient programs. 
Federal intervention in incentive policy is more likely to be effec-
tive if it is 1) targeted on instances where there is a clear national in-
terest in state and local incentive policy, and 2) accomplished through 
federal subsidies rather than taxes and regulation, which forces some 
awareness of costs by federal decision makers. Three types of federal 
interventions appear justified based on national interests. First, federal 
dollars should continue to be provided for initiatives that seek to target 
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economically distressed areas, such as Empowerment Zones and the 
New Markets Initiative. The rationale for this intervention is that there 
is a national interest in promoting a more progressive income distribu-
tion, which such initiatives help accomplish. Second, federal dollars 
should be provided for rigorous prospective and retrospective benefit-
cost analyses of economic development incentives. In the process of 
evaluating these incentives, such study will disclose exactly what incen-
tives are being offered in different states. The incentive offers from the 
different states should be compiled by the federal government into a da-
tabase that would be publicly available. The rationale for this interven-
tion is that information on what incentives are being offered, and these 
incentives’ effectiveness, is a public good with benefits to economic 
developers and the public in all states. Third, federal dollars should be 
provided to help fund metrowide economic development organizations, 
with extra funding for metrowide economic development organizations 
that extend across state boundaries. The federal government has some 
advantage over the states in encouraging cooperation that might benefit 
an interstate metro area as a whole.
CoNCLUSIoN 
Wasteful economic development incentives should be dealt with 
largely by opening up the incentives policy process at the state and lo-
cal level to broader public participation and debate. To promote more 
effective public participation, we should continually improve our data 
on and analyses of the benefits and costs of incentives. Broader public 
participation and better analysis should lead to the specific reforms that 
are discussed in this chapter. 
Such a reformed incentive policy would only offer incentives selec-
tively, subject to an overall budget constraint. Incentive offers would 
be coordinated at the metrowide or state level. Full public information 
would be available on all incentive offers and their results. Incentive of-
fers would be subject to a prospective benefit–cost analysis, have some 
minimum standards for job quality, and have provisions for recovering 
incentives if performance goals were not achieved. Incentives would 
focus on encouraging more hiring of the unemployed, for example, 
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through hiring subsidies and customized training grants. Economic de-
velopment incentives should be seen as a part of an overall policy to 
improve local labor markets. Economic development incentives should 
be used to increase labor demand for those local residents who are un-
employed or underemployed. Such local demand policies should be 
coordinated with local labor supply policies, which would provide the 
training and education needed for local residents to succeed in these 
new and better jobs. In addition to overcoming barriers to the efficient 
working of local labor markets, economic development incentives 
should be used to overcome barriers preventing the use of brownfields, 
and to encourage use of underutilized public infrastructure. 
A “bottom-up” approach to reforming incentives, by working at the 
state and local level to improve incentive policy, is likely to be more 
effective, more durable, and more democratic than a heavy-handed 
“top-down” approach of using federal intervention to prevent certain 
practices. Federal policy can be more helpful by providing financial 
support for “bottom-up” reform: subsidizing better benefit-cost analy-
ses and information on incentives, encouraging stronger coordination 
of incentives at the metro level, and targeting assistance on economi-
cally distressed local areas. 
Incentive reforms are preferable to incentive abolition, as there are 
real economic forces that in some cases make incentives a desirable 
policy. Attempting to abolish incentives will lead to even more wasteful 
policies to create a “good business climate.” 
If one believes the government can take wise action, it is sensible 
to allow state and local governments the flexibility to use incentives. 
We should have a reasonable faith in state and local governments as 
“laboratories of democracy.” State and local experimentation in eco-
nomic development incentives can lead to better public policies if the 
public has the information and participation needed to allow for incen-
tive reforms.
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Appendix 5A
Plausible Calculations of Medium-Term Benefits 
and Costs of Economic Development Incentive 
Programs for a State or Metropolitan Area
This appendix presents in table form plausible medium-term flows of 
benefits and costs associated with an economic development incentive pro-
gram. The table is an expansion and updating of calculations I have previously 
presented in Bartik (1991a, 1992, 1994b, 2004a) and Bartik, Eisinger, and Er-
ickcek (2003). The incentive program considered is for a state or a metropoli-
tan area. The benefits and costs estimated are for the residents of the state and 
metropolitan area, and their governments and businesses. Benefits and costs 
to the federal government, or to persons, businesses, or governments outside 
the state or metropolitan area, are not considered. The benefits and costs are 
calculated as annual flows over some medium term after the incentives are pro-
vided, say, five years. Some table entries also speculate about shorter-term or 
longer-term benefits and costs. Benefits and costs are calculated in two ways: 
1) as percentages of annual state or local personal income for a 1 percent once-
and-for-all labor demand increase to state or metropolitan area employment, 
with this 1 percent employment increase induced by incentives of average ef-
fectiveness; and 2) as real dollars, using prices of 2003, per job induced by 
incentives of average effectiveness. This appendix will go through Table 5A.1 
line by line, explaining how each line is calculated based on the research litera-
ture and various data sources.
The gross incentive costs (line [1]) are derived assuming the response of 
state or metropolitan employment with respect to an incentive will be equiva-
lent in gross costs to the foregone business tax revenue to induce increased 
local activity if the elasticity of local employment with respect to state and 
local business taxes is −0.25. As derived in Note 4, the gross foregone business 
tax revenue per induced job (line [1], column B) is dR/dJ = (JdT)/dJ = T(1/E), 
where dR is the gross change in business tax revenue due to a reduction in 
business taxes, J is the number of jobs, dJ is the number of induced jobs, T is 
the business tax rate calculated as state and local business taxes per job, dT is 
the change in that tax rate, and E is the elasticity of state and local employment 
with respect to the business tax rate, which is assumed to be −0.25, a compro-
mise between the −0.3 preferred in the literature review of Bartik (1992) and 
the −0.2 preferred by Wasylenko (1997). Business tax revenue per job is calcu-
lated as detailed in Note 4. Line (1)(A) is derived in similar manner, using the 
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Table 5A.1  Estimated Benefits and Costs of Economic Development Incentives
Category
Benefits/costs as % of 
local personal income for 
1% induced employment 
growth (column A) 
Benefits/costs in annual 
real 2003 dollars per 
induced job (column B) 
(1) Incentive costs −0.218 −9,699
(2) Fiscal effects 
(2.1)   Induced revenue from additional business tax base 0.055 2,425
(2.2)   Net incentive cost = (1) + (2.1) −0.163 −7,274
(2.3)   Net long-run fiscal effects of equal employment and 
population growth 
0.000 0
(2.4)   Gross effects of extra jobs on revenue from business tax base 0.011 485
(2.5)   Required public services for extra jobs −0.006 −285
(2.6)   Net fiscal effects of “profit” on extra business tax base =  
2.4 + 2.5 
0.005 200
(2.7)   Reduced social spending and unemployment benefits due to 
higher employment rates 
0.019 845
(2.8)   Sales/income taxes on increased personal income of local 
residents = 3.8 
0.018 795
(2.9)   Property taxes on increased real estate values 0.008 343
(2.10) Short-run fiscal effects: Positive if underutilized 
infrastructure, negative if growth requires expensive new 
infrastructure 
Uncertain    Uncertain
(2.11) Net quantifiable fiscal effect = 2.6 + 2.7 + 2.8 + 2.9 0.049 2,183
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Category
Benefits/costs as % of 
local personal income for 
1% induced employment 
growth (column A) 
Benefits/costs in annual 
real 2003 dollars per 
induced job (column B) 
(3) Labor market effects 
(3.1)   Gross real earnings gains for local residents 0.317 14,104
(3.2)   Extra real earnings on new job 0.916 40,766
(3.3)   Subtracting out earnings of in-migrants = 80% of (3.2) −0.733 −32,613
(3.4)   Net earnings of local residents on new jobs = 3.2 + 3.3 0.183 8,153
(3.5)   Increase in real wages due to promotion of local residents to 
better-paying occupations = 3.1 − 3.4 
0.134 5,950
(3.6)   Loss of social spending transfers = 2.7 −0.019 −845
(3.7)   Net increase in real income of local residents before taxes = 
3.4 + 3.5 + 3.6 = 3.1 + 3.6 
0.298 13,258
(3.8)   Sales/income taxes on increased income of local residents −0.018 −795
(3.9)   Increase in income of local residents after taxes = 3.7 + 3.8 0.280 12,463
(3.10) Reservation wages in low unemployment local area =  
90% of 3.4 
−0.165 −7,338
(3.11) Reservation wages in high unempl. area: assumed zero 0.000 0
(3.12) Net labor market benefits in low unemployment area =  
3.9 + 3.10 
0.115 5,125
(3.13) Net labor market benefits in high unemployment area =  
3.9 + 3.11 
0.280 12,463
(3.14) Shorter-run or longer-run labor market benefits: probably 
greater in short-run, less in long-run 
Uncertain Uncertain
(4) Real estate effects 
(4.1)   Gross gains in real estate values, as annual income flow 0.077 3,426
(4.2)   Increased annual property tax −0.008 −343
(continued)
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Category
Benefits/costs as % of 
local personal income for 
1% induced employment 
growth (column A) 
Benefits/costs in annual 
real 2003 dollars per 
induced job (column B) 
(4.3)   Net gain to property owners 0.069 3,083
(5) Locally-owned business effects: Profit increase at businesses 
serving local market, decrease at export-base businesses. 
Uncertain Uncertain
(6) Environmental/congestion effects: likely to be negative unless 
project involves restoring brownfields 
Uncertain Uncertain
(7) Community effects: Some loss in community character and 
increased rents for local residents for growth beyond original 
community size, some gain for growth that restores community’s 
customary size 
Uncertain Uncertain
Total quantifiable effects 
(8.1) In low unemployment local labor market = 1 + 2.11 + 3.12 + 4.3 0.016 692
(8.2) In high unemployment local labor market = 1 + 2.11 + 3.13 + 4.3 0.181 8,030
Table 5A.1  (continued)
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equation that the foregone taxes as percentage of income to induce 1 percent 
employment growth will be = 100(dT/Y) = ([1% employment growth/E](T/Y), 
where T is now business taxes in dollar terms, Y is personal income, and state/
local business taxes as a percent of personal income are assumed to be 5.46 
percent, based on calculations in Bartik (1991a, p. 180). 
Lines (2.1) through (2.2) present a side calculation showing fiscal effects 
and net incentive costs if the only fiscal effects considered are the extra busi-
ness tax revenue from enhancing the business tax base. This extra business 
tax revenue is simply the business tax revenue associated with the induced 
jobs. Line (2.1)(B) is business tax revenue per job in 2003 dollars, based on 
calculations in Note 4, as the (B) column expresses everything per one induced 
job. Line (2.1)(A) is 1 percent of average business tax revenue as a percent of 
personal income, because the (A) column expresses everything per 1 percent 
in induced extra employment. Line (2.2) then shows a supposed “net incentive 
cost,” which, however, is erroneous because it omits all the fiscal effects from 
the public services associated with the extra business tax base, as well as the 
taxes and public services associated with the extra households, and the effects 
of higher employment on the need for social services and revenue from the 
property tax. This erroneous calculation is the style of calculation frequently 
done by advocates for incentives who claim that such incentives “pay for them-
selves.” Line (2.2) shows that such incentives clearly don’t pay for themselves 
even if we only look at the business tax base gains. 
To simplify the analysis of the full fiscal effects, I start from the baseline 
of the long-run fiscal effects of employment growth and population growth 
when both increase by the same percentage. This baseline is straightforward 
to analyze, and the actual net fiscal effects of the incentive-induced growth are 
then analyzed as effects of deviations from this baseline. Line (2.3) assumes 
that if state and local public services are constant returns to scale in the long 
run, as indicated in Fisher (1996) and Inman (1979), a balanced increase in 
employment and production should produce equal tax revenue and public ser-
vice needs. But of course we don’t expect that induced jobs will bring about 
the same percentage increase in population. Based on Bartik (1991a, 1993), we 
expect that for a given percentage increase in induced employment, the per-
centage increase in population will be about four-fifths as much. So we analyze 
the fiscal effects as if for every 1 percent in induced jobs, we have four-fifths of 
1 percent in increased population. The fiscal effects then are a combination of a 
“balanced” increase of four-fifths of 1 percent in both employment and popula-
tion, which should have zero fiscal effects in the long run, and the fiscal effects 
of the “extra” one-fifth of 1 percent of jobs. The effects of these extra jobs 
are the effects of these extra jobs on the business tax base and required public 
services, as well as the effects of the extra jobs, via a higher employment rate, 
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on the taxes and transfers associated with higher earnings for local residents, 
considered in the section on labor market effects. 
Line (2.4) calculates the business taxes from the extra jobs as one-fifth 
of the business taxes from the business tax base associated with all the jobs, 
from line (2.1). Line (2.5) is based on Oakland and Testa’s (1996) calculation 
that business tax revenue is 70 percent greater than public services directly 
required by businesses. Line (2.7)(A) is based on estimates from Bartik and 
Eberts (1999) that 1 percent employment growth reduces welfare caseloads 
by 6 percent, and estimates by Chernick and McGuire (1999) that own-source 
state and local spending on social services is 1.3 percent of personal income; 
social services spending is assumed to decline by the same percent as welfare 
caseloads. This yields a decrease in social services spending as a percent of 
income of −0.008 percent. This may seem small compared to overall earnings 
gains of 0.317 percent (see line (3.1) below), but growth is only modestly pro-
gressive; about 4.2 percent of the total earnings gains from stronger regional 
labor demand goes to the bottom income quintile, which is not much more 
than their share of income (Bartik 2001, Table 5.3). In addition line (2.7)(A) is 
based on estimates (Bartik 1991b, Table 2) that 1 percent extra local employ-
ment growth in the short run reduces unemployment payments by 3.4 percent. 
Based on 1995 statistics from O’Leary and Wandner (1997, p. 733), and 1995 
personal income data from the Regional Economic Information System, UI 
benefits are 0.33 percent of personal income, so a 3.4 percent reduction in 
such payments will reduce unemployment benefit payments by 0.011 percent 
of personal income. Adding 0.011 percent to the 0.008 percent reduction in 
social spending yields the 0.019 percent figure shown in line (2.7)(A). Line 
2.7(B) is derived from (A) by using ratios. Line (2.8) is based on the taxes as-
sociated with the extra earnings of local residents, and will be discussed further 
when the labor market section of the table is discussed. Line (2.9) is based on 
the property taxes on the increased real estate values associated with growth 
and is discussed further in that section. Line (2.9) is based on case studies by 
Altshuler and Gomez-Ibanez (1993) that show that new required infrastructure 
frequently vastly exceeds tax revenue from growth; because existing infra-
structure will eventually require replacement, this suggests that depreciation 
charges for existing infrastructure are understated. 
Line (3.1)(A) is based on estimates reported in Bartik (1991a, p. 163) on 
effects of growth on real earnings, expressed as a percent of personal income 
by assuming earnings are 73.5 percent of personal income (Bartik, 1991a, p. 
163). Line (3.1)(B) uses ratios to calculate this on a per job basis. Lines (3.2) 
through (3.5) attempt to divide line (3.1) into various components: gains for 
workers newly employed, vs. gains for workers already employed who get 
better jobs. Line (3.2) attempts to replicate what a naive benefit-cost analysis 
Markusen.indb   130 2/27/2007   12:40:09 PM
Solving the Problems of Economic Development Incentives   131
would assume about earnings gains: they are equal to the earnings on the in-
duced jobs. Line (3.2)(B) is based on dividing total earnings by total employ-
ment, using 2002 data from the Regional Economic Information System. Line 
(3.2)(A) uses ratios to calculate this as a percent of personal income. Line (3.3) 
subtracts out the earnings of in-migrants to get the effects on local residents 
who get jobs in line (3.4). The rationale for subtracting line (3.3) is twofold: 
1) this analysis takes a local perspective in which only the original residents 
count, and 2) the analysis in Bartik (1991a) suggests that the well-being of 
in-migrants is not substantially affected by extra jobs in this local area, as the 
in-migrants would otherwise move to a similar local area. After subtracting 
line (3.4) from line (3.1), the remaining earnings gain must be from local resi-
dents moving up to better paying jobs. The residual calculation for line (3.5) 
appears roughly consistent with data from Bartik (1991a) on how employment 
growth affects occupational upgrading for local residents. The loss of transfer 
income in line (3.6) was previously derived for line (2.7). Line 3.8 is based 
on estimates from Citizens for Tax Justice that state and local personal sales 
and income taxes in 1995 averaged 6 percent of income for households in the 
middle income quintile (Ettlinger et al. 1996, Appendix 1, p. 51). In line (3.10), 
the reservation wage figure of 90 percent is used in Bartik (1991a) based on 
a review of the reservation wage literature. The assumption that reservation 
wages are zero for the unemployed in high unemployment areas is arbitrary. 
This assumption might be justified, even if nonwork time has some value for 
the unemployed, as seems likely, if unemployment has sizable social costs 
such as increased crime or increased social problems for the children of the 
unemployed. Lines (3.12) and (3.13) emphasize how different the labor mar-
ket benefits are based on different assumptions about reservation wages. Line 
(3.14) reflects that estimates suggest that the earnings effects reported in this 
table for local residents are probably greater in the short run and less in the 
long run than the medium-run figures used here (Bartik 1991a; Bartik 1994b). 
The question mark for line (3.14) suggests that it is unclear how this would af-
fect a present value analysis compared to simply using the medium-run annual 
flow benefits and costs reported in the table. 
Line (4.1)(A) comes from Bartik (1994b, Table 3) and is based upon es-
timates by Bartik (1991a) that 1 percent employment growth increases real 
estate values by 0.451 percent. A 10 percent real discount rate is used to con-
vert changes in capital values to annual flows. Line (4) (B) is derived from 
(A) using ratios. Line 4.2 is based on Table 3.13 of the 2001 American Hous-
ing Survey, which estimates that the median residential property tax rate for 
owner-occupied housing is 1 percent of value (U.S. Census Bureau 2001). 
The line (5) discussion assumes that only locally owned businesses should 
be considered in this local benefit-cost analysis. This is consistent with this 
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analysis focusing on the perspective of the state or metropolitan area, and ig-
noring effects on the federal government, or other state or metropolitan areas. 
Growth will clearly increase nominal wages and prices, as shown in Bartik 
(1991a), which reduces profits for businesses selling to outside markets. But 
businesses with some comparative advantage that they can maintain as the area 
grows (e.g., a local newspaper) will likely increase profits due to growth, as 
discussed in Bartik (1991a). For more discussion of environmental effects of 
local economic development, and of brownfields, see Bartik (2004b). 
The line (7) entry assumes that in a world with imperfect mobility, changes 
in a community’s “character” that bring it away from the originally chosen 
amenity package of the area’s households, with the accompanying wage and 
price changes, will reduce utility of the area’s original residents, as these origi-
nal residents must have preferred the original amenity package given prevail-
ing wages and rents. For more on this type of model, see Bartik (1991a, pp. 
73–76), and Bartik (1986). 
There is considerable uncertainty in these figures; for example, I could 
come up with a rationale for adjusting the incentive cost figures and the earn-
ings gains numbers up or down by 50 percent or more. Stating the numbers in 
this table to three, four, or five digits is an aid to calculation, but is a misleading 
indication of how much we really know. Therefore, it would be relatively easy 
to come up with a scenario under which quantifiable net benefits of economic 
development in a low unemployment area are negative. 
Notes
 This chapter reprinted by permission. See Bartik (2005).
 1. I have previously written about incentives in Bartik (1990; 1991a; 1993; 
1994a,b,c; 1996a,b; 2001; 2003; 2004a,b), as well as in Bartik, Erickcek, and 
Eisinger (2003). My comments on the benefits and costs of incentives from a 
state and local perspective are reasonably consistent. As I will footnote later, my 
comments on federal intervention in incentives have some inconsistencies.
 2.  The following Michigan programs are cash or near-cash incentives to large busi-
nesses: property tax abatements, one-third of tax increment financing, MEGA 
tax credits, brownfield tax credits, Renaissance zones, and federal Empowerment 
Zone/Enterprise Community funding. Together these programs comprise $531 
million of the $706 million in annual Michigan economic development resourc-
es. Michigan also spends $13 million on customized job training, $60 million in 
federal community development block grants on infrastructure development for 
economic development in nonurban communities, and $48 million on business 
recruitment and retention. The remainder of Michigan economic development 
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resources are devoted to small business development, high-tech research, and 
manufacturing extension.
  3. Although this is the general consensus, not all scholars agree that state tax ef-
fects on business location are significant. The most prominent scholarly critic of 
the notion that state taxes affect business location is McGuire. McGuire admits, 
however, that her position is inspired in part by fears of how state policymakers 
will respond to the conclusion that taxes affect business location. According to 
McGuire:
. . . I confess to being somewhat (perhaps very) irrational in my 
interpretation of this literature. With respect to the interstate and 
interregional studies, despite the number of studies with signifi-
cant coefficients, I find it difficult to be convinced that taxes are 
an important factor in explaining differences in business location 
decisions and economic activity between states or regions. In part 
I believe the discrepancy between my conclusion and that of many 
other scholars of the topic is due to our different perspectives. I 
came to this topic through the tax-study, blue-ribbon-commission 
route. I have seen firsthand state policymakers grasping for straws. 
I simply do not think that the evidence allows us to comfortably 
advise lawmakers that reducing the corporate income tax rate or 
the personal income tax rate will revive a flagging state economy. 
(McGuire 2003)
 4.  This calculation is as follows: the tax elasticity of private employment with re-
spect to state and local business taxes (E) is defined as (dJ/J)/(dT/T), where J is 
the number of jobs, dJ is the change in the number of jobs, T is the tax rate, and 
dT is the change in the business tax rate. The percentage change in revenue from 
a tax cut, dR/R, will approximately equal dT/T	=	dJ/J.
   Substituting and rearranging, one obtains, for the net foregone revenue cost 
per job created, dR/dJ = (R/J)[1 + (1/E)]. R/J is state and local business tax rev-
enue per job, which was about $1,634 per job in the United States as of 1989. 
With a value of −0.25 for E, one obtains dR/dJ = −$4,902. Updating by the 
change in consumer price index from 1989 to 2003 gives a figure in 2003 dollars 
of (184/124)4,902 = $7,274. The figure of $1,634 for state and local business 
taxes per private employee comes from three sources. Total state and local tax 
revenue in fiscal year 1989 was $469 billion (U.S. Census Bureau 1991, p. 21). 
One estimate of the business share of state and local taxes is 31 percent (ACIR 
1981, revised version of table A-1; figures for 1977). Private nonagricultural 
employment in the United States averaged 89 million during fiscal year 1989 
(U.S. Department of Commerce 1991, S-10). These figures could be updated 
using more recent data, but most of the studies were estimated using earlier data, 
so use of this historical data is probably better. The elasticity used is a compro-
mise between the −0.3 preferred in the literature review by Bartik (1992) and the 
−0.2 preferred by Wasylenko (1997). The Consumer Price Index figures come 
from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. I used an identical calculation in Bartik 
(2004a, 1992). The dynamic calculation here only looks at effects of taxes on 
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the business tax base, and ignores extra public expenditures required by a higher 
business tax base, and extra taxes and required public expenditures because of a 
larger household tax base.
   The cost in static tax revenue is dR	=	JdT, which, per job created by lower 
business tax rates, is JdT/dJ = T(1/E) = (business tax base per job) (1/0.25). Us-
ing the same figures the loss in static revenue from a business tax cut in 2003 
dollars is $9,699 = 1,634(184/124)(1/0.25). 
  5. Derived from Fisher and Peters (2002, Table 3.7). This takes their present value 
of incentives per job in the highest subsidy city and state of $22,678 in 1994, 
translates this into an annual equivalent by multiplying by the 10 percent dis-
count rate used by Fisher and Peters, and then adjusts to a 2003 value using the 
Consumer Price Index, or (1984/148.2) × (0.10)(22,678) = 2,816.
  6. An annual subsidy of $2,816 per job will yield a gross cost of $9,699 per induced 
job, as previously calculated, if the proportion of induced jobs (p) satisfies the 
equation p = $2,816/$9,699 = 0.29.
  7. These calculations are based on Fisher and Peters’ figures for the mean value of 
“general incentives” per job in 1994, translated into an annual equivalent and 
updated to 2003 dollars.
  8. What about migrants? I explore this in Bartik (1991a, Chapter 3). The argument 
is that persons on the margin of migrating in, or migrating out, do not have their 
opportunities substantially affected by changes in the characteristics of this one 
local area. If the local area had remained unchanged, with no growth, the persons 
who would have otherwise migrated in would choose other, similar metropolitan 
areas. Similarly, the individuals whose outmigration is averted by growth are by 
definition close to indifferent between staying or moving.
  9. For more “market failure” analysis of state and local economic development 
policy, see Bartik (1990, 1994c) or Courant (1994).
  10. This fiscal impact analysis is imperfect. The fiscal impact analysis only looks at 
state revenues, and not at state expenditures, or local taxes and expenditure. In 
addition, a full benefit-cost analysis would include labor market benefits. See 
Bartik, Erickcek, and Eisinger (2003) for a more detailed discussion of MEGA.
 11. More extensive discussion of clawbacks is found in Peters (1993) and Weber 
(2002).
 12. This is advocated by Bartik (2001) and Schweke and Woo (2003).
 13. Favoring the unemployed in jobs associated with business subsidies would seem 
likely to be acceptable discrimination from a legal perspective. Favoring local 
residents is more open to question.
 14. More on “First Source” programs is in Anderson (1999); Bartik (2001, Chapter 
9); Molina (1998); and Schweke (1999).
 15. I have been inconsistent over the years in my comments on federal regulation of 
incentives. I have sometimes been tempted by the notion that the federal govern-
ment should intervene to prevent the wasteful incentives of state and local areas 
with low unemployment. In the current political environment, I am pessimis-
tic that an intervention that comes at no federal cost, such as taxing incentives, 
would be so benign as to simply target wasteful incentives.
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6
Negotiating the Ideal Deal
Which Local Governments Have 
the Most Bargaining Leverage?
Rachel Weber
University	of	Illinois	at	Chicago
It is easy to criticize local governments’ use of financial incentives 
for business retention and attraction. Critics say that incentives cost 
more than the public benefits they create and redirect monies from other 
important public goods like infrastructure and education. They argue 
that incentives poison interjurisdictional relations, contribute to sprawl, 
favor large businesses over small, strain the planning capacity of local 
government, and are subject to the worst kinds of cronyism and abuse 
(for an inventory of such abuses, see LeRoy [2005]). 
However, calls for both federal legislation that could eliminate the 
practice of incentives (Burstein and Rolnick 1994) and regional truces 
that could reduce their use have been largely ignored. Public officials 
and fiscal watchdogs alike admit that, despite their general distaste for 
incentives and the competitive interjurisdictional relations they have 
created, such programs are difficult to condemn across the board. In-
centives, along with zoning and land use regulations, are one of the few 
sources of leverage that local governments possess in their negotiations 
with developers and businesses. 
Local governments use these economic development tools in dif-
ferent ways and to different effect. Whereas some jurisdictions are held 
hostage to demands of businesses and sign off on expensive long-term 
commitments, other states and cities negotiate better agreements. Some 
local governments have used incentives strategically to influence both 
the site-location decision as well as the magnitude of private invest-
ment. These dealmakers absorb relatively little risk and commit rela-
tively little up-front investment in relation to the public benefits created. 
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In other cases, however, “subsidy programs and deals have become so 
astronomically expensive that they can only be fairly described as ‘soak 
the taxpayer’ scams” (LeRoy 2005, p. 34). Anecdotes of states and cit-
ies spending (or foregoing tax revenues) upwards of $500,000 per	job	
created abound.
What is a “good deal” from the public sector’s perspective, and why 
do some states and cities craft better deals than others? This chapter 
provides some insight into the context in which the public sector and 
private business negotiate agreements; it also describes the elements 
of a well-designed deal from the public sector’s perspective.1 The fi-
nal section identifies the different sources of bargaining leverage from 
which local governments and business draw in order to partially explain 
the observed variation in deal structure. 
BARGAINING ENvIRoNMENT
Regulatory Context
Development incentives and regulatory environments matter less 
to businesses when deciding between distinct regions of the country. 
Proximity to key markets and suppliers, labor and transportation costs, 
and the whims of corporate executives are more important at this stage. 
Once the business has narrowed its choice of location to a particular 
region, however, it begins to consider the tax burden and physical 
characteristics of potential sites. The site location decision could be a 
relatively private affair, whereby the company purchases land, hires a 
developer and employees, and pays whatever taxes are levied on its 
property, employees, sales, and income. Aside from obtaining the req-
uisite building permits and complying with existing zoning and envi-
ronmental regulations, the business could have little direct contact with 
the public sector.
Protracted negotiations ensue only if expectations are raised, that is, 
either the business wants something more from local government, or the 
local government wants something more from business. What exactly 
comprises more is contested because public and private responsibilities 
in economic development are not fixed and unchanging. The principle, 
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for example, that a city should not be responsible for the development 
costs of individual businesses (because this falls squarely within some 
kind of proprietary private realm of responsibility) is difficult to sup-
port given the historical reality of public assistance for business. The 
courts have tried to resolve the issue by requiring local governments to 
document and prove the “public purpose” inherent in every act of tar-
geted assistance (Schoettle 2003). But 200 years of incentive use in the 
United States have stretched the public purpose doctrine beyond recog-
nition, blurring the boundaries of public and private roles and making 
it impossible to defer to principle or precedent (Sbragia 1996). Every 
case, therefore, must be negotiated on its own merits.
State governments have historically limited city taxing and spend-
ing power to curtail the cronyism, wasteful expenditures, uncontrolled 
borrowing, and general profligacy associated with municipal financial 
governance (Frug 1980). But they have also authorized municipalities 
to engage in development negotiations and, beyond an initial grant of 
authority, have often provided little to no guidance to them in terms of 
what to offer and expect from subsidized businesses (Briffault 1997). 
Even within the same state, local governments lack uniform criteria for 
allocating funds toward business attraction and retention. The varia-
tion in deal structure reveals multiple local economic development “re-
gimes” and cultures that have evolved over time, with little interference 
from higher orders of government.
Depending on one’s perspective, this reliance on negotiated strat-
egies at lower levels of government is either the result of a historic 
oversight, whereby such practices had become entrenched before they 
could be regulated, or the intentional by-product of a federalist system 
of governance. Cities and states have fought to preserve their autonomy 
from higher levels of government and have, in the case of economic de-
velopment, exhibited a preference for more informal and decentralized 
strategies. The economic theory of jurisdictional competition advanced 
by Tiebout (1956) and developed by Peterson (1981) provide post	facto	
support for this kind of decentralization by arguing that a combination 
of independence in public strategy and choice in private location deci-
sion will lead to regulatory outcomes that are aligned with citizen pref-
erences in a dynamic equilibrium. 
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Interests
Businesses and governments are not likely to agree on what con-
stitutes the “ideal deal” due to the conflicting nature of their interests. 
Business wants to maximize profits, and can best do so when local gov-
ernments agree to absorb risks and pay for costs that the business would 
otherwise shoulder (e.g., taxes, infrastructure, job training). Public in-
terests are more complex, broad, and diffuse: improving the general 
welfare of citizens through the provision of tax-funded services.2 Public 
officials can achieve this objective if they strengthen their economic 
base (retaining and attracting business) with minimal expenditure. Be-
cause strengthening an economic base is a formidable and unmanage-
able goal, public economic development practitioners tend to “shoot 
low” and focus their efforts on a tangible outcome: attracting businesses 
to their locale (Rubin 1988). 
While it may initially appear that one party’s benefit is always the 
other’s burden, a gray area exists where mutual gains may be had. This 
is because public and private interests are interdependent: both parties 
need the other in order to attain their objectives. Businesses rely on a 
public service infrastructure, property security, and a stable business en-
vironment whereas governments depend on tax revenues, employment, 
indirect and induced spending, and the physical development business-
es provide. A deal that allows a firm to add more staff will help it to 
grow to meet increasing demand for its products while a municipality in 
need of jobs for its un- or underemployed population also values these 
jobs. The notion of a “spillover effect” captures and complicates the 
interdependence of public and private interests. Development subsidies 
selectively mitigate some of the costs of doing business for individual 
firms, but advocates contend that assisting individual projects will lead 
to areawide improvements and the sharing of public benefits. 
Deal structure depends on both parties’ ability to persuade the other 
that their interests are symbiotic and served equally well by the agree-
ment. If a business is able to convince local governments that their in-
terests overlap entirely (“what’s good for General Motors is good for 
Detroit”), governments may be excessively accommodating and assume 
many of the costs of private land development and infrastructure. If a 
municipality can convince a business that it is getting a special deal on 
Markusen.indb   144 2/27/2007   12:40:10 PM
Negotiating the Ideal Deal   145
land in an up-and-coming inner-city neighborhood, that business is less 
likely to demand generous tax incentives.
Power
Despite their interdependence, local governments and businesses 
do not always negotiate on equal footing. Local governments are handi-
capped by the fact that they are embedded in space and not footloose 
like business. Because they are constrained by interjurisdictional com-
petition for private investment, public entities are dependent on private 
business to pay for basic services and infrastructure (Peterson 1981). 
They may be more likely to offer compromises so that deals end closer 
to the business’ initial proposal.
Businesses are also better able to control critical information flows 
during negotiations (Markusen and Nesse 2007). The financial gap com-
panies seek to fill to make a project feasible may be much smaller than 
they would have the public sector believe. Business tries to assure local 
governments that the deal would not take place without public assis-
tance (the “but for” condition) (Persky, Felsenstein, and Wiewel 1997). 
However, they can also bluff about the other sites they are considering 
and demand more than is really necessary because management has 
access to relevant information about the firm’s own cost structure and 
hurdle rates to which local governments are not privy (LeRoy 2005; 
Weber 2002). Government agencies never know the extent to which the 
business is serious about selecting a location; even if the business has 
made up its mind, it does better to keep the local government nervously 
anticipating a change of heart. 
Moreover, the private sector starts from an organizational advan-
tage. Local governments often lack flexibility; in order for public ad-
ministrators to change their initial offers of infrastructure provision, for 
example, they often have to go back to their city councils or legislatures 
and engage in a time-consuming process of backroom lobbying (Ru-
bin 1988). Even though local officials try to limit the range of interest 
groups who can participate in the debate over these issues, community 
organizations, labor unions, and watchdog groups may try to expose the 
terms of the deals and insist on protracted public discussion. In contrast, 
most corporate officials control information and negotiate in a bare-
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knuckled manner, hire consultants and lawyers to help them do so, and 
rely on internal decision-making structures for expedited action. 
Local governments have only recently learned how important good 
negotiation skills are to protecting their interests. They are subjecting 
their spending on economic development to more scrutiny and rely-
ing on more accountable forms of assistance by looking to the legal 
framework that governs the performance of private sector contracts for 
guidance. This changed behavior is not the result of some enlightened 
attitude—with fewer own-source funds, fewer intergovernmental trans-
fers, and increased community outrage at “corporate welfare,” cities 
have to been forced to be more selective about the businesses and proj-
ect expenses they finance.
WHAT IS A GooD DEAL FoR THE PUBLIC SECToR?
In many ways, the quality of a deal can only be evaluated post	facto. 
Did the local government get what it wanted (business retention, jobs, 
tax revenues) without paying “too much”? At a minimum, the marginal 
benefits should equal or exceed the marginal costs (including any fore-
gone revenues and additional costs associated with the development) 
after a reasonable period of time (Bartik 1991; Ledebur and Woodward 
1990). But local governments may not have to wait years to evaluate 
the quality of their deals. Even before the ink has dried and the deal is 
cut, certain kinds of incentive design are more likely to lead to better 
outcomes for the public sector.3 In such deals, the benefits and burdens 
of public financing are more fairly calibrated, contractual safeguards 
exist to help governments manage risks, and relevant information is 
disclosed.4
Ex Ante Decision Analysis
Local governments should have some idea of what they want out of 
a deal before negotiations even begin. Contracts that rely on very loose 
parameters of fulfillment are considered “incomplete” and provide par-
ties with opportunities to exploit gaps. The state of Minnesota, for ex-
ample, requires all state agencies and municipalities to develop explicit 
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benchmarks for awarding subsidies.5 These public purpose benchmarks 
include standards for job creation as well as for the wages of any new 
jobs. Job retention is only considered a legitimate criterion “where job 
loss is imminent and demonstrable.” The law requires each incentive-
granting agency to submit their benchmarks to the state’s Department 
of Employment and Economic Development and for the department to 
publish them annually.
With a better sense of their bargaining goals, local governments can 
better evaluate the costs and benefits of their subsidy programs. Few 
cities and states actually know the real cost of what they are giving 
away or what they are getting in return. In a survey of local economic 
development practitioners, only 24 percent reported any systematic or 
quantitative means of analyzing deals (Reese 1993). By comparing the 
present value of anticipated public costs (e.g., foregone revenues and 
additional expenditures on services, such as schools and infrastructure) 
to the present value of expected benefits (e.g., increased jobs, revenues 
generated by salaries of new employees, and multiplier effects) ex	ante, 
standard methods of cost-benefit analysis can provide a ballpark esti-
mate of how much the public benefits will cost. The more intangible de-
sign amenities, real estate improvements, and environmental mitigation 
may be valued by comparing them to their market equivalents.
Performance Standards
Local government can make their assistance to private business 
conditional by including legally binding provisions in the contracts that 
specify public benefit projections. For example, business may have to 
commit to creating a certain number of jobs, not relocating within a 
specified time period, and compliance with higher environmental or 
design standards. Many state statutes now require contracts to specify 
a particular wage rate, often based on a percentage of the federal mini-
mum wage or regional averages (see Purinton [2003] for an inventory 
of jobs standards). Contracts may also stipulate that businesses provide 
health care benefits to the new or retained employees. 
The contractual agreement can specify a reasonable time period for 
which the business must maintain operations in the locality or create 
a certain amount of jobs in exchange for its assistance. A Connecticut 
statute governing a below-market rate loan program states that “Busi-
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ness is prohibited from relocating during the term the loan is outstand-
ing or for 10 years after receiving assistance, whichever is longer.”6 
Without a so-called “benefit period,” a subsidized company will have 
an indefinite amount of time in which to fulfill its promises.
At the same time, savvy governments are not excessively rigid in 
their attempts to embed capital; they understand that it can be difficult 
to hold firms to their promises about the future given the vagaries of 
the global economy (Weber 2002). Corporate managers make location 
decisions in the context of great uncertainties and attempt to rein in the 
factors they can control: debt levels, capital spending, overhead, and 
staffing—all of which influence the places where they locate.
Local administrators are left with the challenge of protecting their 
assets while anticipating the uncertainties inherent in a turbulent busi-
ness environment. They do this by designing incentives that calibrate 
the number of jobs or investment to a subsidy ex	post and by making 
investments in places, as opposed to individual firms. Unlike an out-
right grant of funds, performance-based programs provide no assistance 
to a company until it meets specified levels of performance. For ex-
ample, a firm receives an income tax benefit once it has hired a certain 
number of workers at a designated minimum wage. The incentive can 
increase as the number of employees hired grows. The $2.5 million in-
centive package negotiated between Bismarck, North Dakota, and Cov-
entry Healthcare contained a provision whereby the company agreed 
to receive progressively larger payments for the subsequent phases or 
groups of employees hired (Hanson 2002). The city waited to make its 
largest payment until the final group had been hired.
This kind of payment clause protects the jurisdiction’s investment 
in case the company encounters setbacks or falls behind in its hiring 
schedule. Performance-based incentives may be less popular with busi-
nesses, as they typically prefer to receive lump sum payments to cover 
development and other start-up costs. With proper monitoring, how-
ever, they are easier for the public sector to enforce and respond better 
to unforeseen exigencies.
Enforcement Mechanisms
Spending time and effort to write detailed contracts and then ig-
noring the subsidized businesses after funds have “changed hands” is 
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not an effective economic development strategy. If businesses do not 
comply with the terms and conditions of the agreement as stated, they 
may have “breached” their contracts. Some contracts include a notice 
provision to inform the municipality of any changes in the operations 
of the business, such as the initiation of any lawsuits or bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, which might adversely impact the subsidized project. 
In other cases, the public sector must devise monitoring require-
ments. Local governments typically include one of two types of moni-
toring techniques. The first type places the onus of oversight on the 
public sector but requires that specified documents be available for pub-
lic inspection and audit. A more effective type of provision creates an 
affirmative obligation on the part of the business to provide necessary 
information rather than to merely allow local governments to ask for 
the right of inspection. Kansas City, for example, double checks self-re-
ported data from firms against information derived from the city’s em-
ployee earnings tax (Weber 2002). Companies are given a grace period 
of about two to three years to meet the specified standards.
Penalties are less important when municipalities use performance-
based incentives from the start. If a state or city withholds funds until 
the recipient company has demonstrated that it has lived up to its obli-
gation, there is no need to recapture funds because of nonperformance 
further down the road. 
If public funds do change hands up front, however, nonperformance 
provisions, remedies, and damages should be written into the contract. 
These provisions generally fall into five categories (Ledebur and Wood-
ward 1990):
 1) Recisions: canceling a subsidy agreement if job and revenue 
projections are not met.
 2) Clawbacks: recovery of all or part of subsidy costs if perfor-
mance goals are not met.
 3) Recalibrations: adjustment of subsidy to reflect changing 
business conditions.
 4) Penalties: additional charges (e.g., the interest accrued on the 
public’s investment) for nonperformance or relocation.
 5) Debarment and suspension: prohibiting the noncompliant 
company from receiving incentives in the future. 
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A written contract should represent the complete understanding be-
tween parties because informal promises do not hold up well in court. 
If accountability mechanisms are clear, reasonable, and obvious from 
the start of negotiations, firms may voluntarily repay the incentive if 
they renege on their promises, obviating the need for any formal legal 
enforcement.7 In 2003, for example, Philips Semiconductor honored its 
clawback agreement by paying back $13.1 million in tax breaks to the 
City of Albuquerque, New Mexico, after it closed its plant. United Air-
lines agreed to pay back almost $32 million in prorated clawback fines 
(of the $300 million in tax breaks it had received from Indiana govern-
ment agencies) after it failed to live up to its promise to invest $800 mil-
lion by 2001 (Wall	Street	Journal 2002). Accountability mechanisms 
reduce the uncertainty and potential for arbitrary behavior that plague 
incentives on both sides of the bargaining table. 
WHAT kINDS oF GovERNMENTS NEGoTIATE  
GooD DEALS?
Nonetheless, many local governments continue to fear that the 
above-mentioned contractual mechanisms will lower the value of the 
incentive for the business if the business perceives future tussles with 
the law, a lack of flexibility on the part of the public sector, and addi-
tional reporting requirements and compliance costs. Many states and 
cities resist the use of the contractual protections mentioned above and 
enter into deals where they accept the bulk of project risks for little 
return. When the state of West Virginia loaned over $64 million to An-
chor Hocking to help the company keep its plant open and provide jobs 
to its employees, it failed to state these goals in the actual loan docu-
ments. When the company closed its plant, the absence of a specific 
goal, coupled with a contractual provision allowing prepayment of the 
loan without penalty, led the court to conclude that the firm had satisfied 
its obligations by paying off the loan (West Virginia v. Anchor Hocking 
1988). 
Conversely, some governments take a rigid bargaining position, re-
fusing to negotiate altogether or make any concessions. The assumption 
of fundamental interest conflict (i.e., zero-sum bargaining) underpins 
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the notion that firms seek only to extract wealth from the locale and that 
cities try to extract as much as they can from the firm. Such adversarial 
assumptions lead local governments to adopt overly protective regula-
tory strategies: for example, exactions on corporations disproportion-
ate to the costs associated with new development. Such behavior may 
discourage business activity. Although perceptions of its impact vary in 
hindsight, the city of Cleveland experienced an investment “strike” fol-
lowing then-Mayor Dennis Kucinich’s refusal to subsidize a large retail 
redevelopment in the absence of a living wage guarantee.
Why do some states and cities negotiate safeguards to manage risks 
and assure performance while others potentially jeopardize their fiscal 
health? Why do others adopt overly demanding and rigid postures? This 
last section seeks to generalize about the features of local governments 
that may influence their bargaining leverage. 
Leverage implies some situational advantage—those who have it 
have less to lose if the deal falls through. Although space-bound gov-
ernments start off from a bargaining disadvantage, any locality that has 
discretionary power to grant or deny requests for changes in density, tax 
burdens, and zoning has a modicum of bargaining leverage. This is be-
cause property development and industrial relocation offer businesses 
opportunities to increase their profits. The subsidies themselves are per-
ceived to be a source of leverage, which is one of the reasons why local 
governments continue to offer them.8 If municipalities had no leverage, 
businesses would have no need to negotiate with them.
However, the more assets particular places possess, the more le-
verage and decisional independence they are likely to acquire. This is 
why those governments with better market positions (relative to their 
competition as potential business locations) appear to have the ability to 
be better negotiators. If the private sector needs the municipality more 
than the municipality needs the business, many of the risks of develop-
ment can be migrated back to the private sector. The shifting of need 
occurs in urban areas that are built-out with relatively little available 
land for development. For example, the attractiveness of Chicago as 
a location for retail development has allowed the city to require that 
developers receive tax increment financing (TIF) incentives on a “pay-
as-you go” basis instead of front-funding subsidies with bond proceeds 
(Weber 2003). Structuring the deal this way means that the developer 
initially pays for the costs of the project and is only reimbursed as the 
Markusen.indb   151 2/27/2007   12:40:11 PM
152   Weber
municipality collects the incremental property taxes. This places the 
onus on the developer (to generate new property tax revenues) instead 
of on the municipality (to float bonds secured with the incremental tax 
revenues).
Moreover, in higher income locations with strong tax bases, resi-
dents may prefer slower growth, choosing less congestion over more 
development (Elkins 1995; Goetz 1990). Slow growth measures have 
been adopted by many municipalities (particularly those on the coasts) 
and, in these places, citizens have rejected ballot measures that would 
raise taxes to support new large-scale development. These jurisdictions 
can afford to be selective, either refraining from the practice of offering 
incentives or including extensive public benefits requirements in their 
incentive contracts. They can devalue the threats of businesses in favor 
of other political objectives. In contrast, poorer places may have to offer 
more to induce much-needed development and help private investors 
overcome perceived and actual development risks (Rubin and Rubin 
1987).
The desirability of a locale is reflected in the value of its land. In-
deed, those municipalities with a valuable land inventory (i.e., publicly 
owned properties) are able to extract benefits from potential developers 
(Elkins 1995). With the Yerba Buena development in San Francisco and 
California Plaza in Los Angeles, the respective cities took on more risks 
but were able to secure from private developers expensive new cultural 
facilities and public spaces (Sagalyn 1997). They used the power of 
rising land values and a scarcity of developable sites to negotiate for 
additional developer contributions to their ambitious mixed-use proj-
ects. Because of the desirability of these sites, the municipalities crafted 
deals in such a way that the developers were able to achieve their antici-
pated rates of return. Expensive homes provided the tax base needed to 
pay for the bulk of city services so that the overall tax burden on busi-
nesses was not considered so high as to require abatements.
For these reasons, one might expect to see those local governments 
with higher initial levels and rates of growth in a superior bargaining 
position relative to those more desperate for private investment. Indeed, 
jurisdictions such as Berkeley (CA), Westchester County (NY), and 
Cambridge (MA) include public benefit requirements, such as job qual-
ity standards, in their incentive contracts. These jurisdictions are not as 
concerned about their competition because they know their highly edu-
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cated residents and positive reputations are already a draw for particular 
kinds of business. 
But not all such governments play their (upper) hands. For exam-
ple, New Jersey, a wealthy, high-tax state, just passed a law that would 
allow it to borrow to pay for incentive grants in any year when the 
state legislature does not appropriate the money. A recent report found 
that several high-profile deals between New York City and businesses 
contained “employment cushions” that allowed companies to lay off 
employees without such actions breaching their contracts (Good Jobs 
First 2004). 
Nor does this rationale explain why many lower-income jurisdic-
tions are proponents of more accountable deal making. Good Jobs First 
lists the 43 states, 41 cities, and 5 counties that attached job quality 
standards to at least one development subsidy (Good Jobs First 2003). 
On this list, many poor, fiscally challenged jurisdictions stick out—De-
troit, St. Louis, and Rochester, to name a few. 
Factors unrelated to the wealth of their residents appear to be at 
play. Elkins (1995) finds that more progressive strategies were adopted 
by municipalities with higher unemployment rates. Perhaps, it has been 
argued, some poor municipalities experience such high degrees of po-
litical activism that local governments are pressured into good behavior 
(see, for example, Reese and Rosenfeld [2001]; Elkins [1995]). If this 
is the case, local officials there may propose incentives with more com-
munity benefits requirements. 
Recent examples of the success of grassroots coalitions in getting 
community benefits agreements signed in cities such as Los Angeles and 
Milwaukee attest to the role of third parties in influencing government 
behavior (Good Jobs First 2006). In the past decade, a community-based 
movement for corporate accountability has arisen to monitor economic 
development deals and expose incidents of subsidy abuse. These groups 
have organized an increasing number of petition drives and referenda to 
place subsidies and performance measures on local ballots. Their power 
also lies in their ability to raise community awareness of the deal terms, 
which may shame companies and the local governments that subsidize 
them into better behavior. If minorities participate to a high degree in 
such movements, it may explain why Reese (1998) finds that the larger 
the minority presence in a municipality, the more likely it was to in-
clude contractual requirements of community benefits. 
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Even if a municipality has bargaining leverage (e.g., due to a scar-
city of developable sites and concomitant market appeal), there must be 
opportunities for exploiting this bargaining advantage. Such opportuni-
ties arise only when government and business engage in specific politi-
cal processes to coordinate interests on specific matters of public policy 
(Kantor 2002; Elkins 1995). For example, wealthy residential suburbs 
may not craft ideal deals because they have little available land for new 
commercial or industrial development and wish to maintain their com-
munity’s exclusivity. No deals would come to the table so there would 
be no opportunity to use the leverage that the suburb would, in all likeli-
hood, possess.
Ideal deal-making is likely to arise out of what economists call “re-
peated games”—similar experiences that build staff’s negotiation skills, 
spur community activism around these issues, and lead to ordinances 
and statutes that expressly require such mechanisms. This is one of the 
reasons why larger cities and states (with better-paid staff and more 
use of sophisticated planning and decision analysis techniques) tend to 
be better negotiators. Competing with larger cities may induce smaller 
places in the metro area to mimic their good behavior. One study found 
that the more strategic municipalities were located in close proximity 
to cities of similar sizes or were suburbs of a central city (Reese 1998). 
In contrast, depopulated, low-tax, rural areas have been known to give 
away the store to lure branch plants. 
Local governments comprise part of the distinctive civic cultures of 
economic development. Some adopt ideal deal structures because they 
are in keeping with a broader “good government” culture that respects 
values such as transparency and accountability. Others adopt better 
deal structures because they are desperate for anything that promises 
short-term outcomes and willing to try anything and everything (i.e, the 
“shoot anything that flies” approach). Reese and Rosenfeld (2001) note 
the importance of differentiating between these two motivations.
Empirical studies have found the use of accountability mechanisms 
more prevalent on the West Coast and in the Northeast (Elkins 1995; 
Reese 1998), but that their use cuts across political persuasions. Some 
of the most conservative, pro-business local regimes have passed the 
most stringent laws requiring the use of these contractual safeguards. In 
Indianapolis, for example, it was Republican mayor Stephen Goldsmith 
who insisted that all new jobs pay at least 90 percent of the area aver-
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age wage level in order to qualify for property tax assistance, and the 
city has a reputation for auditing firms and enforcing clawbacks (We-
ber 2002). In 1996 alone, the Indianapolis Metropolitan Development 
Commission cancelled tax abatements to five companies who failed to 
live up to their pledges of job creation (Phillips 1996). Ideal dealmaking 
is not, apparently, politically partisan.
CoNCLUSIoN
Without empirical research it is difficult to determine which spe-
cific factors will predict which political jurisdictions negotiate better 
deals. It is also difficult to examine whether ideal deals actually lead 
to ideal outcomes. Although using performance standards is certainly 
better than giving away subsidies for free, local governments still draft 
contracts too loosely and enforce them too weakly to get the most from 
their public investments (Weber 2002).
Often economic development practitioners give up before they start. 
They figure that even when they write comprehensive contracts, there is 
no guarantee that businesses will stick by their promises. Indeed, public 
officials have the power to bargain and persuade, to make concessions, 
provide incentives and reduce or eliminate local taxes or restrictions, 
but they do not have the power to compel businesses to move into or 
remain in the jurisdiction. Drafting contracts takes place within a larger 
context of suburban, regional, and international competition for busi-
ness and the context in which it operates has become increasingly un-
stable and unpredictable. 
This fact, however, is no excuse for being a poor negotiator. Spe-
cialized real estate investments can help embed footloose firms in the 
locality and create spillover benefits in terms of jobs, additional invest-
ments, and tax revenues. Indeed, sunk costs may be able to soften the 
market pressure firms feel to traverse the globe in search of the cheapest 
factors of production. However, the irony is that the more the public 
sector subsidizes those sunk costs and effectively absorbs part of the 
development expenses, the less firms have financially at stake in their 
own investment decisions. Public risk bearing allows firms to be more, 
not less, mobile. A recent survey by Site	Selection	magazine found that 
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since 1996, corporate migration within the United States “has soared, 
roughly doubling to more than 11,000 moves a year” (cited in Uchitelle 
2000). Widespread use of business attractive incentives has no doubt 
contributed to some of this movement. 
Better public use of these tools, especially a reliance on more per-
formance-based incentives and legal protections to govern breach, 
remedies, and damages if businesses do not perform as promised, may 
give businesses pause before they consider yet another corporate relo-
cation. But these contractual provisions will only be effective if more 
municipalities and states adopt them as routine operating practice. If all 
governments raise standards in a coordinated manner, accountability 
mechanisms will not hamper the ability of individual governments to 
“bid for business”—a habit that has proven hard to break although one 
whose implementation still needs improvement. 
Notes
 1. This chapter focuses on those incentives that are negotiated on a case-by-case ba-
sis at the discretion of the local government. Other kinds of programs, sometimes 
called “statutory” incentives, are offered “as a right” if a business meets certain 
preset eligibility requirements. An example of the latter case is an investment 
tax credit program that allows any business that meets eligibility requirements 
to deduct a certain amount from its annual income tax bill. In such a case, no 
negotiation is necessary.
  2. Of course, public agencies must often be reminded of their responsibility to serve 
wider, public interests—a role that interest groups, fiscal watchdogs, and com-
munity organizations take on.
  3. Parts of this section are based on a handbook for state and local officials, The	
Ideal Deal: How Local Governments Can Get More for Their Economic Devel-
opment Dollar (Weber and Santacroce forthcoming).
  4. “Ideal deals,” as they are labeled in this chapter, closely resemble what other 
authors have referred to as “Type II developmental strategies” or “programs in 
which local jurisdictions require private developers to provide a service or public 
benefit in exchange for development rights” (Goetz 1990, p. 171; see also Elkins 
1995).
  5. Minnesota Statutes 116J.994.
 6. Connecticut Development Authority, Master Guarantee Agreement, Participa-
tory Loan Program 1995. See also Connecticut Public Act No. 93: 218.
  7. In a recent interview in Site Selection Magazine, a vice president of Toyota de-
nied that states and cities with accountability mechanisms were “crossed off” 
the list of possible plant locations (Bruns 2004). He advised, “If you’re going to 
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use clawbacks, put them in up front. Don’t put them in at the last minute, when 
you think you have a deal and all of a sudden the lawyers get involved with all 
these clawbacks nobody talked about. The problem with clawbacks is . . . (i)t’s 
just another bureaucracy to deal with. But I understand why states sometimes use 
them—with some companies you’re not sure of their history and can’t test their 
track record.”
 8. Scholars have long questioned just how much leverage subsidies provide given 
that they often comprise a small percentage of total relocation and start-up costs 
(Fisher and Peters 1998).
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7
Do Better Job Creation 
Subsidies Hold Real Promise for 
Business Incentive Reformers?
William Schweke
Corporation for Enterprise Development
INTRoDUCTIoN: AN IMAGINARy DIALoGUE oN 
BUSINESS INCENTIvES
Typically, business incentive reformers win the intellectual argu-
ments about the downsides of business incentives, but state and local 
policymakers refuse to stop providing incentives. The following imag-
ined dialogue between a “wonk” reformer and a business recruiting 
“buffalo hunter” captures the “back-and-forth” of such a conversation. 
But there is one big difference: this	conversation may offer a way out 
of the present impasse. 
Wonk: Business incentives are a waste of money, nationally speak-
ing. They only make sense if they are designed to correct a market failure 
or really move private investment into poorer communities. The typical 
recipient of public largess does not need the money to do the deal. They 
are instead shaking down the jurisdiction for what they can get. Contin-
ued incentive use also perpetuates an unceasing incentives “arms race” 
between jurisdictions and a virtual “war between the states.”
Buffalo Hunter: That is easy for you to say. It might be high-minded 
of you to take such a perspective, but I have to think “state” and “local.” 
These are my constituencies and my customers. Sometimes an incen-
tive can land a deal for my state and create some much-needed jobs. 
Wonk: That’s noble, but this is a game that you cannot win ultimate-
ly. If you also roll back your regulations and tax base to court footloose 
firms, it can lead to a “race to the bottom.” Eventually, you will inevita-
bly fall behind in the incentives competition: you match your peers, and 
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then come up with a new fiscal gimmick only to see it copied by oth-
ers. It just pushes the price tag up and up. Plus, there is also the danger 
of the “winner’s curse”: you land the deal, but end up paying way too 
much for it. Essentially, the company holds all the cards because only it 
knows what will tip the deal one way or the other.
Buffalo Hunter: Fine, but I can’t just sit on my hands. If I’m head-
ing down the wrong path, get the Feds to stop me. Regulate subnation-
al subsidy use, like the European Community does. Or get the World 
Trade Organization to pay more attention to America’s implicit indus-
trial policies and crack down on the most egregious of these.
Wonk:	That’s not really the point. Just looking at the deals them-
selves, you should be a smart investor, not a chump. When negotiating 
you need to be sure to add stronger performance standards, increase 
transparency, conduct independent cost-benefit analyses, and so forth. 
It will help you to be more cost-effective with your incentives and weed 
out the bad programs. 
Buffalo Hunter: Maybe, but my constituents can’t eat “good gov-
ernment.” Telling them I avoided some bad deals only goes so far. They 
want jobs.
Wonk:	Of course they do, but the most important way to create jobs 
and wealth is to invest wisely in early childhood and K-12 education, 
research and development, higher education, infrastructure, and work-
force retraining. Modernize the tax structure and provide professional 
and predictable regulation.
Buffalo Hunter: I completely agree, but it takes so long to generate 
the jobs and enterprises that are yielded by these public investments. 
Plus, it is kind of invisible, compared to cutting ribbons at the construc-
tion site of a new 100-job project.
Wonk:	Well, what if I were to tell you that I have a viable alternative 
to the limited promise of that ribbon cutting ceremony? What if I can 
give you an option that generates real returns in one year or less? It is 
guaranteed to foster development in all counties of a state—not just the 
most affluent places, such as the metro areas (though it can help them, 
too). It is a game that everybody can play and win. It can really aid 
small businesses and help those workers and communities that are los-
ing jobs today. The option that I propose is a smarter approach: growth 
tax credits and direct grant incentives for targeted job creation.
Buffalo Hunter: I’m listening. Please continue.
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Such, in microcosm, is our current policy and political situation re-
garding business incentive reform. We are making headway. More cit-
ies and states are adopting performance standards, disclosure, and other 
accountability mechanisms. But, at the same time, the costs of incen-
tives and the expectations of business for public dollars are constantly 
escalating. 
We also win most of the policy arguments. Most technical policy 
experts believe that state and local business incentive competition is 
a zero sum (and at times a negative sum) game. Incentives are a waste 
of money, nationally speaking. They typically subsidize companies 
for jobs that they were already going to create. Incentives are unfair 
to firms that do not receive the subsidies. They divert scarce public 
dollars from wiser investments in the workforce or infrastructure. And 
they frequently fail to even generate a positive fiscal impact. But sadly, 
state and local policymakers keep on providing them, thereby weaken-
ing the tax base and escalating the costs of the incentives customarily 
offered. Ultimately, the only way to turn this situation around is via 
Congressional action and complementary litigation on Interstate Com-
merce grounds.
What can be pursued at the subnational level? Several things. We 
should strengthen performance standards, accountability, and disclo-
sure. In addition, reform advocates must advance and provide evidence 
for the thesis that the best climate for private investment and job cre-
ation is not one loaded with incentives, but one with good schools, qual-
ity higher education, a modern infrastructure, predictable and profes-
sional regulation, research and development, a fair but not excessive 
tax system, amenities, and good public services and governance. More 
policy attention to entrepreneurship and the existing business base is 
needed as well.
Yet, there are problems, politically, with this approach. The citizens 
cannot “eat good government”: they want jobs. Moreover, the payoff on 
many of the preferred foundational investments take time. Constituents 
and their elected leaders want “jobs now.” Therefore, what is needed is 
a viable alternative to the ribbon-cutting that accompanies “successful” 
business attraction efforts.
We need an alternative that generates a return in one year or less, 
that is guaranteed to foster development in all parts of a state (not just 
the most affluent areas), and that is a game that every community can 
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play and win. In short, we need to generate jobs in a fashion that dwarfs 
the output of the standard business capital subsidy.
That is essentially what I propose in this chapter. And I have two 
questions for all readers: 1) Could this be a “shut them up” alterna-
tive to the final points that business recruiters and chambers typically 
make—that although what we say is right, our alternatives to incentives 
(school reform, entrepreneurship, etc.) take too long to generate results, 
and although incentives may not be a good thing, they are a necessary 
option? And 2) Should we have our own subsidy preferences, which 
could build a new political constituency base for reform, beyond the 
usual suspects, based on rural areas, small and existing business, and 
economically struggling cities? Distilled into its essence: Could more 
fine-tuned job creation subsidies be a promising new direction for the 
business incentive reform field? It’s a sort of “if you can’t beat them 
then join them” notion.
I will start by describing the situation in my home state of North 
Carolina. Next, I describe my alternative business subsidy alternatives. 
The chapter closes with a few summary points and questions.1
THE NoRTH CARoLINA CASE
The North Carolina economy is struggling. Compared to its state 
peers, it ranks as follows: unemployment rate (45th), short-term em-
ployment growth (44th), involuntary part-time employment (37th) and 
rural/urban disparity (47th). Nineteen North Carolina counties have 
jobless rates with more than 10 percent unemployment. Black unem-
ployment was 10.7 percent in 2002; Hispanic was 10.8 percent. In the 
last few years, 121,000 manufacturing jobs have been lost. Obviously, 
the recent recession and a weak recovery have hit the state hard, and 
more jobs are desperately needed. And like most states, North Carolina 
has a weakened fiscal base. Further cuts in public services are strong 
possibilities.
When an economy is stalled like North Carolina’s, state and lo-
cal officials often try to jump-start economic renewal by using tax and 
other business incentives to attract footloose facilities. Their hope is 
that these will sweeten the deal and help their state or community stand 
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apart from the other competitors who are also trying to entice private in-
vestment. Economic development professionals also believe that these 
subsidies will send firms the message that this jurisdiction is a good 
place to do business.
THE WILLIAM S. LEE ACT
Prior to the mid-1990s, North Carolina had not been known as an 
incentive-providing state. Its first entry in this all-too-crowded field was 
a grant program, with a number of strong job quality and environmental 
standards. But, as the competition for trophy facilities heated up and 
the state lost out on some high-profile projects, its policymakers felt 
compelled to enter the sweepstakes. Created in 1996, the William S. 
Lee Quality Jobs and Business Expansion Act has been the principal in-
centive tool used by the state of North Carolina for business recruitment 
and expansion. Businesses may qualify for the Lee Act tax credits by
•	 creating new jobs,
•	 investing in machinery and equipment,
•	 incurring the expenses of training workers,
•	 undertaking research and development efforts, and/or
•	 establishing a headquarters or central administrative offices.
The act has been amended repeatedly since its inception in order 
to update and refine its tier targeting approach and to make the credits 
available for specific projects. It has three main goals:
 1) help existing firms stay competitive by encouraging modern-
ization and investment in new technologies,
 2) encourage new investment in North Carolina’s economy from 
both new and existing industries, and
 3) ensure that economic growth reaches all people in all parts of 
the state, particularly distressed rural counties and high-pov-
erty urban areas.
Counties are divided into five economic distress tiers based on 
unemployment rate, per capita income, and population growth of the 
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county. For many of the credits, the lower the tier of the county, the 
more favorable the incentive.
In summary, an official summary and assessment document on the 
law states the following:
Before 1996, North Carolina made little use of tax incentives to 
lure businesses to the state. Even without incentives, North Caro-
lina was consistently one of the top states in attracting industry. 
The array of credits authorized by the Lee Act was viewed as an 
experiment, to be evaluated in five years to determine whether 
the incentives were cost effective and actually affected behavior, 
or merely provided tax reductions to businesses that would have 
located or expanded in any case. In 1999, the General Assembly 
extended the 2002 sunset to 2006. (Luger 2003)
CoNTRovERSy ovER INCENTIvES
The Lee Act was created by the North Carolina legislature as an 
experiment	to see whether tax incentives could successfully create jobs 
and increase private investment, especially in economically distressed 
parts of the state. Recently, the North Carolina Department of Com-
merce’s own commissioned research	has concluded that only about 4 
percent of the jobs claimed under the act were induced by the Lee tax 
credits and that most of the incentives and private investment are going 
to the least	distressed	areas of the state (Luger 2003, p. 1). The Corpora-
tion for Enterprise Development’s (CFED) research further emphasized 
that the state had already cost North Carolina taxpayers $208 million 
with an ultimate liability of over $1 billion.2
Despite these damning findings and a fair amount of press cover-
age, the governor called a special session for the North Carolina Gener-
al Assembly to approve specialized grant-based incentive packages for 
a handful of hot prospects.3 The legislature complied with his wishes.
It is also important to note here that the focus of incentive policy 
has shifted from the Lee Act to another grant-based tool: the Job Devel-
opment Investment Grant (JDIG). The Department of Commerce can 
award up to 15 grants annually to strategically important new and ex-
panding businesses and industrial projects. The subsidy is deep—up to 
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70 percent of the personal state withholding taxes are derived from the 
creation of new jobs. JDIG has a performance-based dimension—mon-
ey is only released when jobs are created. An offer by the state, along 
with the grant awarded to the firm, only occurs after a fiscal analysis has 
been conducted. Its purpose is to make sure that fiscal benefits exceed 
costs. Theoretically, these grants are only given to projects that would 
otherwise not locate in the state. JDIG has a cap on costs per job created 
and a cumulative annual ceiling of $10 million.4
Simultaneously, legislative leadership, worried about North Car-
olina’s current economic misfortunes, including a high-profile 5,000-
worker textile firm closing, created a Joint Select Committee on Eco-
nomic Growth and Development. This committee is charged with ex-
amining the state’s economic conditions and opportunities and develop-
ing new ideas. The governor’s office has responded with a laundry list 
of actions, including—you guessed it—more incentives and a corporate 
tax cut. 
Ironically, in December 2003, North Carolina was named the best 
business climate in the United States by Site	Selection magazine (Arend 
2006). This occurred approximately at the same time as the special ses-
sion, which sought to earmark money for trophy projects like Merck, 
Reynolds, and Boeing.
At roughly the same time, bipartisan leadership in the general as-
sembly asked CFED to develop some incentive reform models, which 
they hoped to include in the select committee’s deliberations. As a re-
sult, we pursued three courses: 1) arguing for improved services for 
displaced workers, their families, and their communities (including 
rapid action on mortgage foreclosure mitigation); 2) crafting a variety 
of incrementalist refinements of the Lee Act and the other two grant-
based incentives; and 3) developing more job creation–focused incen-
tive alternatives.
We argued that the Lee Act was a noble experiment, but in our view, 
the results are clear: the experiment has failed. The William S. Lee Act 
has already cost North Carolina taxpayers $208 million. In these tough 
economic times, the state cannot afford to finance these failing tax 
giveaways any longer. It is time to end or seriously restructure the Lee 
Act.5
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FoCUSING oN JoB CREATIoN: THE TWo MoDELS
We have developed two new options for the state. Firms must elect 
to participate in one program or the other, not both.6
 1) A new Job Growth Tax Credit, which would provide a 30 per-
cent tax credit of the first $14,700 of wages paid to each ad-
ditional employee over and above 102 percent of the baseline 
employment. In other words, the state would only subsidize 
additional employment for a firm. This incentive would be of-
fered statewide to all sizes of business only in years of high 
unemployment.7
 2) A Targeted Job Creation Grant Program, which would offer 
private employers direct wage and benefit subsidies in Tier 1 
counties (the most economically disadvantaged) for hiring un-
employed job seekers.8 
It is important to state at the start that the term—job creation, hir-
ing, wage, and employment subsidies—are sometimes used as equiva-
lent expressions. In this chapter, they are not. A hiring subsidy refers to 
funds used to offset wage costs in the initial part of an employee’s pe-
riod of employment with a firm. A wage subsidy is one whose purpose 
is to raise an employee’s income. This chapter focuses on job creation 
or employment subsidies. We are exploring ways to increase employ-
ment. This strategy may use wage subsidies, but the purpose is differ-
ent. Both of our options try to create net new employment relative to 
the nation as a whole.
The Job Growth Tax Credit
The first option, the Job Growth Tax Credit, is a refinement of the 
New Job Tax Credit, one that is tailored to the state of North Carolina. 
During years in which the state’s unemployment rate exceeds 5 percent, 
it would provide subsidies for employment only on the margin (and not 
finance all current employment). It would apply to for-profit firms that 
expand employment and be paid to the firms.9 In so doing, the tax credit 
lowers the cost of labor for employers, hopefully spurring a substitution 
of labor for capital. The structure of the credit safeguards against a firm 
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firing all of its current employees and hiring twice as many half-time 
workers who qualify for the tax credit and minimizes the advantages of 
hiring additional part-time workers.
Under this proposal, the credit would be available for firms that in-
crease their employment beyond some percentage (say, 2 percent) over 
the base year’s employment level; the base year is that year in which 
the state’s unemployment first exceeds 5 percent. The credit would ex-
ist until the state’s unemployment rate falls below 4.5 percent. Based 
on typical business cycles, we expect the credit to exist for multiyear 
stretches (probably three or four years at a stretch). Assuming that the 
baseline year is announced after January 1, the period in which the cred-
it may be applied should be free of gaming behavior by firms; that is, 
firms will be unable to adjust their baseline employment to maximize 
their later tax credits. During that period, any firm that increases its em-
ployment more	than the prescribed percentage will receive the credit. 
The multiyear period would help firms make investments that require 
more time, investments that support increased employment (e.g., ex-
pansion of a plant). The credit would be available for each year that the 
firm increases its employment above the targeted amount.
The design is antirecessionary and countercyclical. By encourag-
ing expansions in employment during high unemployment periods, the 
state is rewarding firms that act, perhaps hastening the recovery. It is 
possible that firms may delay expansions until recessionary years (as-
suming that the credit is made permanent and known to kick in during 
times of high unemployment), but there are few firms that will postpone 
expansions for years in hopes of gaining a tax credit.
The credit would be applied only to an individual’s wages up to 
some cap (such as 30 percent of the first $14,700 of wages10), which 
would tend to provide an above-average subsidy of jobs for lower-skill 
and lower-wage workers. More specifically, under the tax credit, the 
credit to a firm will be equal to: 30 percent of the first $14,700 of wages 
paid to each additional employee over and above 102 percent of the 
baseline employment with no cap. Ideally, new firms will receive a 
smaller credit: the lesser of 15 percent of the above quantity.11 Ideally, 
this would lower the costs of the credit, because there is a higher chance 
of windfalls with startups that were already planned by their owners.
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The Targeted Job Creation Grant Program
The second approach, the Targeted Job Creation Grant Program, 
would be a refinement of the Minnesota Emergency Employment De-
velopment Act strategy. On a pilot basis, North Carolina policymakers 
would make a targeted discretionary grant program available to Tier 1 
counties. (If successful, it could be expanded statewide.) 
The state would offer private employers $6.75 per hour in wage 
subsidies and $1.75 per hour in benefits (these figures represent 2003 
inflation-adjusted amounts of the original MEED figures) for a 26-week 
period to employ certified job applicants suffering severe economic 
distress. Local or regional Workforce Investment Boards would award 
subsidies, on a discretionary basis, to identified employers that hire se-
lected individuals from disadvantaged groups. To be eligible, a worker 
must have been a state resident for at least one month, be unemployed, 
and be currently ineligible for unemployment insurance (or have ex-
hausted his or her six-month UI payments), or be a currently UI-eligible 
individual who has been displaced by a mass layoff (as certified by the 
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification law) or a member of a 
household with no other source of income than UI benefits.12 To reduce 
displacement of current workers, the subsidies would be available only 
for newly created jobs. 
Preference would be given to firms that can provide good on-the-
job training in both “soft” and “hard” skills and that are committed to 
“rolling over” these subsidized hires into permanent jobs with some 
prospect for advancement. Indeed, as an incentive for long-term place-
ments, if an employee continues in the job for at least one year after the 
initial six-month subsidy, employers will pay no reimbursement to the 
state. However, for employees that are hired for fewer than 18 months, 
employers will be required to repay up to 70 percent of the subsidy (the 
actual amount will be prorated).
Since these are grants, not tax credits, these subsidies are ideal for 
new, young, and/or small firms. (They can be used immediately, not just 
when the firms have profits or when they file their taxes.) Moreover, 
there is little uncertainty about such a program: potentially participat-
ing businesses already exist in North Carolina; they do not have to be 
coaxed to come. They must only have expansion plans that require a 
little financial boost. The upfront grant nature of the subsidy also means 
Markusen.indb   170 2/27/2007   12:40:12 PM
Do Better Job Creation Subsidies Hold Real Promise?   171
that it could improve an enterprise’s financial position for obtaining 
bank loans.
Like MEED, it also probably makes sense to provide these grants 
to nonprofits and local public agencies. Except for the requirements 
to create a permanent job and to pay back some of the subsidy, all the 
same rules would apply. 
Furthermore, having this temporary public job alternative is im-
portant for a number of reasons. In many Tier 1 counties, government 
payrolls are one of the major sources of jobs, and recent economic dis-
tress is forcing some local and county governments to terminate some 
positions. Secondly, there are a number of community improvement 
projects that could be implemented and that would not significantly 
compete with the private sector.13
HoW MANy JoBS, AND WHAT WILL THEy CoST?
What sort of impact might these two strategies have on the North 
Carolina economy? It is difficult to say. We can only make an educated 
projection (and a highly speculative one at that). Here is our reasoning 
and data work. 
We estimate on a net basis that our Job Growth Tax Credit, after sub-
tracting jobs that would have happened anyway, will generate 26,806 
jobs per year.14 The cost is roughly $14,800 per job.15 
For the Targeted Job Creation Grant Program, we project costs and 
benefits for a program restricted to Tier 1 counties so as to keep costs 
down and help the most troubled places. If we further deal only with 
net jobs (employment that occurred because of the grant), we estimate 
that it would create about 2,291 net jobs annually in Tier 1. The cost 
is $16,370 per job. If one was citing gross jobs created, the quantity 
of jobs would be doubled and the cost would be roughly halved. Let’s 
compare this net number to the data for the Lee Act as cited in the 
Luger and Stewart report.16 In 2002, 7,702 jobs were created across the 
state. Of these, 465 were in Tier 1 counties (Luger and Stewart 2003). 
Thus, our figures are approximately 5 times greater than the Lee Act 
outcomes.
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Now, to look at the full picture: Our two options create jobs at a 
blended cost of $15,527 per job. In the latest in-house assessment of the 
Lee Act, the author comes up with a range of job creation figures, from 
87,000 to 147,000 (Luger 2003). A paltry 4 percent of these (i.e., 3,400 
to 5,900) are estimated to have been induced by the Lee Act (Luger and 
Bae 2005). The cost is about $39,475 (Table 7.1).
Our employment numbers are much bigger than those attributed to 
the Lee Act, reflecting that these proposed programs are targeted to job 
creation and labor intensity and that they would apply to startups, busi-
ness expansions, and new recruitment projects, not just the footloose 
facility waiting to land somewhere.17
Doesn’t this proposal generate proportionately more low-wage 
jobs? Yes, it does. There are times when more jobs (any job) are needed. 
In addition, not all job seekers will have the time, the capacity, or the 
opportunity to get retrained and find a better job. The creation of more 
jobs pushes all wages up. The Job Growth Tax Credit is also meant to 
be a countercyclical tool. It is triggered when it is most needed—dur-
ing a recession and the early recovery period. The availability of fed-
eral Trade Adjustment Assistance wage supplements mitigates the low-
wage problem for jobless workers over 55 years old. If they have lost 
their jobs due to imports or trade-induced relocations and have landed 
new jobs that pay less than the old wage and less than $50,000, they 
may receive 50 percent of the difference between their old and new 
wages for up to two years.
DESIRABLE PRoGRAM FEATURES
The	 fundamental	 virtue	of	 these	 two	alternatives	 is	 that	 a	 strong	
rationale	could	be	made	for	them	even	if	there	was	no	incentive	com-
petition. The Job Growth Tax Credit is promoting economic activity 
during a recession and strengthening the early stage of the recovery. 
On the other hand, the Targeted Job Creation Grant is trying to encour-
age more private employment in economically disadvantaged and de-
pressed counties.
Analogous employment programs have been run successfully both 
here and abroad. Research documents that wage subsidies for the job-
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Program Subsidy type Objectives Mechanism Number of jobs Cost per job
Targeted 
Job Creation
Grant • Foster job creation in poor 
tier 1 counties
• Promote the expansion  
of small business
• Grant subsidy for 6 months 
to firms hiring unemployed 
job seekers
• Up to $6.75 for 
wages/$1.75 for benefits
• Penalty for jobs terminated 
before 18 months





Tax credit • Encourage job creation 
during recessions and 
early recoveries
• 30% tax credit per 
employee of first $14,700 
of salary above 102% of 
baseline employment







Tax credit • Drive private investment 
into poor counties
• Encourage job creation
• Attract premier property
• Foster R&D
• Training credit
• For machinery and 
equipment 4–7% of 
investment above  
threshold





Table 7.1  Incentive Comparisons
M
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less or less-skilled workers are likely to be more effective when utilized 
in conjunction with labor market intermediaries that help provide some 
training, placement services, and job retention assistance.18 The ben-
efit/cost ratio can be increased, and the overall expenses can be limited 
by targeting the program to certain communities and potential workers. 
If the recession truly ends, the strategy can be easily converted into a 
welfare-to-work operation and even use welfare monies as a means of 
funding these wage subsidies. 
This strategy is appealing because it does not fit conveniently into 
any one of the boxes typically used to describe comparable programs.19 
It is an economic development tool. It supports small businesses that 
will be the main users of the program. (Larger firms are eligible as 
well.) It is a temporary, countercyclical adjustment program for main-
stream workers. And it balances the above with more of a focus on the 
harder-to-employ, disadvantaged worker.
This program would also help level the playing field for all com-
munities. Many will never land a prime business attraction project, but 
all have indigenous firms that might expand with an injection of money. 
All can play and win in this game. Further, it focuses on aiding those 
workers who are suffering right now, unlike the approach of the Lee 
Act, which is structurally indifferent to who gets hired.
The two proposed programs also complement each other. The first 
is administratively less demanding and will be attractive to more es-
tablished firms. The second will require more oversight but will be 
very attractive to small firms and startups; it targets those needing new 
employment. Moreover, the two have different funding advantages 
and disadvantages. The first option does not require any real out-of-
pocket revenues from the state, while the second will entail a specific 
appropriation.
A further comparison with the Lee Act is especially telling. Given 
what’s been happening to the state since it was enacted, a policymaker 
could come up with a new litmus test for new program development. 
For example, 
 1) Does the development reform or new option encourage in-
vestment in those communities that are being hardest hit by 
economic restructuring and dislocation?
 2) Does it improve the reemployment prospects of displaced 
workers?
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 3) Does it help the state’s businesses and sectors compete suc-
cessfully on the basis of innovation, productivity, timeliness, 
flexibility, and quality in the new global economy?
 4) Do development strategies help to ensure an adequate rev-
enue base for financing essential public services?
The Lee Act only compares favorably with our proposals on the 
third item. But it does so at an unacceptable cost relative to benefits.20 
Lastly, our two approaches can be linked with a statewide First 
Source hiring program.21 Such agreements help local/state governments 
target more of the jobs resulting from new business projects to local 
residents, the unemployed and the economically disadvantaged. Such 
agreements require private companies that receive public monies to use 
the public sector or designated nonprofit contractor as the “first source” 
for new job hires. The state or local government (or a nonprofit broker 
and job training/placement “shop”) acts as the “job developer” on be-
half of the private firm, identifying and screening potential workers, 
arranging training services, and so forth. The private sector is under no 
obligation to hire these workers, but must interview them before seek-
ing any other possible employees. Such programs have been run very 
successfully in Portland, Oregon; Berkeley, California; and Minneapo-
lis, Minnesota. Berkeley’s program, for example, has been used since 
1986 to meet business and construction contractors’ needs for workers, 
while giving special attention to filling entry-level and intermediate-
level jobs with qualified local workers (particularly, unemployed and 
underemployed minorities, women, youth, and disabled persons).22
A BUFFALo HUNTER’S REBUTTAL? 
Continuing the argument in the prologue, the proponent of using 
fewer performance-based incentives might argue as follows. 
•	 You can put so many conditions and complexities on an incen-
tive that it becomes a disincentive.
•	 The local developer can claim that she needs a more attractive 
incentive to do her job. (Of course, if the state government is 
footing the bill, she has nothing to lose and everything to gain.)
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•	 Furthermore, the incentive proponent can argue that the Job 
Growth Tax Credit is not really equivalent to a conventional job 
creation or machine and equipment credit, because it is not avail-
able at all times. The grant program is mainly a small business 
subsidy, targeted at the most needy areas. So, it too is not helpful 
for attraction purposes.
Does this leave the author of this paper with no ammo for a counter-
argument? Here is my response:
My critics are right: the alternatives proposed in this chapter are less 
attractive to business. This is inevitable, because the financial interest 
of the shareholders of the business prospect and the state government 
are not completely in sync. The shareholders want to maximize the in-
centive offer, get it in cash rather than in-kind, and have the least strings 
attached. The state (or local, if it’s financing the incentive) government 
has a different bottom-line: it wants jobs and private investment on its 
terms, which includes, most importantly, a fiscal surplus generated by 
their incentive investment. 
But there is a political dimension as well. If the citizenry understands 
and supports cost-effective incentives offered by fiscally responsible 
public officials that are targeted at priority economic development and 
employment challenges, then this chapter’s proposals look stronger. 
The Buffalo Hunter still has a final response. He points out that 
his way of working still possesses more political muscle and it is more 
widely understood. “Unilateral disarmament is not an option,” he says. 
“I assure you, citizens, that I will never leave you undefended. I will 
court every opportunity for jobs.”
He also has a constituency base that can be more easily mobilized. 
Local developers, chambers of commerce, and county officials, along 
with governors and secretaries of commerce want tools for deal mak-
ing. At this time, they are rewarded for winning or losing this game. 
They are deeply interested and engaged in keeping incentives around 
while other constituencies, such as school teachers, unions, communi-
ties that will never land a plum plant, environmentalists, and advocates 
for the poor and progressive taxation are only marginally engaged in 
this fight.
Looking again at the North Carolina case surfaces another dimen-
sion that should be discussed. There is growing interest in reforming the 
Lee Act. Some, even in the mainstream economic development com-
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munity, may be willing to let William S. Lee go. But	this	is	only	accept-
able if JDIG gets more resources.
The state’s relatively new JDIG has some good elements.23 The com-
mittee that manages the JDIG funds has authored an excellent series of 
guidelines for making decisions and holding firms accountable for pri-
vate investment and job creation. I especially like the required upfront 
fiscal impact analysis, the cap on the costs per job, the limit on number 
of projects per year, disclosure and reporting requirements, quality job 
and company standards, employment-triggered releases of funds, the 
contractual breach language, and the sanctions for noncompliance.24 
The virtue of this program is its vice: it is very flexible, which means 
that it allows for highly tailored incentive packages. This customization, 
along with the size of the subsidy, makes it extremely attractive to pros-
pects. But there’s a downside: it also raises the specter of the “winner’s 
curse”—in the heat of the state-to-state competition and in the absence 
of knowing what the firm’s bottom line is or what other communities 
may be offering, you pay too much for the honor of hosting this firm.
This is why I argue that the upfront fiscal impact analysis is so im-
portant. These fiscal projections must be conservative and must not use 
inflated multipliers. They must count all the state and local incentives 
on the table and recognize that a certain number of jobs will go to non-
natives. They must use a reasonable discount rate over time, and they 
must factor in somehow and subtract the percentage of jobs that would 
have happened anyway.
Given the importance of the fiscal impact analysis in avoiding the 
winner’s curse, its credibility and integrity might be increased if the 
analysis were conducted not by the Commerce Department, but instead 
by the Department of Revenue or Fiscal Research in the General As-
sembly. (There are no accusaitons here of wrongdoing; the change, 
however, could remove any potential doubts and concerns.)
The likelihood of a favorable ratio of benefits over costs is much 
more likely if the unemployed or the working poor get a shot at these 
jobs. This is why imposing a “First Source” hiring requirement on JDIG 
or any other subsidy is so important.
In my view, any expansion in dollars and numbers of projects annu-
ally must be contingent on these reforms of JDIG.
One further recommendation: I strongly suggest that any new in-
centives proposed to the General Assembly must have a fiscal note at-
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tached to them and must specify the management information system 
and outcome measures that must be in place before the incentive is open 
for business. This would greatly aid the General Assembly and com-
merce staff in monitoring and evaluating the incentive’s results.
So, who won the argument? In some ways, it looks like the buffalo 
hunter once again had the last word, but hopefully not the last laugh.
That’s why it all comes down to innovative accountability reforms for 
the short-term and civic education, advocacy, and politics for the long 
haul.
CoNCLUSIoN
Business incentives for attracting private capital are, at best, a nec-
essary evil. Indeed, in giving away public resources, states are trying 
to influence where the jobs will be located, not whether the jobs are 
created. The offer typically is not: “If you can help us financially, then 
we can afford to take a risk to build a new line of profitable business.” 
Rather, it is: “We have a new line of profitable business, so we’re going 
to build a new plant. How much will you give us to build it near you.” 
This whole “auction” is largely a waste of limited public resources.
To conclude, this is the current situation in North Carolina. CFED’s 
two “models” are being translated into legislation by General Assem-
bly staff. CFED was asked to testify before the Joint Select Committee 
on February 19, 2004. Some progress has been made in getting this 
Committee concerned about the recent rise in mortgage foreclosures. 
Plans are in the works to establish an ad hoc coalition for incentive 
reform and improved displaced worker services. The jury is still out 
regarding the substance and political viability of a more job creation– 
focused approach to business incentives.
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Notes
 1. Many of these ideas were developed in collaboration with a CFED colleague, 
Lillian “Beadsie” Woo. We also received a great deal of good advice from econo-
mists John Bishop, Tim Bartik, and Robert Haveman.
  2. Between 1996 and 2001, the accumulated value of the tax credits generated was 
$1.16 billion, of which $208 million were claimed. “Generated” credits are ones 
in which a business has successfully applied for a credit. “Claimed” credits are 
ones where a business has actually invoked the credit and is paying fewer taxes. 
Some credits can actually expire over time if they are not claimed.
  3. Sample projects included Boeing and Merck. These might be called ad hoc sub-
sidies rather than “statutory-based” subsidies.  
  4. To date, North Carolina has funded six projects. Most were located in Tier 5 
counties, the most affluent. They include General Dynamics Armament and 
Technical Products (headquarters and light manufacturing); Infineon Technolo-
gies North American Corporation (semiconductor company from Germany, with 
U.S. headquarters in California and operations across the United States); R.H. 
Donnelley Corporation (publishing company, headquarters relocating from Ver-
mont); GE Nuclear Energy (headquarters moving to North Carolina); and Good-
rich Corporation (expansion of existing facility, moving from Illinois and New 
Jersey).
 5. For a much more detailed critique, see Schweke and Woo (2003a). We have also 
crafted a more incrementalist reform of the Lee Act.
  6. For a thorough description and defense of these models, see Schweke and Woo 
(2003b).
  7.  This option was an adaptation of the federal New Jobs Tax Credit (1977–1978). 
The background literature on it is cited in Schweke and Woo (2003b).
  8. The grant program is based on the successful Minnesota Emergency Employ-
ment Development Act in the 1980s.
  9. In the interests of fairness and the potential to create a larger employment impact, 
when enacted, the tax credit should be limited to firms in those sectors that pro-
duce goods and services that are either exported to other states or countries or are 
substitutes for goods and services that would otherwise have to be imported. The 
Lee Act has some eligibility wording that could be used or adapted. Moreover, 
CFED has a list of those industries that should be eligible for the tax credit and 
will gladly make it available upon request.
  10. The mathematical rationale is as follows: a firm that chooses to hire 10 people 
for a total cost of $250,000 in salaries gets a better tax deal than a firm that hires 
5 people for $250,000. Firm 1 can take a credit of $44,100, while firm 2 only 
gets $22,050. The tax credit’s structure, therefore, subsidizes a higher percentage 
of lower-waged employees’ salaries. $14,700 is the figure for North Carolina’s 
FUTA wages. This is for the unemployment insurance tax that firms pay. 
 11. There may be legality issues with having two rates, so this may not be possible.
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 12. The Targeted Job Creation Grant could be made administratively simpler by be-
ing available for hiring any unemployed North Carolinian, but we were trying to 
address those people in greatest need.
 13. For more detail about public versus private job creation, see Johnson, Schweke, 
and Hull (1999).
 14. We assume that 30 percent of the job growth is directly attributable to the tax 
credit. The typical time for the national economy to go from peak to trough is 
seven years. We can assume, then, that the tax credit would be operational for 
about half that time, or three years. That brings the total number of jobs created 
to 80,417.
 15. This figure may be too high because some of the firms that might use the Job 
Growth Tax Credit will use the grant program. So, we may be counting the type 
of firm with potential to add some jobs twice. However, we qualify this possible 
overcounting worry by noting that the two options target different sized firms to 
some extent. The grant program is more attractive to small, new and young firms. 
The tax credit is more of a winner for large and established enterprises.
 16. It should be noted here that the Institute for Economic Development at the Uni-
versity of North Carolina has authored two reports evaluating the Lee Act, one 
in 2001 and another in 2003, plus an interesting report on the North Carolina 
economic development system (see next footnote). In each report, different es-
timates are given for the Lee Act. Sometimes they are only statewide numbers. 
Other times they look at Lee tax credits, in particular, Tiers. Sometimes they are 
citing net jobs, other times they are gross jobs. The 2001 and 2003 Lee assess-
ments used different numbers to derive net jobs. In 2001, the authors claimed 
that 50 percent of the jobs were due to the Lee Act. In 2003, the number was 4 
percent. So, it is often difficult to get comparable benchmarks.
 17. We think both options are wise and complementary, but if you can only do one, 
the Targeted Job Creation Grant is the most compelling, because it focuses on 
citizens most in need. 
 18. See Katz and Molina publications in Schweke and Woo (2003b). Also go to “Job 
Initiative” program of Anne E. Casey Foundation at http://www.aecf.org. There 
is an extensive list of relevant publications to consult for more research on the 
role of labor market intermediaries.
 19. In short, the programs are synergistic. Their creators (Haveman, Bishop, Bartik, 
and others) sought to “think outside the box” when they were developed.
 20. Some might argue that the 4 percent figure is too low. It might be, but Luger’s 
(2003) calculation is the best number we have at this point. And it does under-
score the danger and reality of inevitable windfalls in any subsidy program.
 21. The administrative monies for implementing the direct grant program can also 
cover much of the expenses of upgrading county and regional job placement 
services.
 22. Excellent discussions of First Source Agreements can be found in Molina (1998) 
and Lyall and Schweke (1996).
 23. JDIG has been catching some heat because four of its first five deals have gone 
to Tier 5 (affluent) counties. In addition, there is still the inevitable problem that 
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eventually North Carolina competitor states will replicate JDIG or come up with 
another incentive “gizmo.” The whole process starts again.
 24. JDIG could still be strengthened in the areas of performance contracting and 
sanctions for noncompliance.
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Nine Concrete Ways to Curtail 
the Economic War among the States
Greg LeRoy
Good	Jobs	First
More than 10 years ago I wrote a book titled No	More	Candy	Store:	
States	 and	 Cities	 Making	 Job	 Subsidies	 Accountable (LeRoy 1994), 
which likened the choices that many companies faced between all of 
the “sweet” job subsidy deals offered by competing states and cities 
to a kid in a candy shop. Too often a mess resulted—very few jobs 
were created and/or the company went out of business or relocated. One 
could get very depressed thinking about how hard it will be to solve 
this crazy “candy store” mess. A lot of people with huge financial self-
interests are tied to the status quo: footloose corporations, site location 
consultants, accounting firms and tax consultants, industrial real estate 
brokers, mayors, governors, and building contractors.
Given how deeply entrenched this wasteful system has become, 
only an organizing approach to the problem can undo it. By this I mean 
reforms that bring everyday taxpayers back into the process, that ac-
tively enable and encourage grassroots groups like community organi-
zations, environmentalists and labor unions, as well as journalists and 
government watchdogs, to wade in. With all due respect to some who 
have proposed sweeping lawsuits or legislation that I would call “silver 
bullets,” such ideas don’t stand a chance against a problem so deeply 
embedded as this one.1 
Reforms, of course, involve legislation. Some new laws are neces-
sary, but they should be simple laws based on common sense that are 
strongly enforced—laws with clear intentions that courts cannot per-
vert. Don’t forget, today’s candy store mess is a dream for lawyers and 
accountants, since it consists of so many hundreds of convoluted laws 
and tax gimmicks. 
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SUNSHINE: THE BEST ANTISEPTIC
The first two necessary reforms involve disclosure. Taxpayers need 
to see how much money each company received in tax breaks and oth-
er subsidies—especially corporate income tax breaks that are usually 
undisclosed.
This disclosure is the cornerstone of reform. Think about other ma-
jor reforms the United States has enacted in the past 40 years. 
•  When community groups alleged that banks were discriminat-
ing against minorities or those living in older neighborhoods by 
denying loans to worthy borrowers because of their race or their 
address, they demanded and won the Home Mortgage Disclosure 
Act. That law requires banks to disclose the number and dollar 
value of all their housing loans every year, by census tract. The 
data revealed blatant discrimination, and prompted Congress to 
pass the Community Reinvestment Act, which has enabled hun-
dreds of community groups to win billions of dollars for neigh-
borhood revitalization from many of the nation’s largest banks. 
•  When community groups and labor unions alleged that chemical 
factories and other big polluters were endangering their health 
with toxic emissions, they demanded and won the Toxic Right 
to Know law, which requires companies to disclose the content 
and quantity of all emissions. Using that data, coalitions have 
won hundreds of agreements with companies to reduce hazard-
ous emissions and otherwise improve local safety.
•  During Watergate, when citizens become frustrated with reports 
of corruption, they demanded to know who was giving money—
and how much—to politicians. The resulting disclosure produces 
data compiled by the Federal Elections Commission. And while 
many people call our campaign finance system “legalized cor-
ruption,” at least we know who bankrolls whom. If we did not 
have that information, none of the more recent campaign finance 
laws, like McCain-Feingold, could have taken hold.
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REFoRM 1: STATE ECoNoMIC DEvELoPMENT  
SUBSIDy DISCLoSURE
By disclosure, I mean annual, company-specific, public reporting 
of costs and benefits. How much did each company get? Which subsidy 
program did the money come from? What did the company do with the 
money? How many jobs did it create? How well do the jobs pay? Do 
they provide health care?
Seems pretty simple, doesn’t it? Every state and city should be able 
to disclose such basic facts. But as we’ve seen in so many horror sto-
ries, most governors and mayors aren’t watching the store. Some even 
pretend to perform cost-benefit analysis by adding up their own press 
releases.
Twelve states have already enacted some form of economic devel-
opment subsidy disclosure (Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, 
Minnesota, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Texas, 
Washington State, and West Virginia). These states vary a lot in terms 
of the quality and completeness of their disclosure, but we certainly 
have enough experience now to talk about what works best. (You can 
see details about each state’s disclosure law in Chapter 3 of our research 
manual, No	More	Secret	Candy	Store, at www.goodjobsfirst.org.)
Any state can be investigated, regardless of whether it’s on the list. 
You can normally get quite a bit of information about deals in a state, 
especially if you are willing to wage a paper war under the state’s Open 
Records Act or Freedom of Information Act. With a lot of time and per-
sistence (and possibly some money for processing charges), you might 
be able to cobble together as much information as you could get quickly 
for free in a state with disclosure. But taxpayers shouldn’t have to wage 
a costly paper war with bureaucrats; they should be able to quickly and 
easily find out where their economic development money is going and 
whether their taxpayer investments are paying off. That’s what I mean 
by disclosure. Indeed, the information should be on the Web, just like it 
already is in some states.
Let’s look at an example. Minnesota is one of my favorite disclo-
sure states. Although the Gopher State’s law does not cover corporate 
income tax breaks, it does cover lots of other subsidies—and the data 
are on the Web! Since its original law was passed in 1995 and improved 
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twice later, hundreds of Minnesota deals have been disclosed every year. 
Figure 8.1 shows an example of one deal, in Caledonia, Minnesota.
So here we have a tax increment financing deal (box 11) worth 
$275,515 (box 16) to create one new job (box 17) at Dairy Queen (box 
12) paying $4.50 an hour (box 18). Now, I don’t know how many ice 
cream cones they sell in Caledonia in February, I mean, I really hope 
that’s a full-year job. Health care? I doubt it. I suppose we should be 
grateful that the company is reporting an actual wage of $5.15 an hour, 
but then, that may be due to the federal minimum wage getting raised 
in the interim. But isn’t that an awfully big subsidy for a poverty-wage 
job? Until the state enacted disclosure, Minnesotans didn’t know there 
were deals like this happening.
Notice how unbureaucratic this disclosure system is. A city staff 
person fills in the top half of the form (based on its files from the origi-
nal deal), then she calls the company and asks about jobs created and 
wages paid. Then she mails the form to the state Department of Em-
ployment and Economic Development (DEED) in St. Paul, and DEED 
scans the forms and posts them on its Web site.
Of course, I prefer a state’s disclosure system to include corporate 
income tax breaks, and some already do. West Virginia has been report-
ing on every company that claims any major kind of corporate income 
tax credit for more than a dozen years. Maine has been disclosing three 
since it enacted disclosure in 1998. North Carolina enacted disclosure 
in 2002; you can see company-specific data at www.dor.state.nc.us/
publications/williamslee.html.
More information on the disclosure form would be helpful. Will 
these jobs be accessible by public transportation? Does this deal in-
volve a relocation? If so, from where and to where? Were the jobs ac-
cessible by public transportation before? Will they be accessible after 
the relocation? Otherwise, how do we know if the jobs are even avail-
able to low-income workers who cannot afford a car?
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An actual disclosure 
form from Minnesota: a 
company got a TIF (box 
11) worth $275,515 
(16) to create 1 new job 
(17) at Dairy Queen 
(12) paying $4.50 an 
hour (18)
Figure 8.1  1998 Minnesota Business Assistance Form
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REFoRM 2: DISCLoSURE To CoRPoRATE 
SHAREHoLDERS oF STATE TAxES PAID
Publicly traded companies (those that are listed on stock exchanges) 
already disclose how much they pay in federal income tax each year, in 
their annual reports and Forms 10-K. They also already disclose how 
much they pay in all state and local taxes, but they are only required to 
disclose the total from all 50 states in one aggregate number. So, for 
instance, when looking at General Motors’ Form 10-K, it is not possible 
to determine how much the company’s taxes have gone up or down in 
Michigan the past dozen years.
The solution would be simple: require publicly traded companies to 
include a 50-state matrix in their Form 10-Ks showing how much tax 
they paid in each state. Breaking it down into three categories in each 
state would be best: income tax; property tax; and sales, utility, and 
excise taxes. This would surely produce data that would grab people’s 
attention. We already know from accountability campaigns in states 
such as Connecticut and New Jersey that many big companies there 
pay tiny amounts of income tax—as little as $200 a year, far less than 
low-income families—thanks to gimmicks like the Delaware royalty 
loophole. 
If taxpayers learned that large companies in their state were paying 
almost no income tax, they would demand to know why. Indeed, a 1986 
revelation by Citizens for Tax Justice that many huge corporations were 
paying zero federal income tax was memorialized in the famous poster: 
“I pay more income tax than General Electric, W.R. Grace, General Dy-
namics, Boeing, Dow Chemical, and Lockheed All Put Together!”
The ensuing outrage prompted a major progressive reform, closing 
some corporate loopholes; the 1986 law is considered the best thing to 
happen to the federal tax code in decades. There is a large body of evi-
dence from both state-specific and national studies that companies are 
gaming state income tax codes even harder than Uncle Sam’s. For ex-
ample, the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities points out that in the 
second half of the 1990s, when the U.S. economy was sizzling, federal 
corporate income tax revenues grew an average of 6 percent a year. But 
state corporate income tax collections rose at just half that rate. Same 
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companies, same profits, same years, half the tax (Mazerov 2003, p. 3). 
Combined reporting would solve much of that. 
REFoRM 3: CLAWBACkS oR MoNEy-BACk GUARANTEES
A clawback rule or contract simply says that a company must hold 
up its end of the bargain, otherwise taxpayers have some money-back 
protection. Eighteen states and dozens of cities already use clawbacks, 
which basically after a company gets a subsidy (say, two years later), it 
must create a certain number of jobs at a certain wage and benefit level. 
The clawback may also require other public benefits such as a certain 
number of dollars invested to modernize a facility. Then, if the com-
pany does not meet the targets, taxpayers get paid back. The rule can be 
prorated so that, for example, if the company falls 10 percent short, it 
has to pay back 10 percent of the subsidy; it can also be set for a steeper 
penalty, if the company falls far short. 
I can hear the business lobbyists wailing again about poisoning the 
“business climate.” But I think just the opposite is true. From the mid-
1980s to the mid-1990s, there was a string of lawsuits in which cities 
tried to get subsidy money back from companies that were shutting 
plants (Chicago v. Hasbro/Playskool; Norwood, Ohio v. General Mo-
tors; Duluth v. Triangle; Yonkers v. Otis Elevator; Ypsilanti Township v. 
General	Motors). The latter is best known: Ypsilanti Township alleged 
that statements made by GM in public hearings amounted to an oral 
contract obligating the company to stay in exchange for huge property 
tax breaks. 
Now, given the prevailing business climate dogma, these lawsuits 
were huge events, with mayors risking their cities’ reputations for be-
ing friendly to business. The lawsuits speak to incredible frustration 
and anger, even desperation. If the cities had negotiated clawbacks with 
the companies, it’s unlikely that there would have been any lawsuits. 
The companies’ obligations would have been spelled out in black and 
white—just like any private-sector contract—and there would likely 
never have been a dispute. Clear obligations on both sides of the table 
and no litigation: isn’t that a good business climate?
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REFoRM 4: JoB qUALITy STANDARDS
Why give a company a subsidy and then allow it to pay a pov-
erty wage? Subsidizing low-wage jobs only means taxpayers get stuck 
with even higher, hidden costs—in the form of Food Stamps, Medicaid, 
Earned Income Tax Credit, and housing assistance. Thanks to the liv-
ing wage movement—and to good old common sense—this reform is 
already taking root. As of our last updated survey, at least 43 states, 41 
cities, and 5 counties now attach wage and/or health care requirements 
to economic development incentives (Purinton 2003).
I hasten to add that while these numbers have risen sharply since I 
began surveying for them in 1989, we still have a long way to go. Most 
jurisdictions still only apply these rules to one program (we found a 
total of 165, including 107 state rules) but if the 50 states have an aver-
age of 30 or more subsidies each, or a total of at least 1,500, that means 
about 93 percent of state subsidies still allow companies to pay as little 
as that Dairy Queen in Caledonia, Minnesota.
REFoRM 5: UNIFIED DEvELoPMENT BUDGETS
About 35 states publish what is called a tax expenditure budget. 
That is, they provide the legislature with a report that says the state 
lost X dollars in revenue to A, B, and C tax credits. But most of these 
reports are incomplete or unreliable. Incredibly, there is no standard-
ized national set of accounting rules or guidelines for the states to track 
these expenses. (A group called the Government Finance Officers As-
sociation, which is the largest professional association of state and local 
treasurers and comptrollers, formed a committee to study the issue of 
subsidies in the late 1980s, but its work never went anywhere. The Gov-
ernment Accounting Standards Board, which sets guidelines for how 
governments should keep their books, has no firm rules telling states 
how to account for tax expenditures.)
This is a big issue because tax expenditures for economic develop-
ment (i.e., companies claiming corporate income tax credits or sales or 
utility tax exemptions that remain undisclosed) often dwarf other forms 
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of spending such as grants that do show up clearly in budgets because 
they require appropriations. It’s no exaggeration to call appropriations 
the top of the iceberg and tax expenditures the bottom. So most state 
legislatures are flying in the dark when it comes to the big picture. They 
don’t know how big the bottom of the iceberg is, much less what they 
are getting for it. 
The solution is a unified development budget, as advocated for by 
groups in Texas, California, North Carolina, and Illinois. A unified de-
velopment budget provides legislators with a comprehensive inventory 
of all forms of spending for economic development, including all the 
tax breaks as well as all the appropriations. Illinois enacted a unified 
development budget requirement as part of its disclosure law in 2003, 
but the first such budget issued by the state was very incomplete. In 
other states, research groups have cobbled together their own versions, 
a tedious exercise requiring a lot of budget sleuthing. 
Although there is not yet much experience with this safeguard, the 
idea is sound. Give taxpayers and lawmakers a document that puts the 
whole iceberg on the table every year or two. A document that treats tax 
breaks no differently than appropriations, that portrays them both cor-
rectly as simply different forms of the same thing: state spending. And 
then let people decide if they have the right balance. Chances are, with 
an accurate mapping of the whole iceberg, more people will turn their 
attention to the previously hidden bottom part, the secretive tax breaks, 
where most of the money is. Especially in times of budget deficits and 
fiscal strain, there is a better chance that legislators will look at both the 
top and the bottom as they seek to balance their budgets.
REFoRM 6: SCHooL BoARD INPUT oN ABATEMENTS  
AND TIF
As Good Jobs First documented in 2003, only two states effectively 
shield school funding from revenue losses caused by property tax abate-
ments and revenue diversions caused by tax increment financing (TIF). 
A few states give school boards limited input, but the great majority 
give school boards no say in the process (Good Jobs First 2003). It’s a 
big issue for school finance; although local revenue sources for schools 
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are less important than they used to be, as states play a greater role, 
property taxes remain the largest single source of funding for K-12, and 
in some states, they still account for more than half. But with 43 states 
allowing abatements and 48 using TIF, the threat to school funding is 
present in every state. 
It’s crazy public policy when you think about it: voters elect mem-
bers of the school board and expect them to meet their obligation to 
educate the kids. But then along comes a city council or a county board 
doling out abatements or TIF, eating the school board’s lunch. Call it an 
inter-governmental free lunch. Can you imagine the opposite happen-
ing: school boards unilaterally grabbing chunks of the budget for police 
and fire services? 
Protecting education funding matters doubly for economic devel-
opment. Good schools are a key amenity that help cities attract and re-
tain good employers, especially those that require highly skilled (read: 
well-paid) workers. And with the baby boom generation approaching 
retirement, the growth rate of the U.S. labor force is plummeting, sug-
gesting that we may face chronic skilled labor shortages. For both these 
reasons, the states and regions with good schools will be the economic 
development winners of the twenty-first century.
School boards should have a full voting seat on any board that abates 
or diverts property tax revenue away from schools. And school boards 
should have veto power over that portion of property tax that would be 
lost to the schools in each specific abatement or TIF deal. 
REfoRM 7: A fEDERAl “CARRoT” AgAInST JoB PIRACy
The federal government often uses the power of its purse as a “car-
rot” to entice the states to reform their programs. A fraction of federal 
highway funding was held back from states until they raised their legal 
drinking age to 21. The No Child Left Behind Act uses federal funds to 
encourage school reform (though many doubt its effectiveness). 
There is no reason the same idea could not apply to economic de-
velopment. Ten percent of a state’s money from the U.S. Departments 
of Commerce and Labor could be held back until a state adopted cer-
tain reforms. Just a few strategic ones would suffice: a certification by 
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the governor that the state will not use taxpayer dollars to pirate jobs 
from another state, and adoption of disclosure and a unified develop-
ment budget.
REFoRM 8: PRoPERLy DEFINE SITE LoCATIoN 
CoNSULTANTS AS LoBByISTS
Miriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines lobbying as “to at-
tempt or influence or sway (as a public official) towards a desired ac-
tion.” That sure sounds like the work of a site location consultant to me, 
since the deals they orchestrate routinely involve the passage of local 
ordinances for property tax abatements, industrial revenue bonds and/or 
zoning, and bigger deals sometimes involve state legislation as well. 
Site location consultants work both sides of the street; that is, they 
work for companies looking for places and places looking for com-
panies. It is an apparent conflict of interest that allows them to profit 
by controlling the key information about a deal. It’s like a trial lawyer 
who represents children who got cancer from a nearby chemical plant 
also working for the chemical company. Or better yet, like a blackjack 
dealer who knows what your down card is. 
Somehow, site location consultants have come to occupy a space 
where they defy norms about professional ethics and the proper repre-
sentation of opposing parties. Let’s be clear: there are opposing interests 
at play here. Companies want to pick the public pocket for every dime 
they can get, and public officials (or at least most of them) are trying 
to land the deal while spending as little as possible. But the bargaining 
table is sloped sharply because the site location consultant controls all 
of the information between the company and the sites competing for 
the deal. And in some cases, the site location consultant has a monetary 
self-interest in upping the ante of subsidies because he is working on 
commission of up to 30 percent of the value of those subsidies. 
To help remedy this, states ought to legally classify site location con-
sultants as lobbyists. In many states, that would require them to disclose 
at least a little about their activities. More importantly, it would block 
them from receiving success fees (read: commissions) and thereby re-
move their most outrageous incentive to fuel the candy-store arms race.
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The long-term objective here is to split the profession into two. 
Site location consulting ought to consist of fish and fowl, i.e., consul-
tants who work for companies and others who work for cities, counties, 
and states. There should be a robust, adversarial process in which the 
taxpayers benefit from a side of the profession that specializes in ag-
gressive bargaining, professional cost-benefit analysis, and cold market 
judgments about corporate behavior. 
REFoRM 9: PRoMoTE SMART GRoWTH AND CURTAIL 
ThE “EConoMIC WAR AMong ThE SuBuRBS”
In some respects, the “war among the states” alarm is misleading. 
Far more common than state versus state competitions for deals like 
the Boeing 7E7 are deals in which two or three jurisdictions within 
the same metro area compete for a deal. Indeed, when we looked at 29 
subsidized corporate relocations in the Twin Cities metro area, only one 
company had even considered locating just across the state line in Wis-
consin. Most relocating companies cannot afford to move to another 
state; they want to retain their workforces, and stay close to their cus-
tomers and suppliers. They simply need more space or a better location 
within the same metro area. 
The state versus state competitions tend to be more high-profile, 
such as those involving new auto assembly plants, so many people are 
unaware that intraregional competition is far more common. Only four 
states—Connecticut, Ohio, Minnesota, and Maine—collect informa-
tion about subsidized relocations as part of their disclosure systems, 
and none has ever analyzed the data. To their credit, local development 
officials in some regions, by informal arrangements, seek to deter the 
use of subsidies to pay for relocations within their areas. 
States should deny subsidies altogether to retail deals (except in 
truly depressed inner-city markets that are demonstrably underserved, 
such as those that lack basic retail items such as groceries, medications, 
and clothes). Retail is not economic development; it is what happens 
when people have disposable income. (It has lousy upstream ripple ef-
fects—all those goods from China—and paltry downstream ripple ef-
fects, since retail jobs are overwhelmingly part time, low wage, and 
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without health care.) And big-box retail, which has become so expert 
at mongering subsidies, undermines existing retailers and is a primary 
cause of abandonment of urban core areas and the loss of open space at 
the suburban fringe.
States should also repeal point-of-sale sales tax collection rules. 
That is, they should not allow the city where a retail sale occurs to 
collect any share of the tax. Allowing one suburb to build a mall that 
pirates sales tax revenue from the core city and dozens of surrounding 
suburbs simply undermines the tax base of older areas. And it creates a 
perverse incentive for another suburb to build yet another mall further 
out, and so the leap-frog sprawl continues. For the same reason, those 
states that allow sales tax to be “TIFed” should repeal it; that just puts 
the perverse incentive on steroids. In today’s sprawling metro areas, 
people live in one jurisdiction, work in another, and shop in a few oth-
ers. Sales tax revenues ought to be shared statewide and regionally, 
reflecting that reality. 
In metro areas, states should explicitly link economic development 
to public transportation, so that in order to get a subsidy, the project must 
be accessible by transit (i.e., within a quarter of a mile of a regularly 
served transit stop). That would reduce companies’ abilities to whipsaw 
suburbs against each other (by taking exclusionary suburbs out of the 
race), steer more jobs onto the transit system, help low-income families 
gain access to more jobs, give more commuters a choice about how to 
get to work, and improve air quality. In a 50-state survey, we found that 
not a single state effectively coordinates any of its subsidy programs 
with public transit, even though the average state now has more than 30 
subsidies. It is a huge wasted opportunity for transportation dollars to 
leverage smart growth, since states spend five times more on economic 
development than on public transportation (Khan 2003). In 2006, the 
Illinois legislature passed a “location efficient incentives” bill, which 
the governor signed into law. Illinois thus became the first state to in-
tentionally make such a link, giving a slightly larger state tax credit to 
deals located close to transit and/or affordable housing. 
Finally, states should deny development subsidies (as Maryland 
does under its Smart Growth Act) to any kind of deal that is not located 
in an area that already has infrastructure. Making developers bear the 
full infrastructure cost of sprawling fringe development helps tip the 
scales in favor of urban reinvestment. If land use policies bring jobs and 
Markusen.indb   195 2/27/2007   12:40:14 PM
196   LeRoy
tax bases back to older areas, the need for subsidies to revitalize those 
areas will diminish.
ACCounTABIlITy AnD ThE “BuSInESS ClIMATE”
I can hear the business lobbyists howling already. “This is inva-
sion of taxpayer privacy. This will threaten small businesses. This will 
poison the business climate,” they’re crying. Well, to them, I say three 
things.
First, there is no evidence that any of the 12 states cited here have 
harmed their business climates by having disclosure. (Nor, for that mat-
ter, is there evidence that any state has hurt its business climate with any 
other kind of reform I have cited, such as wage rules or money-back 
guarantee clawbacks.) As the person who has been out there publicizing 
these safeguards for 12 years, I think I would have been presented with 
such evidence if there was any, and I have not.
Second, nothing proposed here will invade anyone’s privacy or 
harm any small businesses. By disclosure, I am not talking about public 
release of any companies’ state income tax returns. I am not talking 
about seeing a company’s profits or losses, nor am I talking about dis-
closure of how much most companies paid in state income tax. But I 
do think that as a taxpayer, I ought to have the right to see how much 
a company claimed on a tax credit. Because when a company claims a 
credit and pays less income tax, it is the same thing as if the government 
wrote a check to the company for some other economic development 
purpose, like a training grant. When a company claims an income tax 
credit, it means the company is paying less for public services and I 
have to pay more. I want to know how much more.
Third, lots of other kinds of tax breaks and subsidies are already pub-
lic information. If a company gets a property tax abatement, I can see 
the details at the county tax assessor’s office. If a company got a training 
grant, I can get that file at the Workforce Investment Board. If a company 
got a low-interest industrial revenue bond, I can go the county industrial 
development authority and get that information. Why should income tax 
credits be treated any differently? They were sold to us as “jobs, jobs, 
jobs,” so we should be able to see how much those jobs are costing. 
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Notes
A more detailed version of the remedies discussed here was published in LeRoy (2005).
 1.  In May 2006, in DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the 
plaintiffs lacked standing in federal court to contest a state investment tax credit 
that a lower court had ruled unconstitutional. In a separate ruling, the Supreme 
Court upheld a ruling by the same lower court that a property tax abatement was 
constitutional.
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